Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 18-juil.-06, à 18:42, 1Z a écrit :
and I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental
quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett
...).
Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ?
matter is
Le 18-juil.-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
It is far from obvious that a simulation even
contains 1stP POV's.
I agree with you. That is why I postulate comp to begin with.
In any case
that doesn't effect the logic: simulations
*might* be detectable, so they are not necessarily
Bruno Marchal wrote:
No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical
truth.
No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be
found in maths than any substantiallity.
But there is no more any phenomenality to be found in physics,
Then we need
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
(whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
thesis, that cognition is
Le 18-juil.-06, à 12:30, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux: Because if you were in a simulation and you have
managed to get out of it,
how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the
material
world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is
the real
Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit :
A computer simulation is obviously computable.
Not necessarily from the first person povs.
The word emerge is often used to hide magic.
I agree with you. Often, but not necessarily always.
What actually exists cannot emerge from mere truths.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit :
A computer simulation is obviously computable.
Not necessarily from the first person povs.
It is far from obvious that a simulation even
contains 1stP POV's. In any case
that doesn't effect the logic: simulations
*might* be
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :
I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
justification.
So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
Now my problem is that a term like material is very vague in physics,
Huh ? Physics
Bruno and 1Z:
both of you write extraordinary wise remarks in
approx. 3-4 times as many words than I can attentively
folloow.
However - with mostly agreeing with the positions of
BOTH OF YOU - I may remark (hopefully in less words??)
*
I consider the epistemic development of our experience
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is
not
in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are
equally
likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work.
No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I
said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the
relative probability of different
1Z wrote:
Erratum:
http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/diagrams/time_growing.jpg
http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/met_time2.html
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Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :
I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
justification.
So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
Now my problem is that a term like material is very vague in physics,
and I would say experimentally vague since
Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit :
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
See my work and this list for some path toward it.
To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
and vice-versa.
Le 12-juil.-06, à 02:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
BM (Bruno):
For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for
granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
knocking a table when
Le 12-juil.-06, à 03:53, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Well, I don't think the world obeys mathematical laws because it is
causally
interacting with platonic forms, any more than I think the world obeys
the
law of noncontradiction because it is causally interacting with
platonic
laws of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit :
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
See my work and this list for some path toward it.
To have material existence is to have non-zero
Hi,
1Z wrote:
I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
demostrated
otherwise.
This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that
Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary
reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
1Z wrote:
I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
demostrated
otherwise.
This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that
Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary
reality does not
Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
(whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
thesis, that cognition is computation).
If
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Deutsch uses this to explain objectivity, and argues, with such a
criteria due to Johnson, that math is objective. Perhaps some
materialist use this to define matter but then there need to define
kicking back, and thus interaction, etc.
Johnson' demonstration was
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
But it is a straw man to say everything-theories makes the
prediction
that
Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones,
because in
fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just
said
Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :
It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.
How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
First nobody
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :
It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.
How could a substantial world be' a modest
1Z wrote:
The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.
It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to
the view that every possible world or observer-moment
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty) explanation.
Today, physician
This discussion is very interesting to me. Not addressing anyone in
particular, I only have time to make a quick comment, and hope that I
can get time for later:
In my reading about Plato, it seems that Plato didn't have the answers
either. It might be helpful to remember that Plato not only
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.
It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to
the view that every
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty)
IZ wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.
It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe
to
Hi,
Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp,
giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.
Brains are material. Computers are material.
I think you
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence
is
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp,
giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.
Brains are material.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty)
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
no-once can say that
Brent Meeker wrote:
For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for
granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists.
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:15, Lennart Nilsson a écrit :
I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the
numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our
observations.
But why should we infer a substantial world? Substantial or primary
I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the
numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our observations.
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