Yup it seems we do agree. I agree with most of what you said. And
with Bruno's comments we have some consensus in this thread. So to
borrow a phrase from you: 'Yes indeedy' :D
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[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I don't totally agree. I think qualia have a dual-aspect: they are
> *both* Ontological (the fabric of reality itself) *and* Epistemological
> (the means through which reality is experienced).
But I think we *do* agree - I would put it precisely as you have above.
>
David Nyman wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > Whoa dude. That is some heavy-duty 'reality theory' speak ;)
>
> Yes indeedy. But my point is that qualia are an ontological category,
> not an epistemological one. This is crucial, because it entails that we
> can't *know* qualia, we can only
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Whoa dude. That is some heavy-duty 'reality theory' speak ;)
Yes indeedy. But my point is that qualia are an ontological category,
not an epistemological one. This is crucial, because it entails that we
can't *know* qualia, we can only instantiate them - *be* them. Wh
Le 19-sept.-06, à 11:50, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> Interesting what you said about modal and category theory. I don't
> know much about category theory and I'd be interested to know how you
> would define it. So: what is category theory? As far as I can make
> out it's a highly advance
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> So I think integrated patches of Knowledge-Information (logical-depth
> complexity) are the 'islands' in the 'sea' of raw Information (Shannon
> or statistical type complexity). And I think there's a third kind of
> information associated with Qualia which isn't unders
David Nyman wrote:
>
> I agree that qualia are ontological, rather than epistemological. I
> 'experience blue' in virtue of 'being blue' - i.e. myself-as-perceiver,
> in specific self-relation with myself-as-percept = being blue (or
> rather, blue in parts). This qualitative ontological base is
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I think that conscious experience (Qualia) is ultimately knowledge
> reflecting on itself, or, to be more precise, I think Qualia are
> *mathematics modelling itself* - a sort of 'internal model of
> mathematics'. To be even more precise, I think Qualia are symbols
> r
Interesting what you said about modal and category theory. I don't
know much about category theory and I'd be interested to know how you
would define it. So: what is category theory? As far as I can make
out it's a highly advanced branch of algebra concerned with the
classification of mathemat
Le 13-sept.-06, à 09:19, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Oh hurrah, then there is finally light at the end of the philosophic
> tunnel for me :D Trying to learn this stuff is just a matter of
> becoming a baby again... the baby just has to keep painfullly throwing
> himself at the stuff and afte
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> With those remarks what you say makes sense for me,
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Oh hurrah, then there is finally light at the end of the philosophic
tunnel for me :D Trying to learn this stuff is just a matter of
becoming a baby again... the baby
Le 08-sept.-06, à 05:42, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> It must consist of the 'movement' of mathematical forms through
> state space. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that
> mathematical truth is not fixed, but can vary with time - because
> that's exactly what 'the movement
I shall quickly try to explain in a bit more detail my idea for what
Qualia (phenomal accepts of conscious experiences) are again - Because
it's clear that no-one yet understands what I was going on about in
my last post ;)
The important point is that you first accept the existence of some sort
>But is it true that different brains can implement the same algorithm? It
>seems it
is only true because we abstract a certain algorithm from it's various
representation, e.g. as written on paper. Every actual realization, in
brains or
computer or on paper is actually slightly different at a m
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
...
> Different levels of Causality
>
> Brain processes are enacting things which are *mathematical* in nature
> - 'algorithms' (See 'Functionalism').Mathematical entities are
> abstracted patterns. But abstracted patterns themselves (like
> 'algorithms') don't exist
An update to some of my earlier horribly crude metaphysics ideas. This
latest version of my theory of metaphysics is at last *starting* to
converge on an academic quality philosophy paper. I think it's OK to
post so long as I keep all postings under 4 000 words or so.
I make very clear my alter
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