On 6/27/05, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Sorry for going on about this, but I'm still trying to understand: what
> possible difference could it make to anyone - you or your copy - if you
> suddenly disintegrated and were replaced a microsecond later with an exact
> copy?
To und
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
> >I do not equate my identity with the matter that composes my body at
all.
> >I would say that my personal identity cannot be defined in a
> >communicable way, in the way I see it. I believe there is something
> >fundamental about consciousness.
>
> If you don't equate
Le 24-juin-05, à 20:40, Eugen Leitl a écrit :
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 06:52:11PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why don't we terminate this pointless thread, until we can actually
make numerical
models of sufficiently complex animals and people, so the question
completely
renders itself irreleva
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 06:52:11PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >Why don't we terminate this pointless thread, until we can actually
> >make numerical
> >models of sufficiently complex animals and people, so the question
> >completely
> >renders itself irrelevant?
>
> You answer like if by mak
Le 24-juin-05, à 12:27, Eugen Leitl a écrit :
Why don't we terminate this pointless thread, until we can actually
make numerical
models of sufficiently complex animals and people, so the question
completely
renders itself irrelevant?
You answer like if by making things more precise, automat
rmiller wrote:
Jesse wrote
In reality the molecules in your brain are constantly being recycled--if
you believe that the changes that make up memories happen at the synapses,
the article at http://www.sci-con.org/articles/20040601.html suggests all
the molecules at the synapses are replac
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
> If I were to be consistent, I
> would have to wonder whether the person I was a few months ago was
"really
> me", because the atoms comprising my body today are probably completely
> different. In fact, in *every respect* the person I was a few months ago
> differs mor
Eric Cavalcanti writes:
I do not equate my identity with the matter that composes my body at all.
I would say that my personal identity cannot be defined in a
communicable way, in the way I see it. I believe there is something
fundamental about consciousness.
I guess that my position could be m
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 11:23:33AM +1000, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
> Furthermore, there is always some way to tell the difference between the
> copy and the original, in principle, even if that infomation is not
> epistemologically
> available to the subjects themselves. If the original flew to New
Jesse wrote
In reality the molecules in your brain are constantly being recycled--if
you believe that the changes that make up memories happen at the synapses,
the article at http://www.sci-con.org/articles/20040601.html suggests all
the molecules at the synapses are replaced in only 24 hou
> >I know that sounds somewhat solipsist in the end, but I can't believe
> >that merely scanning me can affect my future. And I would like to
> >be convinced otherwise, because I don't like solipsism.
>
> What do you mean, "the only way I could be convinced otherwise is by doing
> the test"? You a
Eric Cavalcanti writes:
I believe that the solution is not 3-rd person communicable. I believe that
if
I press the button 100 times, I'll never experience leaving the room, but
there will be 100 copies of me claiming otherwise. That is because I
believe
that my 1-st person probability (in the
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
In fact, I believe that in your example "Eric the copy" would probably
agree
that he is a copy after seing evidence of that, and would live with his
life
without claiming the rights of the original. That would make him very
unhappy
and confused, of course, and then "Eric
On 6/23/05, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Eric Cavalcanti writes:
> >I don't think it is that good an analogy for the following reason:
> >I don't believe that pushing a button to create a copy of me in
> >New York will increase my expectation of experiencing New York,
> >while
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> That is the basic idea behind these thought experiments with copies: as
a
> more easily understood analogy for what happens in the
multiverse/plenitude.
I don't agree, and in fact I think the use of copies as an analog for
what happens in the
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> That is the basic idea behind these thought experiments with copies: as a
> more easily understood analogy for what happens in the multiverse/plenitude.
I don't agree, and in fact I think the use of copies as an analog for
what happens in the multiverse is fundamenta
Tom Caylor writes:
quote--
The flip side of the coin is that apparently the probability of having a
next OM is 100% ("everything exists"). In this theory, no matter what God
does with 10^100 copies, there are 10^100^n other identical next OMs out
there to replace them. It seems like what I'v
Stathis wrote:>To summarise my position, it is this: the measure of an observer moment is relevant when a given observer is contemplating what will happen next... Now, minimising acronym use, could you explain what your understanding is of how measure changes with number of copies of an OM which
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Hi Jesse,
I was still trying to put some sort of reply together to your last post,
but I think your water analogy is making me more rather than less confused
as to your actual position on these issues, which is obviously something
you have thought deeply about. Wit
Le 18-juin-05, à 13:09, Eric Cavalcanti a écrit :
But with comp, then yes, I agree that the memory of the newly created
copies is just as "real" as any other memory.
ok
Or maybe not quite. Because
we cannot find any evidence that we were created 10 minutes ago. That
hypothesis is indistingu
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Do you accept the way I have presented the thought experiment above, i.e.
> that when God creates or destroys 10^100 copies the subject notices
> absolutely nothing other than the light changing colour, or do you think he
> would notice some other difference? If so,
Just to clarify my view on copies, if they start to diverge from me the
moment they are created, then they aren't me and I don't care about them in
a *selfish* way. That is, if a copy experiences a pain, I don't experience
that pain, which I think is as good a test as any to distinguish self f
... or should I say "spooky"?
Tom Caylor
Stathis wrote:
> ...Once the difficulty of creating an AI was overcome, it would be a
trivial matter to copy the program to another machine (or as a separate process
on the same machine) and give it the same inputs.
OK this is weird. Every time I get an email from Stathis, I actually
get
Hi Jesse,
I was still trying to put some sort of reply together to your last post, but
I think your water analogy is making me more rather than less confused as to
your actual position on these issues, which is obviously something you have
thought deeply about. With the puzzle in this thread,
Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 23:31, Quentin Anciaux a écrit:
Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 16:12, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> One state consists of you alone in your room. The other state
> consists of 10^100 exact copies of you, their minds perfectly
synchronised
> with your mind, each copy isolated from
Le 17-juin-05, à 07:47, Eric Cavalcanti a écrit :
if you believe God's story, the most likely is that
you have just been created after the last switch, and you have a false
memory of being there for a while.
I don't see why you call that memory "false". Suppose you begin to play
chess with t
On Fri, Jun 17, 2005 at 11:02:01AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
> Applying the SSA, the colour of the light when you first find yourself
> in the room is more likely to be the high measure state than the low
> measure state. (You didn't state what that colour was, but hopefully
> the fictional pr
On 6/17/05, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> You find yourself in a locked room with no windows, and no memory of how you
> got there.
> (...) a light (...) alternates between red and green every 10 minutes.
(...)
> Every 10 minutes, the system alternates between two states. One
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I agree you have given the correct answer to my puzzle: from a first
person perspective, identical mental states are the same mental state, and
at any point there is a 50-50 chance that you are either one of the 10^100
group or on your own. But not everyone on this
Tom Caylor wrote:
Stathis wrote:
> You find yourself in a locked room with no windows, and no memory of how
you got there
> What's wrong with the reasoning here?
This is also in response to your explanation to me of copying etc. in your
last post to "Many pasts?..."
I think there is too
Applying the SSA, the colour of the light when you first find yourself
in the room is more likely to be the high measure state than the low
measure state. (You didn't state what that colour was, but hopefully
the fictional prisoner can remember it).
With the RSSA, subsequent states tell you no inf
Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 16:12, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> One state consists of you alone in your room. The other state
> consists of 10^100 exact copies of you, their minds perfectly synchronised
> with your mind, each copy isolated from all the others in a room just like
> yours. Whenever the
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> You find yourself in a locked room with no windows, and no memory of how you
> got there. The room is sparsely furnished: a chair, a desk, pen and paper,
> and in one corner a light. The light is currently red, but in the time you
> have been in the room you have ob
Stathis wrote:
> You find yourself in a locked room with no windows, and no memory of how you got there
> What's wrong with the reasoning here?
This is also in response to your explanation to me of copying etc. in your last post to "Many pasts?..."
I think there is too much we don't know
At 09:12 AM 6/16/2005, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You find yourself in a locked room with no windows, and no memory of how
you got there. \
(snip)
The other state consists of 10^100 exact copies of you, their minds
perfectly synchronised with your mind, each copy isolated from all the
othe
At 09:12 AM 6/16/2005, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You find yourself in a locked room with no windows, and no memory of how
you got there. The room is sparsely furnished: a chair, a desk, pen and
paper, and in one corner a light.
RM: You've just described me at work in my office.
The light is
You find yourself in a locked room with no windows, and no memory of how you
got there. The room is sparsely furnished: a chair, a desk, pen and paper,
and in one corner a light. The light is currently red, but in the time you
have been in the room you have observed that it alternates between
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