On Feb 2, 7:07 am, Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Wed, 1/27/10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > Jack is talking about copies in the common sense of initially physically
> > identical beings who however occupy different places in the same spacetime
> > and hence have different viewpoints and experience
On 2 February 2010 18:07, Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Wed, 1/27/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> if there were a million copies of me in lockstep and all but one were
>> destroyed, then each of the million copies would feel that they had
>> continuity of consciousness with the remaining one,
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Brent Meeker wrote:
Jack is talking about copies in the common sense of initially physically
identical beings who however occupy different places in the same spacetime and
hence have different viewpoints and experiences.
No, that's incorrect.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Jack is talking about copies in the common sense of initially physically
> identical beings who however occupy different places in the same spacetime
> and hence have different viewpoints and experiences.
No, that's incorrect. I don't know where you g
Jack,
What you mentioned ending the existence of a suffering copy can be positive.
I am curious, would you consider ending any observer whose quality of life
was less than the average weighted (by number of copies) quality of life of
all observers everywhere? Consider this example:
http://en.wik
On 28 January 2010 05:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
> If I understand you correctly, your discussion of "copies" really refers to
> copies that exist in different identical worlds, e.g. like different copies
> of the same AI running in identical virtual environments, so that they can
> run "in lockstep
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/27 Jack Mallah :
See above. That would be a measure-conserving process, so it would be OK.
I would be upset at the prospect of someone killing me even if they
filled the world with angelic beings by way of atonement, because it
would not feel as if an
2010/1/27 Jack Mallah :
> See above. That would be a measure-conserving process, so it would be OK.
I would be upset at the prospect of someone killing me even if they
filled the world with angelic beings by way of atonement, because it
would not feel as if any of them were me. On the other hand,
Le 26-janv.-10, à 22:29, Jack Mallah a écrit :
--- On Tue, 1/26/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:16, Jack Mallah wrote:
Killing one man is not OK just because he has a brother.
In our context, the 'brother' has the same consciousness.
The "brother" most certainly does not h
Thank you Jack for your response.
>That one that is killed doesn't feel anything after he is killed. The one
>that lives experiences whatever he would have experienced anyway. There is NO
>TRANSFER of consciousness. Killing a guy (assuming he is not an evil guy or
>in great pain) and not cre
--- On Tue, 1/26/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:16, Jack Mallah wrote:
> > Killing one man is not OK just because he has a brother.
>
> In our context, the 'brother' has the same consciousness.
The "brother" most certainly does not have "the same" consciousness. If he did,
th
On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:16, Jack Mallah wrote:
Killing one man is not OK just because he has a brother.
In our context, the 'brother' has the same consciousness. From this I
conclude you would say "no" to the doctor. All right? The doctor
certainly "kill a 'brother' ".
Bruno Marchal
ht
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