On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Casey Dahlin wrote:
On 11/18/2009 02:10 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlin cdah...@redhat.com:
On 11/18/2009 01:22 PM, James Antill wrote:
3. Are there any attacks due to disk space used? Eg. If /var is
Seth Vidal wrote:
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, nodata wrote:
-sv
I do if it's in the default DVD install, or was pulled in in an
upgrade. I've never intentionally installed it, and yes I do. Never
imagined it would be a problem. I'll remove it.
Maybe you and I have a different concept of
Hi,
the file Fedora-12-i386-CHECKSUM which is on the mirrors and included in
the torrents says:
Hash: SHA1
f0ad929cd259957e160ea442eb80986b5f01daaffdbcc7e5a1840a666c4447c7
*Fedora-12-i386-DVD.iso
But the truth is that it is SHA256. (I downloaded the DVD twice because
of this...) So maybe
2009/11/18 Andrew Haley a...@redhat.com:
Is there some way to disable PackageKit but keep setroubleshoot?
Just set all the policykit answers to no. You'll find more than just
setroubleshoot breaks if you do this.
Richard.
--
fedora-devel-list mailing list
fedora-devel-list@redhat.com
On 11/18/09 12:03, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
2009/11/18 Simo Sorcesso...@redhat.com:
If I have physical access to your machine, I'll own it. I may have to
use tools to get to the HDD, but it's only a question of time and
dedication.
*you* are not one of my users, and this has nothing to do
Am 2009-11-18 20:20, schrieb Richard Hughes:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlincdah...@redhat.com:
By the admin's first opportunity to change the settings the box could already
be rooted.
I'm not sure how you can root a computer from installing signed
content by a user that already has physical access
2009/11/18 Bob Arendt r...@rincon.com:
I haven't tried .. but does this this also include the capability for
my grade-school child to *remove* software using their account?
Like gcc? glibc? gdm? All fun activities ...
No, removing is a different role and requires a different
authentication.
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Richard Hughes wrote:
2009/11/18 Andrew Haley a...@redhat.com:
Is there some way to disable PackageKit but keep setroubleshoot?
Just set all the policykit answers to no. You'll find more than just
setroubleshoot breaks if you do this.
How do you do this? Set the
2009/11/18 nodata l...@nodata.co.uk:
You install software with a known buffer overflow before it is fixed and
exploit it. More software = more chances to exploit. Bingo!
Why would the additional package start extra services? I thought there
were guidelines about that. Anyway, if the user has
On 11/18/2009 01:30 PM, Robert Locke wrote:
Picture Windows Server for a moment. Now picture that admin coming over
to administer a new Linux server. What's he gonna install? Click Next
repeatedly.
I'd like to think that our policy toward that user is one of education rather
than
2009/11/18 nodata l...@nodata.co.uk:
Am 2009-11-18 20:20, schrieb Richard Hughes:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlincdah...@redhat.com:
By the admin's first opportunity to change the settings the box could
already be rooted.
I'm not sure how you can root a computer from installing signed
content by
Once upon a time, Colin Walters walt...@verbum.org said:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 1:48 PM, Chris Adams cmad...@hiwaay.net wrote:
It seems the latest way of doing this is via PolicyKit. Â IMHO all
PolicyKit configuration should be secure by default,
secure is an meaningless term without
On 11/18/2009 01:19 PM, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
I may be wrong, but I understand that this behaviour of PackageKit
only applies to users with direct console access (i.e. not remote
shells). So, only users that are logged in via GDM or TTY would be
able to perform such tasks.
That's a
On 11/19/2009 12:54 AM, Stefan Grosse wrote:
Hi,
the file Fedora-12-i386-CHECKSUM which is on the mirrors and included in
the torrents says:
Hash: SHA1
f0ad929cd259957e160ea442eb80986b5f01daaffdbcc7e5a1840a666c4447c7
*Fedora-12-i386-DVD.iso
But the truth is that it is SHA256. (I
On 11/18/2009 02:32 PM, Casey Dahlin wrote:
On 11/18/2009 01:19 PM, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
I may be wrong, but I understand that this behaviour of PackageKit
only applies to users with direct console access (i.e. not remote
shells). So, only users that are logged in via GDM or TTY would
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 11:27, Rahul Sundaram sunda...@fedoraproject.orgwrote:
On 11/19/2009 12:54 AM, Stefan Grosse wrote:
Hi,
the file Fedora-12-i386-CHECKSUM which is on the mirrors and included in
the torrents says:
Hash: SHA1
On 11/18/2009 02:29 PM, Richard Hughes wrote:
2009/11/18 nodata l...@nodata.co.uk:
You install software with a known buffer overflow before it is fixed and
exploit it. More software = more chances to exploit. Bingo!
Why would the additional package start extra services? I thought there
were
On 11/19/2009 01:06 AM, darrell pfeifer wrote:
Perhaps it could be made more clear. I almost made the same double
download mistake.
Jesse Keating on fedora-test list indicated earlier that he will fix
this for Fedora 13. Not sure what could be done to clarify this. The
instructions are at
Am 2009-11-18 20:35, schrieb Matthew Garrett:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 07:42:51PM +0100, nodata wrote:
Err no. Admins trusts software he has chosen to install from the repo. I
definitely don't want a user configuring an ftp server or running
anything with a cronjob on a server I look after.
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 12:26 -0700, Bob Arendt wrote:
I haven't tried .. but does this this also include the capability for
my grade-school child to *remove* software using their account?
Like gcc? glibc? gdm? All fun activities ...
No thank-deity at least remove seem not to be permitted
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlin cdah...@redhat.com:
I may be wrong, but I understand that this behaviour of PackageKit
only applies to users with direct console access (i.e. not remote
shells). So, only users that are logged in via GDM or TTY would be
able to perform such tasks.
That's a silly
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 14:29 -0500, Seth Vidal wrote:
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Richard Hughes wrote:
2009/11/18 Andrew Haley a...@redhat.com:
Is there some way to disable PackageKit but keep setroubleshoot?
Just set all the policykit answers to no. You'll find more than just
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 19:20:42 +,
Richard Hughes hughsi...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlin cdah...@redhat.com:
By the admin's first opportunity to change the settings the box could
already be rooted.
I'm not sure how you can root a computer from installing signed
content
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 20:34 +0100, nodata wrote:
If the servers are in locked racks and you require a reboot to get
access to a grub prompt which is not password protected, then the outage
would trip the monitoring system.
The server is in a locked rack, but the console access to the
On 11/18/2009 02:44 PM, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlin cdah...@redhat.com:
I may be wrong, but I understand that this behaviour of PackageKit
only applies to users with direct console access (i.e. not remote
shells). So, only users that are logged in via GDM or TTY would
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 13:31:49 -0600,
Chris Adams cmad...@hiwaay.net wrote:
(what is pulse/proximity-helper? why is nspluginwrapper/plugin-config
setuid root?)
I already filed a bug (491543) about that. It does bad things, but the
maintainer doesn't seem to want to change it.
Firefox
On Thu, 2009-11-19 at 00:34 +0530, Rahul Sundaram wrote:
On 11/19/2009 12:31 AM, nodata wrote:
Rahul, it seems to be that the person who made this change (fesco
approved?) is the one who should answer why the change is a good thing,
rather than oh I changed it, now tell me why it's bad.
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 14:44:20 -0500,
Konstantin Ryabitsev i...@fedoraproject.org wrote:
Okay, so someone managed to get local shell via firefox. How does
installing trusted packages further their nefarious purposes?
There are nuances to trust. Just because you trust a repository to not
On 11/19/2009 01:26 AM, David Zeuthen wrote:
On Thu, 2009-11-19 at 00:34 +0530, Rahul Sundaram wrote:
On 11/19/2009 12:31 AM, nodata wrote:
Rahul, it seems to be that the person who made this change (fesco
approved?) is the one who should answer why the change is a good thing,
rather than oh
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 11:18:28PM +0530, Rahul Sundaram wrote:
On 11/18/2009 11:19 PM, nodata wrote:
Thanks. I have changed the title to:
All users get to install software on a machine they do not have the
root password to
.. if the packages are signed and from a signed
Or even ..
They become a Fedora packager, they put a backdoor into a Fedora
package (which is very discrete and is only triggered when $hostname =
$targethost), and they install that.
Rich.
--
Richard Jones, Virtualization Group, Red Hat http://people.redhat.com/~rjones
New in Fedora 11:
On 11/18/2009 01:52 PM, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 19:50, schrieb Tony Nelson:
On 09-11-18 13:44:43, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 19:16, schrieb Bruno Wolff III:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 17:45:26 +,
Bastien Nocerabnoc...@redhat.com wrote:
Once we get the new user management stuff
Today we celebrate another successful Fedora release (F12), congratulations to
everyone.
Never one to sit still development has already begun on F13, and with it comes
a new bug triage work flow.
For bugs filed against F13(rawhide) and beyond the keyword Triaged will now
be used to indicate
Hi All,
Since Fedora 12 was released yesterday new CVS branches for F-10 will not be
allowed. http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/PackageMaintainers/Policy/EOL list the
policy in effect this means that F-10 is now in a maintenance only cycle, with
EOL fast approaching, the EOL date was set to
I received a couple of emails last night telling me that the NEEDINFO
flag for two bugs assigned to me were cleared. Great, I though,
finally I have the information I need to proceed on those bugs.
Only there is no new information. The flag was cleared by Bug Zapper
reminding the reporter that
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlin cdah...@redhat.com:
Because sudo doesn't use policykit? Because sudo gives you full root
access -- not just ability to install trusted software from trusted
repositories? Moreover, even sudo doesn't ask me again if I invoke it
within 5 minutes of using it (or however
(Thanks for a constructive discussion by the way!)
David, added you to CC for a question below:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 2:31 PM, Chris Adams cmad...@hiwaay.net wrote:
I would agree with that, but it's not trivial. Are we just scoping in
PackageKit here, or also consolehelper @console
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 1:07 PM, Jeff Spaleta jspal...@gmail.com wrote:
when you set the needinfo flag did you set it such that anyone could
clear it or did you specifically require that the original reporter
needed to reply in the bugzilla interface?
The needinfo flag will change state on
Am 2009-11-18 21:02, schrieb Peter Jones:
On 11/18/2009 01:52 PM, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 19:50, schrieb Tony Nelson:
On 09-11-18 13:44:43, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 19:16, schrieb Bruno Wolff III:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 17:45:26 +,
Bastien Nocerabnoc...@redhat.comwrote:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 3:20 PM, Jeff Spaleta jspal...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm not sure enough sysadmins understand PolicyKit enough to
confidently generate local policy edits. I think learning how to
implement site specific PolicyKit best practises by modifying unwanted
PackageKit's behavior
Am 2009-11-18 21:20, schrieb Jeff Spaleta:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 11:08 AM, Konstantin Ryabitsev
i...@fedoraproject.org wrote:
Yes, this is security trade-off -- and with valid arguments. Does it
make sense to have this as a default configuration for a
desktop-oriented distribution? Quite
2009/11/18 nodata l...@nodata.co.uk:
Am 2009-11-18 20:20, schrieb Richard Hughes:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlincdah...@redhat.com:
By the admin's first opportunity to change the settings the box could
already be rooted.
I'm not sure how you can root a computer from installing signed
content
Once upon a time, Dan Williams d...@redhat.com said:
But that's not right because those files aren't config files. Instead,
you drop local authority files in /var/lib/polkit-1/localauthority/
that override those permissions on a site-by-site basis for your
specific use-case, irregardless of
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 10:53 -0900, Jeff Spaleta wrote:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 10:45 AM, Dan Williams d...@redhat.com wrote:
But that's not right because those files aren't config files. Instead,
you drop local authority files in /var/lib/polkit-1/localauthority/
that override those
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 11:25 AM, Colin Walters walt...@verbum.org wrote:
Having Yet Another access control system in HAL was precisely the
reason PolicyKit was created, so administrators can have one place to
find this stuff across the OS.
Doesn't mean meathead sysadmins like me actually
Am 2009-11-18 20:50, schrieb Jesse Keating:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 20:34 +0100, nodata wrote:
If the servers are in locked racks and you require a reboot to get
access to a grub prompt which is not password protected, then the outage
would trip the monitoring system.
The server is in a locked
Am 2009-11-18 21:27, schrieb Seth Vidal:
2009/11/18 nodata l...@nodata.co.uk:
Am 2009-11-18 20:20, schrieb Richard Hughes:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlincdah...@redhat.com:
By the admin's first opportunity to change the settings the box could
already be rooted.
I'm not sure how you can root a
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 21:27, schrieb Seth Vidal:
2009/11/18 nodata l...@nodata.co.uk:
Am 2009-11-18 20:20, schrieb Richard Hughes:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlincdah...@redhat.com:
By the admin's first opportunity to change the settings the box could
already be
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 21:28 +0100, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 20:50, schrieb Jesse Keating:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 20:34 +0100, nodata wrote:
If the servers are in locked racks and you require a reboot to get
access to a grub prompt which is not password protected, then the outage
would
On 11/18/2009 03:24 PM, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 21:02, schrieb Peter Jones:
On 11/18/2009 01:52 PM, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 19:50, schrieb Tony Nelson:
On 09-11-18 13:44:43, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 19:16, schrieb Bruno Wolff III:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 17:45:26 +,
Am 2009-11-18 21:27, schrieb nodata:
Am 2009-11-18 21:20, schrieb Jeff Spaleta:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 11:08 AM, Konstantin Ryabitsev
i...@fedoraproject.org wrote:
Yes, this is security trade-off -- and with valid arguments. Does it
make sense to have this as a default configuration for a
Once upon a time, Colin Walters walt...@verbum.org said:
(Thanks for a constructive discussion by the way!)
No problem; I'm trying to understand and help things move forward. I
don't want to see another thing like SELinux or PulseAudio where it
becomes common knowledge that you should just
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 14:39 -0600, Chris Adams wrote:
What would be nice would be a guide of how all this fits together and
when to change what (not just documentation of individual options or
syntax), but I do also understand that developers don't always like
writing documentation (hey, who
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Seth Vidal wrote:
2009/11/18 nodata l...@nodata.co.uk:
Am 2009-11-18 20:20, schrieb Richard Hughes:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlincdah...@redhat.com:
By the admin's first opportunity to change the settings the box could
already be rooted.
I'm not sure how you can root
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Dan Williams wrote:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 14:29 -0500, Seth Vidal wrote:
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Richard Hughes wrote:
2009/11/18 Andrew Haley a...@redhat.com:
Is there some way to disable PackageKit but keep setroubleshoot?
Just set all the policykit answers to no.
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Jesse Keating wrote:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 14:39 -0600, Chris Adams wrote:
What would be nice would be a guide of how all this fits together and
when to change what (not just documentation of individual options or
syntax), but I do also understand that developers don't
On 11/18/2009 03:27 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
2009/11/18 nodata l...@nodata.co.uk:
Am 2009-11-18 20:20, schrieb Richard Hughes:
2009/11/18 Casey Dahlincdah...@redhat.com:
By the admin's first opportunity to change the settings the box could
already be rooted.
I'm not sure how you can root
Dne 18.11.2009 21:07, Jeff Spaleta napsal(a):
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 11:03 AM, Jerry James loganje...@gmail.com wrote:
Should the NEEDINFO flag be cleared by adding such a comment? I
didn't expect that.
when you set the needinfo flag did you set it such that anyone could
clear it or did
On Wednesday 18 November 2009 01:35:30 pm Simo Sorce wrote:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 13:23 -0500, Seth Vidal wrote:
I'm not sure how this is 'surprise root'. IT will only allow installs
of pkgs signed with a key you trust from a repo you've setup.
which pretty much means: if the admin trusts
2009/11/18 Steve Grubb sgr...@redhat.com:
And I wonder what the audit trail will show? Does it show which user installed
these packages?
Yup, take a look at pkcon get-transactions or just use gpk-log to see
it graphically.
Richard.
--
fedora-devel-list mailing list
On 11/18/2009 03:06 PM, Peter Jones wrote:
On 11/18/2009 02:35 PM, Casey Dahlin wrote:
On 11/18/2009 02:32 PM, Casey Dahlin wrote:
On 11/18/2009 01:19 PM, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
I may be wrong, but I understand that this behaviour of PackageKit
only applies to users with direct console
Am 2009-11-18 22:08, schrieb Richard Hughes:
2009/11/18 Steve Grubbsgr...@redhat.com:
And I wonder what the audit trail will show? Does it show which user installed
these packages?
Yup, take a look at pkcon get-transactions or just use gpk-log to see
it graphically.
Richard.
This should
Sorry, but this default (desktop users can install pkgs without root) is
just stupid. It is antithetical to all standard security models that
have come before in Fedora and other Linux distributions.
Instead of shielding yourselves with silly arguments about the lack of
lock-and-key on a
On 11/18/2009 12:45 PM, Bastien Nocera wrote:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 18:08 +0100, nodata wrote:
Yikes! When was it decided that non-root users get to play root?
Ref:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=534047
This is horrible!
Seems fair as the default for a desktop installation.
On 11/18/2009 01:04 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Jon Ciesla wrote:
Seth Vidal wrote:
You have PackageKit installed on servers? really?
I do if it's in the default DVD install, or was pulled in in an
upgrade. I've never intentionally installed it, and yes I do. Never
imagined
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Jeff Garzik wrote:
On 11/18/2009 01:04 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Jon Ciesla wrote:
Seth Vidal wrote:
You have PackageKit installed on servers? really?
I do if it's in the default DVD install, or was pulled in in an
upgrade. I've never intentionally
On 11/18/2009 01:28 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
I didn't say it did - I said it didn't make sense to have items like PK
on servers.
Listen to yourself.
The above is a blatant admission that it is REALLY EASY for existing
users to upgrade themselves into a security nightmare.
* F11 w/
On Tue, 17 Nov 2009 07:18:27 -0800, Jesse wrote:
If we did a macro change in dist-f13 and a mass rebuild, and did a macro
change on dist-f12 and dist-f11 at the same time (without a mass
rebuild) this might work.
Only with severe discipline by all packagers who push updates to
multiple
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Jeff Garzik wrote:
On 11/18/2009 01:28 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
I didn't say it did - I said it didn't make sense to have items like PK
on servers.
Listen to yourself.
The above is a blatant admission that it is REALLY EASY for existing users to
upgrade themselves into
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Jeff Garzik wrote:
On 11/18/2009 01:28 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
I didn't say it did - I said it didn't make sense to have items like PK
on servers.
Listen to yourself.
The above is a blatant admission that it is REALLY EASY for existing users to
upgrade themselves
On 11/18/2009 01:23 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 19:18, schrieb Colin Walters:
This is a major change. I vote for secure by default.
If the admin wishes this surprise-root feature to be enabled he can
enable it.
I'm not sure how this is 'surprise
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 16:04 -0500, Steve Grubb wrote:
The problem is the *Default* not the fact that you can consciously allow
users to update without a password.
And I wonder what the audit trail will show? Does it show which user
installed
these packages?
PK has it's own logging, it
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Jeff Garzik wrote:
On 11/18/2009 01:23 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, nodata wrote:
Am 2009-11-18 19:18, schrieb Colin Walters:
This is a major change. I vote for secure by default.
If the admin wishes this surprise-root feature to be enabled he can
On 11/18/2009 01:41 PM, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
2009/11/18 Simo Sorcesso...@redhat.com:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 13:19 -0500, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
This significantly limits the number of users with powers to install
signed software -- almost to the point of where it sounds like a fair
On 11/18/2009 02:26 PM, Bob Arendt wrote:
On 11/18/09 12:03, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
2009/11/18 Simo Sorcesso...@redhat.com:
If I have physical access to your machine, I'll own it. I may have to
use tools to get to the HDD, but it's only a question of time and
dedication.
*you* are not
On 11/18/2009 02:53 PM, Casey Dahlin wrote:
The answer is: because being associated with a login on the local console
doesn't verify that it is a /user/ in control.
Bingo.
I guess everyone else missed that day in Security 101 class.
Jeff
--
fedora-devel-list mailing list
On 11/18/2009 03:25 PM, Colin Walters wrote:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 3:20 PM, Jeff Spaletajspal...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm not sure enough sysadmins understand PolicyKit enough to
confidently generate local policy edits. I think learning how to
implement site specific PolicyKit best practises
On 11/18/2009 04:34 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
I said I do remove items from @core that I don't need. It was my way of
saying servers should have as little as possible on them.
You keep repeating this, as if your personal actions and situation are
relevant.
How many existing installs out there
2009/11/18 Jeff Garzik jgar...@pobox.com:
How little social engineering + virus automation does it take to get such an
install to include a malicious 3rd party repo?
You need the root password to install from repos not signed by a key
previously imported, or if the package signature is wrong.
On 11/18/2009 04:46 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
Jeff, I think you're misunderstanding, a lot, here. I'm not in favor of
user-can-install-pkgs. I'm just explaining why I don't think pk should
be on servers.
PK will be on F12 servers, because of upgrades and very poor
communication of this new
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Jeff Garzik wrote:
On 11/18/2009 04:46 PM, Seth Vidal wrote:
Jeff, I think you're misunderstanding, a lot, here. I'm not in favor of
user-can-install-pkgs. I'm just explaining why I don't think pk should
be on servers.
PK will be on F12 servers, because of upgrades and
On 11/18/2009 05:14 PM, Richard Hughes wrote:
2009/11/18 Jeff Garzikjgar...@pobox.com:
How little social engineering + virus automation does it take to get such an
install to include a malicious 3rd party repo?
You need the root password to install from repos not signed by a key
previously
On 11/18/2009 04:10 PM, Casey Dahlin wrote:
On 11/18/2009 03:06 PM, Peter Jones wrote:
On 11/18/2009 02:35 PM, Casey Dahlin wrote:
On 11/18/2009 02:32 PM, Casey Dahlin wrote:
On 11/18/2009 01:19 PM, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
I may be wrong, but I understand that this behaviour of
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 13:22 -0500, Simo Sorce wrote:
I would almost consider it a security vulnerability and ask for a CVE to
be issued.
It certainly seems like an easy path to a denial of service: just
install everything and run the machine out of disk space.
Tim.
*/
signature.asc
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 5:18 PM, Jeff Garzik jgar...@pobox.com wrote:
You forget we have botnets doing distributed cracking now.
But...if you've cracked the root password, there are rather easier
(and less audited) routes to trojaning the system than adding a third
party yum repository and
2009/11/18 Jeff Garzik jgar...@pobox.com:
And this enormous security hole of a policy change was done with next to
/zero/ communication, making it likely that many admins will not even know
they are vulnerable until their kids install a bunch of unwanted packages.
F11 had retained
On Wed, 18 Nov 2009, Richard Hughes wrote:
2009/11/18 Jeff Garzik jgar...@pobox.com:
And this enormous security hole of a policy change was done with next to
/zero/ communication, making it likely that many admins will not even know
they are vulnerable until their kids install a bunch of
2009/11/18 Seth Vidal skvi...@fedoraproject.org:
Richard,
to be fair, when I asked you how to edit a .pkla file you couldn't tell me.
So, if our engineers don't know the basics, how should our users?
Fair comment. Release notes additions might be good in this regard.
Richard.
--
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 10:52 -0800, Jesse Keating wrote:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 13:22 -0500, James Antill wrote:
7. And the most obvious one ... how hard is it to get a bad package into
one of the repos. that the machine has enabled.
Right, PK is counting on this being sufficiently
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 10:36:20PM +, Tim Waugh wrote:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 13:22 -0500, Simo Sorce wrote:
I would almost consider it a security vulnerability and ask for a CVE to
be issued.
It certainly seems like an easy path to a denial of service: just
install everything and run
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 14:49 -0800, Adam Williamson wrote:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 10:52 -0800, Jesse Keating wrote:
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 13:22 -0500, James Antill wrote:
7. And the most obvious one ... how hard is it to get a bad package into
one of the repos. that the machine has
On 11/19/2009 04:19 AM, Richard Hughes wrote:
2009/11/18 Seth Vidal skvi...@fedoraproject.org:
Richard,
to be fair, when I asked you how to edit a .pkla file you couldn't tell me.
So, if our engineers don't know the basics, how should our users?
Fair comment. Release notes additions might
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 20:00 +, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
They can install lots of packages are fill up all the disk space?
Has someone checked yet whether this is actually possible? There are
nuances here. It depends whether PackageKit is capable of using up the
space reserved for root when
On 11/18/2009 05:36 PM, Colin Walters wrote:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 5:18 PM, Jeff Garzikjgar...@pobox.com wrote:
You forget we have botnets doing distributed cracking now.
But...if you've cracked the root password, there are rather easier
(and less audited) routes to trojaning the system
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 17:54 -0500, Eric Christensen wrote:
I do not see how that's relevant, frankly. For it to be relevant it
would have to be true to state that, if you need root privileges to
install signed packages, it's absolutely no problem if a signed package
is evil. Obviously,
On 11/18/2009 05:38 PM, Richard Hughes wrote:
If you're deploying F12, then I really think you should know the
basics about PolicyKit.
should?
The F12 security policy is dumbed down to make life easier for users,
making it easier for them to get by with -less- knowledge. And yet you
claim
Adam Williamson awill...@redhat.com writes:
I do not see how that's relevant, frankly. For it to be relevant it
would have to be true to state that, if you need root privileges to
install signed packages, it's absolutely no problem if a signed package
is evil. Obviously, that's not at all
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 22:37 +0100, Michael Schwendt wrote:
If there were an automated sanity check somewhere as part of the pkg
release procedure, that might help. It would enforce proper %release
bumps.
That is coming with AutoQA and it will certainly be able to find
upgrade-path issues.
On 11/18/2009 05:51 PM, Rahul Sundaram wrote:
On 11/19/2009 04:19 AM, Richard Hughes wrote:
2009/11/18 Seth Vidalskvi...@fedoraproject.org:
Richard,
to be fair, when I asked you how to edit a .pkla file you couldn't tell me.
So, if our engineers don't know the basics, how should our users?
On Wed, 2009-11-18 at 18:03 -0500, Jeff Garzik wrote:
On 11/18/2009 05:51 PM, Rahul Sundaram wrote:
On 11/19/2009 04:19 AM, Richard Hughes wrote:
2009/11/18 Seth Vidalskvi...@fedoraproject.org:
Richard,
to be fair, when I asked you how to edit a .pkla file you couldn't tell
me.
So,
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