OK, safe primes are "better" than ordinary primes in theory. But as I
said, in practice, the strength of the authentication is based on the
two random numbers, which are not exchanged. Any weakness of the price,
group, or generator is of use for breaking the verifier, not the
authentication o
On Tue, 26 Jan 2016 08:35:53 -0500, James Starkey
wrote:
> Is there any reasons to believe there are unsafe SRP primes?
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5054:
The group parameters (N, g) sent in this message MUST have N as a
safe prime (a prime of the form N=2q+1, where q is also prime). Th
On 01/26/2016 04:35 PM, James Starkey wrote:
> Is there any reasons to believe there are unsafe SRP primes?
>
> The magnitude of the prime is a consideration when trying to break a
> verifier, but the security of the handshake is more dependent on the
> quality of the session specific random number
Is there any reasons to believe there are unsafe SRP primes?
The magnitude of the prime is a consideration when trying to break a
verifier, but the security of the handshake is more dependent on the
quality of the session specific random numbers generated in each side of a
connection.
In any case
On 01/26/2016 04:10 PM, Jiří Činčura wrote:
> Hi *,
>
> looking at
> https://github.com/FirebirdSQL/core/blob/master/src/auth/SecureRemotePassword/srp.cpp#L14
> and wondering how was this number selected? Is it a safe prime number
> for SRP? Some might not be. Just wondering.
>
src/auth/SecureRemo
Hi *,
looking at
https://github.com/FirebirdSQL/core/blob/master/src/auth/SecureRemotePassword/srp.cpp#L14
and wondering how was this number selected? Is it a safe prime number
for SRP? Some might not be. Just wondering.
--
Mgr. Jiří Činčura
Independent IT Specialist
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