Re: [Firebird-devel] Sunsetting SHA-1

2014-12-03 Thread James Starkey
Could you be so kind as to explain how an attack on SRP could be constructed? As each session is based on two large random numbers, one on the client and one on the server, and that no information regarding the password is ever exchanged, the protocol itself is robust and secure. What your link d

Re: [Firebird-devel] Sunsetting SHA-1

2014-12-03 Thread marius adrian popa
At least we can change from sha1 to sha2 , in some casese it can help with password guessing (dictionary atttacks) http://opine.me/blizzards-battle-net-hack/ Also I would choose a better hash step http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/211/how-to-securely-hash-passwords/31846#31846 The fu

Re: [Firebird-devel] Sunsetting SHA-1

2014-11-25 Thread James Starkey
On the list of vulnerabilities, this probably about 250. The probability of a random collision is something like 2^79 instead of the design goal of 2^128, but the probabilty of a manufactured duplicate is still around 2^128. SSL sucks right, left, and center by comparison -- it has zippo protecti

[Firebird-devel] Sunsetting SHA-1

2014-11-25 Thread marius adrian popa
maybe is time to upgrade to sha-2 http://blog.chromium.org/2014/09/gradually-sunsetting-sha-1.html -- Download BIRT iHub F-Type - The Free Enterprise-Grade BIRT Server from Actuate! Instantly Supercharge Your Business Repo