If you look in src/nfs/nfs_serv.c in almost every call you'll see
this:
nfsm_srvmtofh(fhp);
nfsm_dissect(tl, u_int32_t *, NFSX_UNSIGNED);
error = nfsrv_fhtovp(fhp, 1, &vp, cred, slp, nam, &rdonly,
(nfsd->nd_flag & ND_KERBAUTH), TRUE);
if (error) {
If you look in src/nfs/nfs_serv.c in almost every call you'll see
this:
nfsm_srvmtofh(fhp);
nfsm_dissect(tl, u_int32_t *, NFSX_UNSIGNED);
error = nfsrv_fhtovp(fhp, 1, &vp, cred, slp, nam, &rdonly,
(nfsd->nd_flag & ND_KERBAUTH), TRUE);
if (error) {
Alfred Perlstein writes:
> the problem with nfsrv_fhtovp is that it is overkill for my application
> (it checks perms where i don't need it to, so i would have to fake
> a lot of stuff to look like i was authorized)
What's your application?
> so instead I gutted nfsrv_fhtovp a bit and came up wi
On 3 Aug 1999, Assar Westerlund wrote:
> Alfred Perlstein writes:
> >
> > * At this point, this should never happen
> > */
> > /* ARGSUSED */
> > static int
> > nfs_fhtovp(mp, fhp, nam, vpp, exflagsp, credanonp)
> > register struct mount *mp;
> > struct fid *fhp;
> > struct sockaddr
Alfred Perlstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> the problem with nfsrv_fhtovp is that it is overkill for my application
> (it checks perms where i don't need it to, so i would have to fake
> a lot of stuff to look like i was authorized)
What's your application?
> so instead I gutted nfsrv_fhtovp
On 3 Aug 1999, Assar Westerlund wrote:
> Alfred Perlstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> >
> > * At this point, this should never happen
> > */
> > /* ARGSUSED */
> > static int
> > nfs_fhtovp(mp, fhp, nam, vpp, exflagsp, credanonp)
> > register struct mount *mp;
> > struct fid *fhp;
> >
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