r253680 enables SSL certificate verification for fetch command.
Ports use fetch to download distfiles.
At least all USE_GITHUB fetches are broken on CURRENT, and others might
be too.
What is the correct/intended way to handle master sites that use bad SSL
certificates?
Is there an intention
On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 08:18:51 -0400
Nikolai Lifanov lifa...@mail.lifanov.com wrote:
r253680 enables SSL certificate verification for fetch command.
Ports use fetch to download distfiles.
At least all USE_GITHUB fetches are broken on CURRENT, and others
might be too.
What is the
On 07/31/13 08:48, Michael Gmelin wrote:
On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 08:18:51 -0400
Nikolai Lifanov lifa...@mail.lifanov.com wrote:
r253680 enables SSL certificate verification for fetch command.
Ports use fetch to download distfiles.
At least all USE_GITHUB fetches are broken on CURRENT, and others
On Wed, Jul 31, 2013, at 8:05, Nikolai Lifanov wrote:
I fully agree. We already checksum the *distfiles*.
It shouldn't be important what the source is.
Are there any objections to adding --no-verify-peer to FETCH_ARGS across
the board?
Won't that break fetch for users whose fetch
On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 08:10:28 -0500
Mark Felder f...@freebsd.org wrote:
On Wed, Jul 31, 2013, at 8:05, Nikolai Lifanov wrote:
I fully agree. We already checksum the *distfiles*.
It shouldn't be important what the source is.
Are there any objections to adding --no-verify-peer to
On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 03:24:07PM +0200, Michael Gmelin wrote:
On Wed, 31 Jul 2013 08:10:28 -0500
Mark Felder f...@freebsd.org wrote:
On Wed, Jul 31, 2013, at 8:05, Nikolai Lifanov wrote:
I fully agree. We already checksum the *distfiles*.
It shouldn't be important what the source
