Re: Unlang clarification

2013-05-20 Thread Nick Lowe
When you are using a traditional EAP type, the identity seen in the EAPOL exchange is authoritative and can be trusted. (Returning a User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept is unnecessary in this case unless it needs to be normalised or customised, and is optional as part of the RADIUS RFCs.) When you

Re: Unlang clarification

2013-05-20 Thread Nick Lowe
*You can of course mandate something like the outer identity must equal the inner identity, or require anonymous@..., which would make the identity spoofing issue one of anonymisation alone. - List info/subscribe/unsubscribe? See http://www.freeradius.org/list/users.html

Normalising the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
Dear All, I am curious if it is possible today with FreeRADIUS to normalise the identity that is returned in the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept? Hypothetically, lets say that a client uses the PEAP EAP type and logs in successfully using an inner-identity of its choosing in a valid format.

Re: Normalising the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
Thanks, Alan! I have got a feature request with Aerohive, our wireless vendor, to support treating the User-Name AVP as being authoritative which they are being pretty receptive and responsive to. (I think RADIUS clients need to stop treating the outer identity as being authoritative if and

Re: Normalising the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
I would have thought that it is perfectly reasonable to return the identity back in the case you have roaming federations as long as it was an agreed requirement beforehand. I am of the opinion that this -should- be mandated as part of Eduroam, for example. - List info/subscribe/unsubscribe? See

Re: Normalising the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
I would default the behaviour to not send the User-Name attribute in the Access-Accept but give the ability to have it trivially enabled with a toggle. And where it is enabled, by default, send it in the normalised user@realm format unless configured otherwise. (That would be the general case as

Re: Normalising the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
As an aside to the mechanics of this, if you do this, test your NAS under simulated user load. We found that our Cisco WLC equipment didn't like that and leaked internal resources, which eventually ran out. We were adding some additional information to the username, so we had many more

Re: Normalising the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
That's a very fair point. A problem with anonymous identities though also comes where you have features at the edge that 'do things' based on the identity. Often you will just want an anonymised unique identity for each discrete user, but not necessarily their real identity. Food for thought...

Re: Normalising the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
I honestly don't see what the problem is with writing it yourself - it's not rocket science - but OTOH a set of examples in the default config would be a good thing too. No problem at all, rather, I would have simply thought that it lowers the barrier to entry, requiring less concious thought

Re: Normalising the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
So which id are you talking about? if its the outer and the user has configured the machine correctly, all you're going to see is @realm - not much use other than it's that institution if its the inner then o.k. you've got a realm from the outer user-name and a userid from the inner but

Re: Normalising the User-Name AVP in an Access-Accept

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
Eduroam visited ORPS and home server ORPS should support CUI. Where the NAS at the visited site lacks support for CUI, and the NAS supports setting values for attributes associated with a session, a globally and temporarily unique identifier should be set (via Access-Accept/COA/SNMP) and

Comware 3 Switches (3Com 4500, 5500, 5500G - H3C S3600, S5600) - EAPOL v2 and v3 being dropped.

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
Dear All, If anybody still uses any Comware v3 switches anywhere with 802.1X, they had a bug until recently where they would drop and not respond to all EAPOL v2 and v3 in flagrant violation to the 802.1X-2001 specification. These are switches such as: 3Com 4500, 5500 or 5500G series H3C S3600,

Re: Comware 3 Switches (3Com 4500, 5500, 5500G - H3C S3600, S5600) - EAPOL v2 and v3 being dropped.

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
In response to a private email I had asking for clarification, sorry, I meant the 10/100 4210s which run Comware v3, not 4210Gs which run Comware v5... The actual error you will see on such switched with terminal debugging enabled along with debugging dot1x all you'll see on afflicted devices is:

Re: Comware 3 Switches (3Com 4500, 5500, 5500G - H3C S3600, S5600) - EAPOL v2 and v3 being dropped.

2013-04-18 Thread Nick Lowe
Great, hit send by accident with a sentence half constructed. Hopefully you'll get the gist! - List info/subscribe/unsubscribe? See http://www.freeradius.org/list/users.html