On 4/15/07, Marcus G. Daniels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Michael Agar wrote:
> > "Reflexivity" is one of those terms...  Nice and neat in set theory,
> > a relation R is reflexive in set A  iff for all a in A aRa is true.
> >
> Question is, what is the discrimination power of R?  Does it ever say
> false?   (Unlike, say, Freud's theories or religious dogma), and if so
> does it report `true' and `false' in any pattern that rarely would occur
> by chance?  Are their precise metrics for the features that R draws
> upon, or does the meta-analyst just have that convenience?


Suppose person i is a member of the group w.  To get to the problem
let's think about the durability of the entitivity of w.  Let's assume
that the status of w as real, living group can be lost or transform or
fission or fuse at any moment.  w ought to have that possibility (does
set theory require that it be an impossibility?).  Suppose that i
belongs to the group known as "women" (w), for example.  The status of
i as a member or, even, not a member in the group is necessarily
reflexive.  It is also necessarily contingent upon the possibility of
the word "women" to make sense of a set of people as a unified entity.
 Where does that possibility come from?  One view is that the
possibility comes from the possibility of anyone in a system, which
would be a different group overlapping with w, call it h, to think
about the question "what it means to be a woman" or, even, "what it
means not to be a woman."  Such a possibility includes i.

To address Daniels' question about the discriminative power of a
category, I suppose that it depends on your theoretical framework and
what criteria exists for giving a category the power to sort people
out.  It seems that the perception is that sex is a category with lots
of discriminative power while gender isn't.  There seems to be some
merit in this but there also seems to be an emphasis on a purpose for
asking the question in a first place.  Depending on what community an
analyst is looking at 'sex' is a better candidate for answering the
question "is person i a suitable mate for sexual reproduction?" than
is gender.  Gender, of course, is a culturally situated representation
of sex (and more) and so it can and is often used to answer the
question "is person i a suitable mate for sexual reproduction?".  And
gender may be a better one for answering the question "why was person
i not a suitable person for role x?" where role x includes things that
don't have to do with sexual reproduction.  Gender is what we use to
figure out which public bathroom to use.  It's what medical
institutions use to design the paperwork nurses and doctors use to
categorize newborn babies.  Arguably, gender is what is used to figure
out the discriminative power of the category sex.  We all know, of
course, that we can't ignore the fact that female and male genitals
exist and that in each individual the differences are robust and
persistent.  Experts and non-experts can identify the differences
fairly easily.  The moment, however, that a researcher puts the
category to a trial of strength, a trial of its discriminative power,
(say that person takes thousands of pictures of male and female
genitalia and shows these pictures to a wide sample of people and
measures how well male and female genitalia are identified) then the
category 'sex' inherits its traits from the discriminative power of
the category 'gender.'  Gender is why sex is meaningful.  But, again,
I don't want to downplay the fact that indeed female and male
genitalia exist.  Here's where I get out of my domain: what are the
precise metrics for the features of the category 'gender'.  'Gender'
is looking dangerously like it is everything.  The category 'gender'
has, however, precise boundaries but one must look at the social
context in which that category is given meaning to figure out its
limitations.  Who is in charge of the word 'gender' and why are they
giving it the capacity to discriminate?

Moving back to the expertise of FRIAM we may ask the same sort of
question.  Who is in charge of the category 'complex adaptive system'
and why are they giving it the capacity to discriminate?







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-- 
Matthew R. Francisco
PhD Student, Science and Technology Studies
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

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