Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Lionel Ferette
In the wise words of [EMAIL PROTECTED], on Thursday 01 December 2005 18:57: [SNIP] > Using crypto all the way from the web server to a smart-card (so all the > compromised system can see is encrypted data it can't get the key for) can > help yere. Even then, you would need a card reader with inte

[Full-disclosure] (no subject)

2005-12-01 Thread CNQQTROVMYSY
The original message was received Mon, 21 Nov 2005 10:10:58 +0100 from - - The following address(es) had permanent fatal errors - <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; originally to [EMAIL PROTECTED] (unrecoverable error) The mail system encountered a delivery failure, code -11. This fai

[Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 915-1] New helix-player packages fix arbitrary code execution

2005-12-01 Thread Martin Schulze
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Debian Security Advisory DSA 915-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze December 2nd, 2005

[Full-disclosure] WinEggDropShell Multiple Remote Stack Overflow

2005-12-01 Thread Sowhat
WinEggDropShell Multiple Remote Stack Overflow by Sowhat 2005.12.02 http://secway.org/advisory/AD20051202.txt http://secway.org/exploit/wineggdropshell_bof.py.txt Affected: WinEggDropShell Eterntiy version (1.7) Other version may be vulnerable too Overview: WinEggDropShell is a popular Ch

RE: [inbox] Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Exibar
nah, screen grabber and keylogger installed on system, compromised password. Biometrics, SecurID, one time password, usb key fob, actual physical key, something that is not on the system is what would be needed to be secure... perhaps not totally secure, but pretty damn secure using more t

RE: [Full-disclosure] Support_388945a0 account in Win XP/2003

2005-12-01 Thread Aditya Deshmukh
> > > That is a "help and support account" that you should disable. > > Also set very long random password and forget it. > I prefer simply delete it. Good choice? > > But I heard a rumours that this account can be activated remotely > without user's aware decision and used for Remote Assistance

RE: [Full-disclosure] Re: Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Aditya Deshmukh
> How about one-time passwords? Just go ahead and *let* them > keylog it all > they like; by the time they've snarfed a pw, it's no use any > more. (See S/Key for more details.) Please no one time passwords: they are a nightmare to manage _

RE: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Aditya Deshmukh
> I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most common > keystroke loggers are. http://keylogger.org/ claims to be an independent testing site for all keyloggers, but they have all the old versions of the Keylogger. You can use this site as starting point for your search. Visit the

RE: [Full-disclosure] Software Firewalls for Windows

2005-12-01 Thread Aditya Deshmukh
> Hi list, I've been a firm advocate of Sygate Pro for some > time but as Symantec > has bought and canned it I'm wondering what you guys would > recommend as a > replacement. Tiny Firewall 2005 works for both 64 and 32 bit machines And is good - I have been using in since version 2.1.5 And no

RE: [spam] Re: [Full-disclosure] Hacking Boot camps!

2005-12-01 Thread Exibar
synchronet! Me too! I loved my Synchronet BBS back in the day :-) RIP graphic support, all the doors you could muster... I had forgotten how much fun the scriptable co-sysop was :-) Exibar (Exibar's Lair BBS (whoop whoop!) > -Original Message- > From: mary [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECT

[Full-disclosure] Software firewalls for Windows

2005-12-01 Thread Paul Stephens
Is there something wrong with Zone Alarm? ;-) > > Also, it was just announced today by Sunbelt Software that they > are picking up Kerio. > > http://www.sunbelt-software.com/Press.cfm?id=134 > > - ferg Hi Fergie, I quite like the fact that Kerrio is light on sys resources as not all my clients hav

RE: [Full-disclosure] Re: SOX whistleblowers' clause Compliance

2005-12-01 Thread Aditya Deshmukh
> > > Why cant you use google to find out this ? > > The same reason you can't use Google and find your answer fuckbag. Are you n3td3v ? > > > *In the para 4* > > "Protecting whistleblowers is an essential component of an ethical > > and open work environment." > > No mention of an anon emai

Re: [Full-disclosure] Webmin miniserv.pl format string vulnerability

2005-12-01 Thread H D Moore
As many folks have pointed out and consistent with the recent Dyad advisory, these bugs are indeed exploitable. I only mention this because a reporter quoted someone who quoted my original message and then used it to downplay the severity of the problem. $ perl -e 'printf("%2918905856\$vs")'

Re: [Full-disclosure] Software Firewalls for Windows

2005-12-01 Thread Fergie
Is there something wrong with Zone Alarm? ;-) Also, it was just announced today by Sunbelt Software that they are picking up Kerio. http://www.sunbelt-software.com/Press.cfm?id=134 - ferg -- Paul Stephens <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Hi list, I've been a firm advocate of Sygate Pro for some tim

RE: [Full-disclosure] Re: SOX whistleblowers' clause Compliance

2005-12-01 Thread Aditya Deshmukh
See below marc email part >> Aditya Deshmukh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >> >>If you read the last line in para 6 you will find that anon >> mailbox is >> a requirement for SOX compliance. >> >> >And mailbox was ment for email Michael :) >> >> >But I think that "with a post and some concrete" ma

[Full-disclosure] [xfocus-SD-051202]openMotif libUil Multiple vulnerability

2005-12-01 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Title: [xfocus-SD-051202]openMotif-libUil-Multiple_vulnerability Affected version : openmotif 2.2.3(not got 2.2.4,so not test in openmotif 2.2.4) Product: http://www.motifzone.net/ xfocus (http://www.xfocus.org) have discovered multiple vulnerability in openmotif libUil library. details followin

[Full-disclosure] Software Firewalls for Windows

2005-12-01 Thread Paul Stephens
Hi list, I've been a firm advocate of Sygate Pro for some time but as Symantec has bought and canned it I'm wondering what you guys would recommend as a replacement. >From the limited testing I've done I'm leaning toward Ghostwall for XP64 & Outpost for 32bit machines. Any suggestions welcomed.

Re: [Full-disclosure] Hacking Boot camps!

2005-12-01 Thread mary
Come on... lets go right old school. I loved and ran RA right old school? Hm, okies! ..didn't care for RA, personally - I ran Synchronet and RENEGADE. Thinking back.. Synchronet's scriptable co-sysop was a lot of fun.. -m Pfft.. RENEGADE all the way :> WWIV was great for modding too.

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread mz4ph0d
I wrote: > I also don't see how having a button change to be blank after > mousing over it effects people with fine motor skills. Apologies, "fine motor skills" should have been "accessibility problems relating to fine motor skill deficiencies or problems". Z. __

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread mary
eng.nprotect.co.kr comes to mind. -m Hi All, I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most common keystroke loggers are. I've been challenged to write an authentication method (for a web site) that can be secure while using a compromised system. Thanks, Shannon __

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread mz4ph0d
Nick Fitzgerald wrote: You are deeply confused if you think "is totally trivial and hasn't been attacked _yet_" is in any meaningful way "more secure" than "is equally trivial and has already been broken". And if that was what I was talking about, fair enough, but seeing as I'm not ... all I was

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Nick FitzGerald
Kyle Lutze to Blue Boar: <> > > Note, however, that "keyloggers" that grab some portion of the screen > > surrounding the mouse pointer every time you click have already been > > observed in the wild. They are designed to specifically defeat this > > kind of mechanism. > > > Actually, I think

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Gustavo
2005/12/1, Nick FitzGerald <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Some South American banks currently under massive identity > theft/keylogging "attack" (like Banco Brasil) apparently don't talk to > others in the banking industry, as some have recently started using > such "on-screen keyboards" to "defeat" the ke

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Blue Boar
Kyle Lutze wrote: say somebody's password is foobar, on screen there would be a page that shows the new alignment of characters,such as saying a=c, d=3, b=z, etc. so instead of typing foobar the password they would type in for that session would be hnnzck. The next time the screen came up, it

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Kyle Lutze
Blue Boar wrote: Shannon Johnston wrote: Hi All, I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most common keystroke loggers are. I've been challenged to write an authentication method (for a web site) that can be secure while using a compromised system. I don't think that's possible for

re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Nick FitzGerald
[EMAIL PROTECTED] to Lyal Collins: > >In 1996, this virtual keypad concept was broken by taking 10x10 pixel images > >under the cursor click, showing the number/letters used in that password. > > > >Virtual keypads are just a minor change of tactics, not a long term > >resolution to this risk, imh

RE: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Lyal Collins
Just expand the size of the image captured under the hotspot to include surrounding buttons. If the image shows the values "around" the button clicked, it makes it possible (but less trivial) to infer the value clicked. Having a totally blank on-screen keypad might work - let the users guess the

RE: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Lyal Collins
Typo - I meant 1997 NOT 1996. -Original Message- From: Lyal Collins [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, 2 December 2005 9:42 AM To: 'deepquest'; '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' Cc: 'Full-Disclosure' Subject: RE: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers? In 1996, this virtual keypad conce

[Full-disclosure] RE: Good old days and flames

2005-12-01 Thread Daniel Sichel
two irrelevancies for you folks >WildCAT BBS Anyone :) > >I remember playing tradewars and calling who knows where to get new text >files :) > >Used Tone-loC a lot more back then :) > I rember my first zmodem download. I dropped it in the middle to test the resume feature. When I saw it work

re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread mz4ph0d
At 9:41 AM +1100 2/12/05, Lyal Collins wrote: >In 1996, this virtual keypad concept was broken by taking 10x10 pixel images >under the cursor click, showing the number/letters used in that password. > >Virtual keypads are just a minor change of tactics, not a long term >resolution to this risk, imh

RE: [Full-disclosure] msdtc exp

2005-12-01 Thread ad
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Several errors in your poc, if(argc == 7) (your usage says 5 or 6...) And if(argc < 6 || argv[argc-1][0] != 'S') What a leet script kiddie protection lol , keep it up :> - -Message d'origine- De : [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread php0t
Yes, obviously not perfect or even near, i didn't even say that. Just a plus, an alternative to having to depend on keyboard / screen / files to help out with the authentication discussed. php0t - Original Message - From: "Nick FitzGerald" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, De

RE: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Lyal Collins
"Usage once" is not an effeective measure against mitm attacks, as has been discussed earlier in this thread. Give user error message, while executing txn of attacker's choice on the victim site with the legitimate user's authority. How do disputed transactions get resovled in this supposedly more

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Nick FitzGerald
php0t wrote: [top-posting-itis corrected] > > I agree but what about the second random password and challenge > > authentification? Both should be unique and usage once. > > How'bout adding direct printing on lpt of new one-time usage passwords? :) So you will limit access to your services t

[Full-disclosure] Cisco Security Advisory: IOS HTTP Server Command Injection Vulnerability

2005-12-01 Thread Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: IOS HTTP Server Command Injection Vulnerability Document ID: 68322 Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20051201-http http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Nick FitzGerald
deepquest wrote: > To me the only thing that can defeat keystroke is what a software or > trojan can not do: See (OCR is just a partial application of guess > but not applicable in that case) Then you are so far inside the box you cannot see the walls... The OP said "keystroke logger" BUT he als

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread php0t
How'bout adding direct printing on lpt of new one-time usage passwords? :) In order to get the passwords, they'd have to hook the printing, too. Not too common, yet. I agree but what about the second random password and challenge authentification? Both should be unique and usage once. _

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread deepquest
In 1996, this virtual keypad concept was broken by taking 10x10 pixel images under the cursor click, showing the number/letters used in that password. Virtual keypads are just a minor change of tactics, not a long term resolution to this risk, imho. I agree but what about the second rando

RE: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Lyal Collins
In 1996, this virtual keypad concept was broken by taking 10x10 pixel images under the cursor click, showing the number/letters used in that password. Virtual keypads are just a minor change of tactics, not a long term resolution to this risk, imho. Lyal -Original Message- From: [EMAIL

Fwd: [HWU-83468]: Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread deepquest
Spamo-Squaters on FD list? Nice auto-reply. We should do a hall shame for those! -D Début du message réexpédié : De : "4Daily.com Hotline" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date : 1 décembre 2005 23:28:02 HNEC À : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Objet : [HWU-83468]: Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Nick FitzGerald
David Harker wrote: > It may be easier and safer to require the user to follow onscreen > instructions for character substitution into their password than attempt > to defeat many individual bits of software. Since it's online, a munged > dynamic image could be used to supply the instructions quit

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Nick FitzGerald
Gustavo wrote: > If you want to provide reliable authentication, given that the user > has a keystroke logger installed, you may simply use a visual keyboard > written in Java. Dude -- you really are out of your depth here... Barclays (and other UK banks?) were doing this in the late 90s. Withi

Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Nick FitzGerald
Dave Korn wrote: > How about one-time passwords? Just go ahead and *let* them keylog it all > they like; by the time they've snarfed a pw, it's no use any more. (See > S/Key for more details.) Ignoring the silliness of pre-printed lists of of OTP (such as some European banking systems' TAN

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread deepquest
To me the only thing that can defeat keystroke is what a software or trojan can not do: See (OCR is just a partial application of guess but not applicable in that case) Imagine a web page with a virtual keyboard page (clickable). In order to prevent the localisation on the keys mapping based

[Full-disclosure] Edgewall Trac SQL Injection Vulnerability

2005-12-01 Thread David Maciejak
Edgewall Trac SQL Injection Vulnerability Trac is an enhanced wiki and issue tracking system for software development project. It provides an interface to Subversion. More information on http://projects.edgewall.com/trac/ Description: Malicious user can conduct SQL injection in ticket query mo

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Michael Holstein
If you want to provide reliable authentication, given that the user has a keystroke logger installed, you may simply use a visual keyboard written in Java. Banks have already started doing this .. and phishers have responded with framegrabbing loggers. ~Mike. _

Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Michael Holstein
If the user is passed to a phishing site that ask for the OTP, the user enters it, the phishing site can return a error and instruct the user to use the next OTP password, hence giving the attacker any number of OTPthe OTP ones that are list based anyways. Social Darwinism : Try to make som

Re: [Full-disclosure] re: webmin remote format string bug

2005-12-01 Thread Dave Aitel
This is exploitable - Immunity has a PoC exploit in our Partner's section written by Bas Alberts. Thanks, Dave Aitel Immunity, Inc. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hello! I succeeded in crashing webmin 1.230 with: username %n password after klicking 4 times on "Login" webmin was dead. There w

RE: [Full-disclosure] Hacking Boot camps!

2005-12-01 Thread Josh Perrymon
Very True.. The BBS and door game back in the days kept me interested to learn and luckily I get to down security full time now... it's just fun.. ( mostly ) I remember back when we where all playing doom on 9600 modems and hacking around with the USR robotic connection strings.. I really enjoy

Re: [Full-disclosure] Hacking Boot camps!

2005-12-01 Thread bkfsec
Christopher Carpenter wrote: Yeah, and if you didn't register V-X after like 90 days, it formatted your hard drive. Imagine if an application tried that today. They'd defend their position as a DRM strategy and after a long battle would finally recall their products, only leaving them on s

Re: [Full-disclosure] Hacking Boot camps!

2005-12-01 Thread bkfsec
Josh Perrymon wrote: WildCAT BBS Anyone :) I remember playing tradewars and calling who knows where to get new text files :) Used Tone-loC a lot more back then :) And Renegade, WWIV, MajorBBS + clones... Those were the days. I remember Tradewars, but I was more of a BRE fan myself.

Re: [Full-disclosure] Hacking Boot camps!

2005-12-01 Thread gat0r
Hello pot...this is kettlejeessh! On 12/1/05 9:14 PM, "InfoSecBOFH" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 12/1/05, Christian kopacsi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> InfoSecBOFH, >> Show me on the doll where they touched you. You should see a therapist to >> get a grip on all your issues. And w

RE: [Full-disclosure] Re: Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Todd Towles
If the user is passed to a phishing site that ask for the OTP, the user enters it, the phishing site can return a error and instruct the user to use the next OTP password, hence giving the attacker any number of OTPthe OTP ones that are list based anyways. > -Original Message- > From:

Re: [Full-disclosure] Hacking Boot camps!

2005-12-01 Thread InfoSecBOFH
On 12/1/05, Christian kopacsi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > InfoSecBOFH, > Show me on the doll where they touched you. You should see a therapist to > get a grip on all your issues. And why would you talk shit about Clement? > He has done so much for the Infosec community. Now that is a great res

RE: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Debasis Mohanty
-Original Message- From: Blue Boar Sent: Friday, December 02, 2005 12:15 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers? Shannon Johnston wrote: > Hi All, > I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most

Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Thierry Zoller
Dear Dave Korn, DK> How about one-time passwords? Just go ahead and *let* them keylog it all DK> they like; by the time they've snarfed a pw, it's no use any more. (See DK> S/Key for more details.) ITAN I hear you scream. Oh yes.. keylogger fakes that the OTP is not accepted, user enters a new

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Gustavo
If you want to provide reliable authentication, given that the user has a keystroke logger installed, you may simply use a visual keyboard written in Java. regards, Gustavo 2005/12/1, Shannon Johnston <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Hi All, > I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most common k

[Full-disclosure] Re: Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Dave Korn
Blue Boar wrote in news:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Shannon Johnston wrote: >> Hi All, >> I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most common keystroke >> loggers are. I've been challenged to write an authentication method (for >> a web site) that can be secure while using a compromised system. >

Re: [Full-disclosure] Hacking Boot camps!

2005-12-01 Thread Christian kopacsi
InfoSecBOFH, Show me on the doll where they touched you.  You should see a therapist to get a grip on all your issues.  And why would you talk shit about Clement?  He has done so much for the Infosec community.  On 11/24/05, InfoSecBOFH <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Bottom line is... and you can igno

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread David Harker
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 It may be easier and safer to require the user to follow onscreen instructions for character substitution into their password than attempt to defeat many individual bits of software. Since it's online, a munged dynamic image could be used to supply the

[Full-disclosure] re: webmin remote format string bug

2005-12-01 Thread craig
Hello! I succeeded in crashing webmin 1.230 with: username %n password after klicking 4 times on "Login" webmin was dead. There were no logs at all, and no error was shown in the web interface... Any idea if it's really exploitable (executing code I mean)? Is anyone working on a POC? [EMAI

[Full-disclosure] re: webmin remote format string bug

2005-12-01 Thread giarc
Hello! I succeeded in crashing webmin 1.230 with: username %n password after klicking 4 times on "Login" webmin was dead. There were no logs at all, and no error was shown in the web interface... Any idea if it's really exploitable (executing code I mean)? Is anyone working on a POC? [EMAI

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Mike Jones
Haha disregard my previous post, forgot to disable my AV program. Thinks it's a trojan. Very Unprivate Software wrote: Since the purpose is showing that the authentication method is "safe" even on a compromised system (hm, hm...) the keystroke logger doesn't have to be common, the point

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Mike Jones
Whats up with www.zorro.hu/sc-kl/ I download the .dll file to my desktop along with the .exe and they dissapear. Strange. Dos dosent show them, either does attrib. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Dec 01, 2005 at 12:57:16PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Forget it. You can't do it with

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Blue Boar
Shannon Johnston wrote: Hi All, I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most common keystroke loggers are. I've been challenged to write an authentication method (for a web site) that can be secure while using a compromised system. I don't think that's possible for all compromise situ

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread foofus
On Thu, Dec 01, 2005 at 12:57:16PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Forget it. You can't do it without going to two-factor authentication, > *and* make sure that the second factor is *not* subvertible by the > compromised system (for instance, even a SecureID won't totally work, > because the key

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 10:24:50 MST, Shannon Johnston said: > I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most common keystroke > loggers are. I've been challenged to write an authentication method (for > a web site) that can be secure while using a compromised system. Forget it. You can't do

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Very Unprivate Software
Since the purpose is showing that the authentication method is "safe" even on a compromised system (hm, hm...) the keystroke logger doesn't have to be common, the point is to show that the system is "under control". For that, just plant a vnc server, with that you can even do a nifty presenta

Re: [Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread foofus
On Thu, Dec 01, 2005 at 10:24:50AM -0700, Shannon Johnston wrote: > I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most common keystroke > loggers are. I've been challenged to write an authentication method (for > a web site) that can be secure while using a compromised system. I can think of a

[Full-disclosure] Most common keystroke loggers?

2005-12-01 Thread Shannon Johnston
Hi All, I'm looking for input on what you all believe the most common keystroke loggers are. I've been challenged to write an authentication method (for a web site) that can be secure while using a compromised system. Thanks, Shannon ___ Full-Disclosure

RE: [Full-disclosure] Re: SOX whistleblowers' clause Compliance

2005-12-01 Thread Madison, Marc
Google "sox whistleblowers" = hard work But let me help you, http://www.whistleblowers.org/html/sox_whistleblower_statute.htm jeff Wilder wrote: >Can some please send me the actual regulation that states or validates the comments of >http://www.nonprofitrisk.org/nwsltr/archive/employprac0910

RE: [Full-disclosure] Re: SOX whistleblowers' clause Compliance

2005-12-01 Thread wilder_jeff Wilder
Can some please send me the actual regulation that states or validates the comments of http://www.nonprofitrisk.org/nwsltr/archive/employprac091005-p.htm ? I am in this very situation right now. -Jeff Wilder CISSP,CCE,C/EH -BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK- Version: 3.1 GIT/CM/CS/O

[Full-disclosure] [DRUPAL-SA-2005-009] Drupal 4.6.4 / 4.5.6 fixes minor access control issue

2005-12-01 Thread Uwe Hermann
Drupal security advisory DRUPAL-SA-2005-009 Advisory ID:DRUPAL-SA-2005-009 Project:Drupal core Date:

[Full-disclosure] [DRUPAL-SA-2005-008] Drupal 4.6.4 / 4.5.6 fixes XSS and HTTP header injection issue

2005-12-01 Thread Uwe Hermann
Drupal security advisory DRUPAL-SA-2005-008 Advisory ID:DRUPAL-SA-2005-008 Project:Drupal core Date:

[Full-disclosure] [DRUPAL-SA-2005-007] Drupal 4.6.4 / 4.5.6 fixes XSS issue

2005-12-01 Thread Uwe Hermann
Drupal security advisory DRUPAL-SA-2005-007 Advisory ID:DRUPAL-SA-2005-007 Project:Drupal core Date:

[Full-disclosure] Perl format string integer wrap vulnerability

2005-12-01 Thread robert
SUMMARY. perl suffers from an integer wrap overflow inside the explicit parameter format string functionality, this has been confirmed to be a vector for remote code execution. Date Found: September 23, 2005. Public Release: TBD. Application:perl Credit: Jack Louis of Dyad Security

RE: [Full-disclosure] Hacking Boot camps!

2005-12-01 Thread Christopher Carpenter
Yeah, and if you didn't register V-X after like 90 days, it formatted your hard drive. Imagine if an application tried that today. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of MH Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2005 11:53 PM To: full-disclosure@lists.gro

RE: [Full-disclosure] Re: SOX whistleblowers' clause Compliance

2005-12-01 Thread Madison, Marc
IANAL, But IMO use an Intranet web page that allows employees to submit anonymous html post to the web server via html. Now if your security policy is pervasive then surely auditing is enabled on all your systems, thus removing any anonymity this would have provided. Have you considered, dare I s

Re: AW: [Full-disclosure] Clever crooks can foil wiretaps, security flawin tap technology

2005-12-01 Thread Steve Kudlak
Roland Ruf wrote: Cool stuff.. *lol* I do not think, that the FBI is still using this old analogue recorders in Total recording mode connected to the analogue extensions... That may have worked 10 or 15 years ago depending on many things like the connection type, the way the recorder detec

[Full-disclosure] [USN-221-1] racoon vulnerability

2005-12-01 Thread Martin Pitt
=== Ubuntu Security Notice USN-221-1 December 01, 2005 ipsec-tools vulnerability CVE-2005-3732 === A security issue affects the following Ubuntu releases: Ubuntu 4.10 (Warty Wa

[Full-disclosure] [USN-220-1] w3c-libwww vulnerability

2005-12-01 Thread Martin Pitt
=== Ubuntu Security Notice USN-220-1 December 01, 2005 w3c-libwww vulnerability CVE-2005-3183 === A security issue affects the following Ubuntu releases: Ubuntu 4.10 (Warty War

AW: [Full-disclosure] Clever crooks can foil wiretaps, security flawin tap technology

2005-12-01 Thread Roland Ruf
Cool stuff.. *lol* I do not think, that the FBI is still using this old analogue recorders in Total recording mode connected to the analogue extensions... That may have worked 10 or 15 years ago depending on many things like the connection type, the way the recorder detects the signal, etc, but I

Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Google Talk cleartext credentials in processmemory

2005-12-01 Thread Colin
On 01/12/05, pagvac <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Even in corp environments you still see some users running admin > privileges. Yes, I agree, it doesn't happen as often as in home > environments, but it *does* happen. Our corporate environment is almost completely full of administrators. The EMEA

Re: [Full-disclosure] Clever crooks can foil wiretaps, security flaw in tap technology

2005-12-01 Thread Andrew McGill
coderman wrote, > heheheh > > http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/250215_wiretap30.html //snip > The tone, also known as a C-tone, sounds like a low buzzing and > is "slightly annoying," Obtaining a snooping order based on the fact that this C-tone was detected should be easy. Did you know

Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: Google Talk cleartext credentials in processmemory

2005-12-01 Thread pagvac
On 11/29/05, Andrew Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > pagvac wrote: > > > Again, my testing is based on today's reality which is that most > > Windows users use administrative accounts for regular tasks such as > > web browsing and using their email clients. > > > er, not really. Home users, per

[Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 914-1] New horde2 packages fix cross-site scripting

2005-12-01 Thread Martin Schulze
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Debian Security Advisory DSA 914-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze December 1st, 2005

Re: [Full-disclosure] Support_388945a0 account in Win XP/2003

2005-12-01 Thread Raoul Nakhmanson-Kulish (en)
Hello, James Tucker! On 01.12.2005 11:27 you wrote: Someone is actually spreading rumors of a service being abused that isn't even listening at the time? RA requires the RA server to be launched. Don't leave un-closed tickets or RA support connection scripts hanging around. Of course :) bu

[Full-disclosure] Perl format string integer wrap vulnerability

2005-12-01 Thread advisory
SUMMARY. perl suffers from an integer wrap overflow inside the explicit parameter format string functionality, this has been confirmed to be a vector for remote code execution. Date Found: September 23, 2005. Public Release: TBD. Application:perl Credit: Jack Louis of Dyad Security