(, ) (,
. `.' ) ('.',
). , ('. ( ) (
(_,) .`), ) _ _,
/ _/ / _ \ _
\ \==/ /_\ \ _/ ___\/ _ \ / \
/ \/ |\\ \__( _ ) Y Y \
/__ /\___|__ / \___ /|__|_| /
\/ \/.-.\/ \/:wq
Am I the only one that thinks that the problem is in the way that Linux
defines the semantics of /proc/nnn/fd/n ?
I only think of three sensible ways of doing it.
One could follow exactly what is in the man page, and /proc/nnn/fd/n are
symbolic links to actual files.
Then, if the file is deleted
Louis Granboulan louis.granboulan.secur...@gmail.com wrote:
However, it is quite clear to me that the current behaviour is
inconsistent and is the reason of this security flaw. We see $ ls -l
/proc/self/fd/3 pretend that it is a symbolic link to a file that does not
exist, and $ ls -lL
Security-Assessment.com follows responsible disclosure
and promptly contacted Oracle after discovering
the issue. Oracle was contacted on August 1,
2010.
My understanding is that Stefano Di Paola of Minded Security reported
this back in April; and further, the feature was a part of reasonably
Eh, you can see where it came from though. Design bugs like this are
absolutely miserable to fix (see how we'll never get rebinding out of the
browser) and letting identical IP's script against eachother lets an awful
lot of legitimate traffic through while blocking almost all attacks.
Sent from my iPhone
On Oct 20, 2010, at 8:58 AM, Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cx wrote:
Security-Assessment.com follows responsible disclosure
and promptly contacted Oracle after discovering
the issue. Oracle was contacted on August 1,
2010.
My understanding is that Stefano Di Paola
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/
LibSMI smiGetNode Buffer Overflow When Long OID Is Given In Numerical Form
1. *Advisory Information*
Title: LibSMI
On Wed, Oct 20, 2010 at 8:58 AM, Michal Zalewski lcam...@coredump.cxwrote:
Security-Assessment.com follows responsible disclosure
and promptly contacted Oracle after discovering
the issue. Oracle was contacted on August 1,
2010.
My understanding is that Stefano Di Paola of Minded
===
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-1007-1 October 20, 2010
nss vulnerabilities
CVE-2010-3170, CVE-2010-3173
===
A security issue affects the following Ubuntu releases:
Ubuntu
On Wed, Oct 20, 2010 at 2:29 PM, Billy Rios billy.r...@gmail.com wrote:
In the patch for CVE-2008-5343 (GIFAR) Sun tightened their file parsing
rules for remote JAR files, making it harder to smuggle JAR files onto the
end of other filetypes. This makes it more difficult to create a GIF+JAR
===
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-998-1 October 20, 2010
thunderbird vulnerabilities
CVE-2010-3175, CVE-2010-3176, CVE-2010-3178, CVE-2010-3179,
CVE-2010-3180, CVE-2010-3182, CVE-2010-3183
Hi Michael,
Let me share some background on this advisory...
I came to this result when I was looking into a way of exploiting the
Apache Web Server Compatibility with older browser feature. A separate
paper has been published here:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
___
Mandriva Linux Security Advisory MDVSA-2010:207
http://www.mandriva.com/security/
Hi Chris, Billy and Michal,
The Host: headers and the ability to perform non-standard HTTP request
is a separate issue from what I reported to Oracle on SOP bypass.
I have only done some research on a XSRF attack involving use of a Java
Applet with two multiple Host: headers matching the same
14 matches
Mail list logo
