Re: [Full-disclosure] New Opera 11.51 PoC Denial of Service (pigtail23)

2011-10-22 Thread Maksymilian Arciemowicz
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 stack exhaustion. it's seems to recursion problem for basic regular expression. the same or similar problem exists in PCRE 8.12, allowing to crash multiple applications cx@cx64:/www$ cat crash0.php cx@cx64:/www$ php crash0.php Segmentation fault or

[Full-disclosure] jara 1.6 sql injection vulnerability

2011-10-22 Thread muuratsalo experimental hack lab
jara 1.6 sql injection vulnerability download http://sourceforge.net/projects/jara/files/v1.6/jarav16.zip author muuratsalo contact muuratsalo[at]gmail.com exploit http://localhost/jara/view.php?id=[SQL Injection] ___ Full-Disclosure - We b

[Full-disclosure] [ MDVSA-2011:160 ] krb5

2011-10-22 Thread security
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 ___ Mandriva Linux Security Advisory MDVSA-2011:160 http://www.mandriva.com/security/ _

[Full-disclosure] [ MDVSA-2011:159 ] krb5

2011-10-22 Thread security
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 ___ Mandriva Linux Security Advisory MDVSA-2011:159 http://www.mandriva.com/security/ _

[Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 201110-19 ] X.Org X Server: Multiple vulnerabilities

2011-10-22 Thread Alex Legler
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 201110-19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - http://security.gentoo.org/ - - - - - -

Re: [Full-disclosure] R: Re: Symlink vulnerabilities

2011-10-22 Thread Byron Sonne
> Sorry for the top posting. No, top posting is the *correct* way to do things, which most people on this list don't seem to realize. Instead they quote *everything* and then respond on the bottom. Yikes. > In fedorable distro Almost pam namespace can do this. It was born from > a selinux project

[Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 201110-18 ] rgmanager: Privilege escalation

2011-10-22 Thread Tobias Heinlein
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 201110-18 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - http://security.gentoo.org/ - - - - - -

[Full-disclosure] [ GLSA 201110-17 ] Avahi: Denial of Service

2011-10-22 Thread Tobias Heinlein
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 201110-17 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - http://security.gentoo.org/ - - - - - -

Re: [Full-disclosure] Symlink vulnerabilities

2011-10-22 Thread Maksymilian Arciemowicz
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 10/22/2011 11:14 AM, full-disclosure-requ...@lists.grok.org.uk wrote: > If you had your way, would you see it implemented as /tmp/ > //tmp, or some other way? per_user_tmp=yes ? http://www.feyrer.de/NetBSD/bx/blosxom.cgi/index.front?-tags=tmp -

Re: [Full-disclosure] Symlink vulnerabilities

2011-10-22 Thread bugs
I apologize as my search wasn't a complex method, just a quick grep for signs of /tmp misuse. Indeed creating a directory under /tmp is a safeway to handle tmp files. > b...@fbi.dhs.org wrote: >> >> bashbug: >> >> /usr/bin/bashbug:TEMPDIR=$TMPDIR/bbug.$$ >> >> Maybe I should use bashbug to report

Re: [Full-disclosure] Google Chrome pkcs11.txt File Planting

2011-10-22 Thread Mitja Kolsek
Hi Chris, You're right: File browse dialogs change the CWD and this contributes essentially to the exploitability of the bug in question. While it's possible to prevent these dialogs from *keeping* the CWD where the user OK'ed a selected file/folder (see http://www.binaryplanting.com/guidelines

Re: [Full-disclosure] Symlink vulnerabilities

2011-10-22 Thread Tavis Ormandy
b...@fbi.dhs.org wrote: > > bashbug: > > /usr/bin/bashbug:TEMPDIR=$TMPDIR/bbug.$$ > > Maybe I should use bashbug to report a bug in bashbug? > I took a quick look, it's actually using mkdir to create a temporary directory in /tmp, which it uses for collecting support files. This is actually a

Re: [Full-disclosure] Symlink vulnerabilities

2011-10-22 Thread Michal Zalewski
> Actually, no; per user /tmp could only be accomplished, without a major > redesign and without breaking almost every application [citation needed] ;-) Only a fraction of apps uses /tmp... vendors can fix their own distros: grepping for "/tmp" isn't complicated, and almost every package usually

Re: [Full-disclosure] Symlink vulnerabilities

2011-10-22 Thread James Condron
On 22 Oct 2011, at 07:06, Raj Mathur (राज माथुर) wrote: > > > At first sight, the best option from that point of view seems to be a > per-user tmp under /tmp/$USER/ and mount /tmp noexec, nosuid. If you > choose the ~$USER/tmp option, you'll probably have to do some userfs > jugglery to achi