[Full-disclosure] WiFi Protected Setup attack code posted

2011-12-29 Thread Craig Heffner
Yesterday, Stefan published a paper describing a vulnerability in WPS that allows attackers to recover WPA/WPA2 keys in a matter of hours ( http://sviehb.wordpress.com/2011/12/27/wi-fi-protected-setup-pin-brute-force-vulnerability/ ). Code has been posted to implement the attack:

[Full-disclosure] DD-WRT Information Disclosure Vulnerability

2010-12-27 Thread Craig Heffner
Remote attackers can gain sensitive information about a DD-WRT router and internal clients, including IP addresses, MAC addresses and host names. This information can be used for further network attacks as well as very accurate MAC address geolocation (see: http://samy.pl/mapxss/). This is

[Full-disclosure] D-Link WBR-1310 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

2010-12-23 Thread Craig Heffner
The CGI scripts in the WBR-1310 (firmware v.2.00) do not validate authentication credentials. Administrative settings can be changed by sending the appropriate HTTP request directly to a CGI script without authenticating to the device. The following request will change the administrative password

Re: [Full-disclosure] Default SSL Keys in Multiple Routers

2010-12-20 Thread Craig Heffner
-- From: Craig Heffner Sent: Sunday, December 19, 2010 5:56 AM To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: [Full-disclosure] Default SSL Keys in Multiple Routers Many routers that provide an HTTPS administrative interface use default or hard-coded SSL keys that can

[Full-disclosure] Default SSL Keys in Multiple Routers

2010-12-19 Thread Craig Heffner
Many routers that provide an HTTPS administrative interface use default or hard-coded SSL keys that can be recovered by extracting the file system from the device's firmware. The LittleBlackBox project contains a database of over 2,000 (and growing) private SSL keys that are correlated with their