[Full-disclosure] [ article ] How to secure medical data on your iPhone

FYI Thoughts? Step-by-step instructions for securing patients' medical data on your iPhone or iPad, courtesy of Dr. John Halamka, chief information officer for Boston's Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Harvard Medical School.

Re: [Full-disclosure] University of Central Florida Multiple LFI

Hi, At the risk of being ridiculed here, I'll point out that UCF does have a Infosec office and a incident response POC. https://publishing.ucf.edu/sites/itr/cst/Pages/IncidentResponse.aspx s...@mail.ucf.edu fwiw, security folks in .edus are at the low-end of this industry's pay-scale and it's

Re: [Full-disclosure] University of Central Florida Multiple LFI

Hi, On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 12:04, Hack Talk hacktalkb...@gmail.com wrote: countless attempt to contact both their infosec team, the tech rangers, and their personal web developers with no contact back or patching of these vulnerabilities I decided to post these up on FD. There are still many,

Re: [Full-disclosure] University of Central Florida Multiple LFI

Hi, On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 12:46, Hack Talk hacktalkb...@gmail.com wrote: Thanks for doing your best to extinguish the flamewar that was starting :D. Who say I don't want one? This _is_ FD after all...maybe just keep the misogynistic pr0n in check? ...must...not...click... ;P Back to

[Full-disclosure] Fred B. Schneider testimony on Cybersecurity Credentials

Testimony of Fred B. Schneider Samuel B. Eckert Professor of Computer Science Cornell University, Ithaca, New York February 19, 2010 http://www.cs.cornell.edu/fbs/publications/SciPolicyHouseArmedServsFeb2010.pdf snip A Cybersecurity Credential. Most professions expect their practitioners to

[Full-disclosure] Upcoming ZDI advisories?

Any word on these vulns? Seems the deadline was 2011-02-04, or am I missing something? Cheers, --scm http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/upcoming/ ZDI ID Affected Vendor(s) SeverityReportedDeadline

Re: [Full-disclosure] Fred B. Schneider testimony on Cybersecurity Credentials

Hi Coderman, On Sat, Feb 5, 2011 at 17:44, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote: fitting that a professor propose a process without any aspect of real world experience or demonstrated capability* in such a credentialed organization for cyber security. i'm all for deprecation of pointless exams,

Re: [Full-disclosure] Fred B. Schneider testimony on Cybersecurity Credentials

Hi Coderman, On Sat, Feb 5, 2011 at 19:00, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote: there is plenty of informative and insightful summary in the document by clearly experienced individuals. however, i wanted to point out this is essentially a funding proposal seeking Federal Funding for Research.

Re: [Full-disclosure] Best Buy and Privacy?

Fwiw, some public forums on BestBuy discuss this... http://forums.bestbuy.com/t5/Best-Buy-Geek-Squad-Policies/For-a-Return-they-scan-your-ID-Don-t-think-so/m-p/218912 http://forums.bestbuy.com/t5/Best-Buy-Geek-Squad-Policies/Driver-s-License-required-for-return/td-p/234098

[Full-disclosure] Book Review: Computer Incident Response and Product Security by Damir Rajnovic

Hi FD folks, A short review of a new title on building a vendor product security response and team. I think this book would prove useful for vendors wishing to avoid the shame and humiliation of having vulns published when they could have avoided it with a process and team in place.

Re: [Full-disclosure] Travel letter from Craig S. Wright

from http://www.gogoinflight.com/gogo/content/FAQ_Service.do also noteworthy that the privacy policy link is broken: http://www.gogoinflight.com/gbp/privacy.do snip Is it safe to use Wi-Fi in flight? Passenger security and safety is of utmost importance to Gogo. Before allowing our service to

Re: [Full-disclosure] 0day McSploit - McDonalds Dollar Menu Exploit/Vulnerability Released

On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 1:22 PM, savethedollarmenu i...@savethedollarmenu.com wrote: There is a recent 0day vulnerability in the McDonalds dollar menu, namely that it is going to be going away in 2011. fwiw, lobbyists are costly

[Full-disclosure] NIST Electronic Health Record Approved Test Procedures Version 1.0

Hi FD, The list below contains the Approved Test Procedures, Version 1.0, for evaluating conformance of complete EHRs and/or EHR Modules to the initial set of standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria defined in the Health Information Technology: Initial Set of

[Full-disclosure] Fwd: [CASE:12632] Warning: BrailleNote Apex Offers Read/Write FTP And Telnet Access To All Comers

To: Shawn Merdinger shawn...@gmail.com Hello Shawn, Thanks for forwarding this information onto us. We will make our developers aware. Kind regards, Tom Tom Burton Technical Support Assistant HumanWare Europe -Original Message- From: Shawn Merdinger

Re: [Full-disclosure] Reliable reports on attacks on medical software and IT-systems available?

Hi Halfdog, While I have not come across any specific documentation of willful attacks, security (and software quality) issues abound in the medical device space. You might try researching some of the databases at the FDA [1]. In particular, a good place to start is the FDA MAUDE database

Re: [Full-disclosure] Paper on the law and Implantable Devices security

Hi Gadi, On Mon, Jul 26, 2010 at 6:44 AM, Gadi Evron g...@linuxbox.org wrote: A new research paper from the Freedom And Law Center deals with issues Killed by Code: Software Transparency in Implantable Medical Devices One of the more useful aspects I found in that paper are the references to

[Full-disclosure] [Software Freedom Law Center paper] Killed by Code: Software Transparency in Implantable Medical Devices

fyi, an interesting read imho. snip The FDA has issued 23 recalls of defective devices during the first half of 2010, all of which are categorized as “Class I,” meaning there is “reasonable probability that use of these products will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.” At

Re: [Full-disclosure] Making Hacking a Spectator Sport

Hi Chris, Maybe take a look at GLtail -- http://www.fudgie.org Cheers, --scm On Tue, Mar 2, 2010 at 10:38 AM, Christopher Covington c...@vt.edu wrote: Does anyone have recommendations for network visualization and auralization software that could produce pretty animations and suitable

Re: [Full-disclosure] McKesson Horizon Clinical Infrastructure (HCI) version 7.6/7.8/10.0/10.1 hardcoded passwords

Hi Michael, On Wed, Oct 21, 2009 at 9:36 AM, Michael Krymson krym...@gmail.com wrote: Oh shit, account...@mckesson.com bounced, too! That must mean they don't even have any accounting! Hehe...who knows? Maybe you needed to do @internal.mckesson.com ;-P Bringing this back to the issue at

Re: [Full-disclosure] McKesson Horizon Clinical Infrastructure (HCI) version 7.6/7.8/10.0/10.1 hardcoded passwords

Great find! And should we _really be surprised_ at the following bounce? snip Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently: secur...@mckesson.com Technical details of permanent failure: Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the recipient domain. We

Re: [Full-disclosure] Cellphone with USB host

Hi Valdis, I did a CSI NetSec preso on this and touched on the WRT54G, Nokia 770, Gumstix and (my personal favorite) PicoTux as good candidates for corporate espionage hijinks. Slides are here: http://www.slideshare.net/shawn_merdinger/csi-netsec-2006-poor-mans-guide-merdinger-1251099 Cheers,

Re: [Full-disclosure] List of security conferences

Google calendar has some listed. http://www.google.com/calendar/embed?src=pe2ikdbe6b841od6e26ato0asc%40group.calendar.google.com cheers, --scm On Mon, Sep 21, 2009 at 5:00 PM, TK ktriv...@msn.com wrote: Where can I find a list of security conferences that I can attend? Securityfocus.com use

Re: [Full-disclosure] Things to do before vulnerability disclosure

While US law focused, you might take a look at the few guides by the EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation). http://www.eff.org/issues/coders/vulnerability-reporting-faq Cheers, --scm On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 2:14 PM, Giuseppe Fuggianogiuseppe.fuggi...@gmail.com wrote: What are, if any, the legal

Re: [Full-disclosure] Security contacts at Netgear and/or D-Link? (DoS, pos. default PWs and other issues)

On Fri, Feb 6, 2009 at 11:01 AM, rembrandt rembra...@jpberlin.de wrote: Is somebody aware of security contacts at Netgear or D-Link? Products of those vendors do suffer from possible DoS, propably default hardcoded root accounts (D-Link) and other issues. Timeline: ZDI: Case Opened

Re: [Full-disclosure] Hackery Channel 01-09-01-LOLZ: Cat Spoofing against Flow Control

On Fri, Jan 30, 2009 at 12:07 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote: On Thu, 29 Jan 2009 17:04:53 CST, hack ery said: Security Risk: High Exploitable: Local Vulnerability: Arbitrary Flow Control Control, Cat Spoofing Discovered by: The Hackery Channel Note the additional possibility of a

[Full-disclosure] Poison-pill auto-disclosure for security vulnerabilities by Paul Robinson

fyi, an interesting email to Risks Digest 25.43: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/25.43.html Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2008 02:15:20 -0700 (PDT) From: Paul Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Poison-pill auto-disclosure for security vulnerabilities I have thought of something

Re: [Full-disclosure] How should Full-Disclosure be funded?

thongs. http://www.iloveanything.com/order/w5.asp?custom=n3td3vI1.x=74I1.y=20 On 7/11/08, n3td3v [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm still calling for Secunia to be dropped as a sponsor of Full-Disclosure mailing list and it to be funded by public donations instead. ..snipped

Re: [Full-disclosure] debug k freezing Cisco routers?

? If this is the case, then maybe this type of attack vector may have potential against the MDS 9000? http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2006-3593 Thanks again for sharing and kindest regards, --scm Shawn Merdinger Independent Security Researcher VoIPninja.com On 8/1/07, Felix 'FX' Lindner [EMAIL PROTECTED

[Full-disclosure] MDS 9000 OS? - (was debug k freezing Cisco routers?)

Hi All, Following up on my own question here ;-) On 8/3/07, Shawn Merdinger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Does anyone know the OS for the MDS 9000? http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6217/index.html SAN-OS 2.1 is the latest version of the operating system for the Cisco MDS 9000 SAN switch

[Full-disclosure] debug k freezing Cisco routers?

Hi All, At level 15 permissions, when I enter debug k on the CLI the router freezes immediately, requiring a manual reboot. While not a vulnerability per se, perhaps something to keep in mind from the fat-finger risk? Anyone else seeing this? Kindest regards, --scm Shawn Merdinger

Re: [Full-disclosure] debug k freezing Cisco routers?

just posting a Hey, I'm seeing this, anyone else? Folks, give debug kernel a try like FX mentioned and see what happens. It worked with debug k on my version I'm working on, but that's a Cisco question I guess. Kindest regards, --scm Shawn Merdinger Independent Security Researcher VoIPninja.com

Re: [Full-disclosure] CISCO Phone 7940 DOS vulnerability

Hello, Is the Madynes VoIP fuzzer available for public download? If not, when/if do you expect to release it? Thanks, --scm On 3/20/07, Radu State [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: MADYNES Security Advisory http://madynes.loria.fr Severity: High Title: Cisco 7940 SIP INVITE remote DOS Date:

Re: [Full-disclosure] Linksys WIP 330 VoIP wireless phone crash from Nmap scan

/pocketpc/ Collin On Wed, 2006-12-06 at 10:40 -0800, Shawn Merdinger wrote: Vulnerability Description == The Linksys WIP 330 VoIP wireless phone will crash when a full port-range Nmap scan is run against its IP address. Linksys WIP 330 Firmware Version

Re: [Full-disclosure] Linksys WIP 330 VoIP wireless phone crash fromNmap scan

at that screenshot again... http://www.flickr.com/photos/metalmijn/295348294/ Heck buddy, you appear correct ~p - Original Message - From: Shawn Merdinger [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Sent: Wednesday, December 06, 2006 1:40 PM Subject: [Full-disclosure

[Full-disclosure] Linksys WIP 330 VoIP wireless phone crash from Nmap scan

Vulnerability Description == The Linksys WIP 330 VoIP wireless phone will crash when a full port-range Nmap scan is run against its IP address. Linksys WIP 330 Firmware Version == 1.00.06A Nmap scan command nmap -P0 WIP 330 ip address -p

Re: [Full-disclosure] Linksys WIP 330 VoIP wireless phone crash from Nmap scan

No better/worse than this I suppose. http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-response-20060113-ip-phones.shtml Thanks, --scm On 12/6/06, Knud Erik Højgaard [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The Linksys WIP 330 VoIP wireless phone will crash when a full port-range Nmap scan is run against its IP

Re: [Full-disclosure] FiWin SS28S WiFi VoIP SIP/Skype Phone Hardcoded Telnet user/pass and debug access

Hi, Paul Schmehl wrote: The engineers who designed this should be summarily fired. The terminal stupidity of it is mind boggling! Nick FitzGerald [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think _beyond_ mind-boggling. Your spirited comments are fun to read, but I personally don't find these types of

[Full-disclosure] Cisco 7905 VoIP phone crashing from dsniff arpspoof?

In the readme in the ohrwurm tarball from Matthius Wenzel's site: http://mazzoo.de/blog/2006/08/25#ohrwurm snip SUCCESS ~~~ As of August 2006 ohrwurm broke the following applications/transports: - linphonec 1.10 / iLBC (stops sending RTP, no crash) - linphonec 1.10 / iLBC (re-negotiates

[Full-disclosure] FiWin SS28S WiFi VoIP SIP/Skype Phone Hardcoded Telnet user/pass and debug access

Zachary McGrew has discovered and reported that the FiWin SS28S WiFi VoIP SIP/Skype Phone with firmware version 01_02_07 has VxWorks Telnet open with a hardcoded user/pass of 1/1. Various debug commonds enable viewing SIP credentials, WEP keys, etc. on the phone. More details here:

Re: [Full-disclosure] linksys WRT54g authentication bypass

Nice find. But probably not a big deal since these are just home-use routers, right? Well, maybe not. 1. Sandia nuclear plant scada network recommended gear doc (October, 2005): http://www.sandia.gov/scada/documents/NSTB_NSIT_V1_2.pdf You'll see when you read the doc that the crux of the

[Full-disclosure] ACT P202S VoIP wireless phone multiple undocumented ports/services

network devices. 3. Undocumented port, TCP/513 allows an attacker rlogin access with no credentials. 4. The phone configuration has a hardcoded Taiwan NTP server CONTACT INFORMATION: Shawn Merdinger [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe

[Full-disclosure] Senao SI-7800H VoIP wireless phone wdbrpc debug service UDP/17185

to disabling this undocumented open port. CONTACT INFORMATION: Shawn Merdinger [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

[Full-disclosure] Clipcomm CPW-100E VoIP wireless handset phone open debug service TCP/60023

the attacker's control from the CPW-100, thereby turning the phone into a remote monitoring device. There appears to be no means to neither disable this access nor enable authentication. CONTACT INFORMATION: Shawn Merdinger [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ Full-Disclosure - We

[Full-disclosure] MPM HP-180W VoIP wireless desktop phone undocumented port UDP/9090

an avenue for DoS. There appears to be no workaround for this issue. CONTACT INFORMATION: Shawn Merdinger [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored

[Full-disclosure] ZyXel P2000W (Version 2) VoIP wireless phone undocumented port UDP/9090

. Also, the undocumented open port may provide an avenue for DoS. There appears to be no workaround for this issue as far as disabling the port. CONTACT INFORMATION: Shawn Merdinger [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http

[Full-disclosure] Clipcomm CP-100E VoIP wireless desktop phone open debug service TCP/60023

the CLIP shell, that allows an attacker to enable call tracing and debugging, conduct a factory reset, write to registers, dump memory, etc. There appears to be no means to neither disable this access nor enable authentication. CONTACT INFORMATION: Shawn Merdinger [EMAIL PROTECTED

[Full-disclosure] Hitachi IP5000 VoIP Wifi phone multiple vulnerabilities

I disclosed today the following vulnerabilities at the 32nd CSI conference in Washington, D.C. https://www.cmpevents.com/CSI32/a.asp?option=GV=3id=406438 Thanks, Shawn Merdinger === VENDOR: Hitachi PRODUCT: Hitachi IP5000 VOIP WIFI

[Full-disclosure] UTstarcom F1000 VoIP Wifi phone multiple vulnerabilities

I disclosed today the following vulnerabilities at the 32nd CSI conference in Washington, D.C. https://www.cmpevents.com/CSI32/a.asp?option=GV=3id=406438 Thanks, Shawn Merdinger === VENDOR: UTStarcom VENDOR NOTIFIED: 27 June, 2005 via

[Full-disclosure] Zyxel P2000W (Version1) VoIP Wifi phone multiple vulnerabilties

I disclosed today the following vulnerabilities at the 32nd CSI conference in Washington, D.C. https://www.cmpevents.com/CSI32/a.asp?option=GV=3id=406438 Thanks, Shawn Merdinger === VENDOR: Zyxel PRODUCT: Zyxel P2000W Version 1 VOIP

[Full-disclosure] Senao SI-680H VoIP Wifi phone undocumented open port

I disclosed today the following vulnerability at the 32nd CSI conference in Washington, D.C. https://www.cmpevents.com/CSI32/a.asp?option=GV=3id=406438 Thanks, Shawn Merdinger === VENDOR: Senao VENDOR NOTIFIED: 28 June, 2005 VENDOR