Re: [Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 2607-1] qemu-kvm security update

2013-08-04 Thread Florian Weimer
* jason: > Could this be exploitable from within the guest vm? Eg could I execute > commands on the hypervisor host as root by generating a malicious packet to > attack the e1000 driver from within the guest? Yes, but at this point, you could directly patch the guest memory, so it's not a real a

Re: [Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 2607-1] qemu-kvm security update

2013-01-16 Thread jason
Could this be exploitable from within the guest vm? Eg could I execute commands on the hypervisor host as root by generating a malicious packet to attack the e1000 driver from within the guest? On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Florian Weimer wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash:

[Full-disclosure] [SECURITY] [DSA 2607-1] qemu-kvm security update

2013-01-15 Thread Florian Weimer
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - - Debian Security Advisory DSA-2607-1 secur...@debian.org http://www.debian.org/security/Florian Weimer January 15, 2013