Re: [Full-disclosure] Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account CachingAllows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily EscalatePrivileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)

2010-12-13 Thread Marsh Ray
On 12/13/2010 11:19 AM, Michael Bauer wrote: > An administrator is very different there are many levels of > administrative control in windows to say an admin is an admin is > absurd. I disagree. There's only one level of pwned. > There is a big difference between a local admin and a domain > adm

Re: [Full-disclosure] Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account CachingAllows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily EscalatePrivileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)

2010-12-13 Thread Thor (Hammer of God)
>The attack has some academically interesting details about how cached >credentials work, but I agree with Stefan. If you own the machine, you own >the machine. What's to stop you from, say, simply installing a rootkit? Exactly. More importantly, even if you must make users local admins, there is

Re: [Full-disclosure] Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account CachingAllows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily EscalatePrivileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)

2010-12-13 Thread Michael Bauer
An administrator is very different there are many levels of administrative control in windows to say an admin is an admin is absurd. There is a big difference between a local admin and a domain admin. There are many types of admin in windows and all of them have different levels of permission. I

Re: [Full-disclosure] Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account CachingAllows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily EscalatePrivileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)

2010-12-13 Thread Michael Wojcik
> From: Stefan Kanthak [mailto:stefan.kant...@nexgo.de] > Sent: Friday, 10 December, 2010 17:12 > > "George Carlson" wrote: > > > Your objections are mostly true in a normal sense. > > However, it is not true when Group Policy is taken into account. > > Group Policies need an AD. Cached credent

Re: [Full-disclosure] Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account CachingAllows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily EscalatePrivileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)

2010-12-13 Thread StenoPlasma @ ExploitDevelopment
Stefan, For you information: Cached domain accounts on a local system are not stored in the SAM. They are stored in the SECURITY registry hive. When a cached domain user logs in to the system, they do not authenticate against the SAM (As you can see in my article, I am not editing the SAM).

Re: [Full-disclosure] Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account CachingAllows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily EscalatePrivileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)

2010-12-12 Thread Stefan Kanthak
"George Carlson" wrote: > Your objections are mostly true in a normal sense. And in abnormal sense? > However, it is not true when Group Policy is taken into account. Group Policies need an AD. Cached credentials are only used locally, for domain accounts, when the computer can't connect to th