> hrm. sigh. Normal moles not being able to grasp trivial knowledge.
*cough*
> Airports are duh known conduits of business travellers with lots of
> data,
first question: do those travellers use encryption? from my experience,
most people are just ignorant when it comes to security.
how many no
barrel
but more of a can of clue you would be better off.
Jay
- Original Message -
From: niclas [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED],[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sat, 23 Feb 2008 01:16:48 +0100
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] round and round they go
> I would think a more realistic scenario might be a person working at
> an airport shutting their system down then getting it stolen vs a
> forensic examiner yanking the cord on purpose. Just an observation.
if somebody steals your notebook at the air port the chance of this
person just beeing an
On Fri, Feb 22, 2008 at 10:05 AM, Michael Holstein
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> ...
> FIPS 140-1 [http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip140-1.htm] addresses this.
> ...
> * The contents of the module shall be completely contained within a
> tamper detection envelope...
> * The module
PROTECTED]
Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Sent: Fri, 22 Feb 2008 09:57:55 -0500
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] round and round they go
I found the article interesting, but I wonder about it's practicality. If
you have physical access to the box you never really need to power down the
b
> Countermeasures and their Limitations
FIPS 140-1 [http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip140-1.htm] addresses this.
[snip]
*SECURITY LEVEL 4*
In addition to the requirements for Security Levels 1, 2 and 3, the
following requirements shall also apply to a multiple-chip embedded
cryptographic m
I found the article interesting, but I wonder about it's practicality. If
you have physical access to the box you never really need to power down the
box in the first place and generally if the box is already on, I think most
people would prefer to attack a service to get on the system directly. Bu
> http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/02/researchers-dis.html
(cooling down DRAMs keeps their contents for longer time, even during
reboot.)
well, this shows how important mechanical security still is, even with
all the crypto-stuff out there. if you e.g. just *glued* your RAM
modules into your
On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 12:43 PM, Elazar Broad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/02/researchers-dis.html
"Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys"
the best part is:
'''
Countermeasures and their Limitations
Memory imaging attacks are difficult to de
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/02/researchers-dis.html
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