RE: [Full-Disclosure] Administrivia: Fool Disclosure

2004-11-15 Thread kquest
it's clean :-) -Original Message- From: Michael Rutledge [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, November 14, 2004 12:19 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Administrivia: Fool Disclosure Anyone check this image for GDI+ exploit? lol -Michael On Fri, 12 Nov 2004 1

RE: [Full-Disclosure] Working GDI+ JPEG exploit code?

2004-10-22 Thread kquest
just a quick comment (unfortunately I don't have time to give a more complete comment and I still haven't had a chance to update my write up on this GDI+ bug)... some of those exploits have misleading comments... they talk about overwriting PEB's lock routine function pointer, but this isn't wha

RE: [Full-Disclosure] Microsoft GDIPlus.DLL JPEG Parsing Engine B uffer Overflow

2004-09-24 Thread kquest
The advisory seems to miss a few things... Here's a small paper I started to put together to fill in the blanks (and then explain how everything fits together). It's by no means complete (as a metter of fact, it's barely started, but still wanted to mention a few things not covered by the advisory)

RE: [Full-Disclosure] NETBIOS SMB IPC$ share unicode access (snor t)

2004-09-15 Thread kquest
This is simply a false positive (in your case). I presume you have Snort running inside of your network, which means that you are going to see a lot of Microsoft networking traffic where IPC$ share access is a common thing. You need to make sure you have the $EXTERNAL_NET variable set properly, so

RE: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Cool Web Search

2004-07-30 Thread kquest
You are probably talking about BHODemon, which can be found at http://www.definitivesolutions.com/bhodemon.htm . Kyle -Original Message- From: Todd Towles [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, July 30, 2004 11:00 AM To: 'Rmuge NineFive '; 'Disclosure Full' Subject: RE: Re: [Full-Disclosu

[Full-Disclosure] SSL PCT vulnerability information

2004-05-01 Thread kquest
Well, Juliano Rizzo provided a great technical description for the vulnerability, but there's more he didn't talk about..., so I put together this paper... <> Enjoy, kcq ms_ssl_pct.pdf Description: Binary data

RE: [Full-Disclosure] no more public exploits and general PoC gui de lines

2004-04-27 Thread kquest
Are you saying that unless there's an exploit that gives you access to the target machine your company wouldn't patch (even if there's an exploit that crashes the target)? I don't know what company that was, but I'm glad I'm not working for them... Ignoring DoS exploits is irresponsible... to say

RE: [Full-Disclosure] no more public exploits and general PoC gui de lines

2004-04-27 Thread kquest
Having proof of concept code is always valuable (and the sooner the better), but I question releasing exploits that execute code on the target machine. Having a DoS PoC is enough... The legitimate pentesters will be able to modify the PoC to execute code on the target while, at the same time, the

RE: [Full-Disclosure] Microsoft IIS SSL PCT vulnerability

2004-04-25 Thread kquest
-Original Message- From: Ami Chayun To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: 4/25/04 1:45 PM Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Microsoft IIS SSL PCT vulnerability Importance: High On Saturday 24 April 2004 22:32, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > I just thought it would be nice to have a little bit more analy

[Full-Disclosure] Microsoft IIS SSL PCT vulnerability

2004-04-24 Thread kquest
I just thought it would be nice to have a little bit more analysis for this vulnerability... with all these exploits coming out because everybody probably wants to know how to stop what's out now and what will follow. To do that we need to understand how the vulnerability is triggered. Unfortunate

[Full-Disclosure] SecurityFocus found a vulnerability in IIS

2004-02-18 Thread kquest
> This is not an unspecified remote DoS. > This is related to the vulnerabilities discovered by EEYE. > The reason the exploit caused a DoS is because the OpenSSL > vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities discovered by EEYE overlap. > They both have a length integer overflow. I actually believe that >