Dear subscribers, we're sharing our latest advisory with you and like to thank everyone who contributed in finding and solving those vulnerabilities. Feel free to join our bug bounty programs (open-xchange, appsuite, dovecot, powerdns) at HackerOne.
Yours sincerely, Martin Heiland, Open-Xchange GmbH Product: OX App Suite Vendor: OX Software GmbH Internal reference: 67097 (Bug ID) Vulnerability type: Cross-site scripting (CWE-80) Vulnerable version: 7.10.2 and earlier Vulnerable component: backend Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by Vendor Fixed version: 7.10.2-rev14, 7.10.1-rev22, 7.8.4-rev64 Vendor notification: 2019-09-20 Solution date: 2019-10-18 Public disclosure: 2020-01-02 CVE reference: CVE-2019-16717 CVSS: 3.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) Vulnerability Details: PNG files can be altered to contain comments, whicht might be script code. When sending such a PNG file as E-Mail and modifying the multipart content information, it's possible to inject script code in case the recipient gets tricked in using a specific URL. Risk: Malicious script code can be executed within a users context. This can lead to session hijacking or triggering unwanted actions via the web interface (sending mail, deleting data etc.). To exploit this an additional step is necessary which could be achieved through social engineering. Steps to reproduce: 1. Create a PNG file with JS code as comment 2. Create a mail with that file as inline image 3. Modify the images multipart information (filename to "something.html", content-type to "image/svg") 4. Send the mail to the victim 5. Make the victim click a hyperlink that requests the multipart image from the specific mail (would require guessing/evaluating the mail ID) Solution: We dismiss modifications to filename and content-type when returning multipart content of mails as download. --- Internal reference: 66594 (Bug ID) Vulnerability type: Cross-site scripting (CWE-80) Vulnerable version: 7.10.2 and earlier Vulnerable component: frontend Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by Vendor Fixed version: 7.10.2-rev13, 7.10.1-rev21, 7.8.4-rev58 Vendor notification: 2019-08-16 Solution date: 2019-10-18 Public disclosure: 2020-01-02 CVE reference: CVE-2019-16717 CVSS: 2.2 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) Vulnerability Details: When editing a mail signatures "Source", pasting malformed script code would bypass local sanitization. Risk: Malicious script code can be executed within a users context. This can lead to session hijacking or triggering unwanted actions via the web interface (sending mail, deleting data etc.). To exploit this an additional step is necessary which could be achieved through social engineering. Steps to reproduce: 1. Edit a HTML E-Mail signature 2. Paste a double-tagged piece of script code Proof of concept: <svg><svg onload=alert(document.cookie)> Solution: We now use DOMPurify at this location as well. --- Internal reference: 66538 (Bug ID) Vulnerability type: Improper access control (CWE-284) Vulnerable version: 7.10.2 and earlier Vulnerable component: backend Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed by Vendor Fixed version: 7.10.2-rev14, 7.10.1-rev22, 7.8.4-rev64 Vendor notification: 2019-08-13 Solution date: 2019-10-18 Public disclosure: 2020-01-02 CVE reference: CVE-2019-16716 CVSS: 2.2 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) Vulnerability Details: Under certain conditions the RMI default configuration could flip to unexpected values, allowing to invoke classes outside of the own codebase. Risk: In case the attacker is able to issue RMI provisioning commands it could be used to invoke malicious classes to the middlewares Java process. As a result malicious code could be executed on server-side. This requires to breach several level of security measures and elevated permissions on the target system. Steps to reproduce: 1. Can be best reproduced with Metasploits "java_rmi_server" script. Solution: We make sure that "java.rmi.server.useCodebaseOnly" is always "true" when initializing the RMI implementation.
signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP
_______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
