RE: [FW1] DMZ advantages

2001-06-25 Thread McCammon, Keith
Once your DMZ box is compromised, the attacker now has a user account on your internal domain. It's that simple. If you're trying to convince a manager or other executive-type of the risks involved, put it to them just like that. They don't need a technical explanation, they just want the fact

RE: [FW1] Port TCP 1025 - Network Blackjack

2001-06-23 Thread McCammon, Keith
Network Blackjack is an old gaming service, which is not used much anymore. This open port is actually a TCP negotiation port, and Windows systems open this negotiation port first by default. If you scan a Windows box that has any open connections to another network device (TCP), there's a good

RE: [FW1] DMZ advantages

2001-06-22 Thread McCammon, Keith
If you require a publicly available system, I can't think of any reason NOT to use a DMZ. But... The main reason for a DMZ (and perhaps the biggest advantage) is protection of the LAN and local domains via network-layer segregation. This is a great improvement over a typical (slack) setup, in

RE: [FW1] Can't connect via GUI_client and voyager

2001-04-20 Thread McCammon, Keith
For the GUI, You need to specify the IP of the GUI client in the Check Point Configuration tool if you're using NT on the management server. For Voyager, you need to place a rule before the Stealth rule to allow HTTP from a given workstation (or network) to the firewall. That should do the tric

RE: [FW1] Routing Question

2001-04-14 Thread McCammon, Keith
We cannot help you.  The broadcast domain for 64.157.160.0/24 (I assume) lies between the firewall and your router--that's it.  It's fundamental networking.  Think about it. -OriginalFrom: Jeff Reinhardt [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]Sent: Friday, April 13, 2001 7:01 AMTo: [EMAIL

RE: [FW1] Re: fw-1-mailinglist-digest V1 #5

2001-04-13 Thread McCammon, Keith
Anyone want to take these guys off the list. I've got about twenty of these today from at least two mailboxes. I'm sure we all get enough mail... Cheers! Keith -Original Message- From: Warren D. Coger [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2001 6:01 AM To: [EMAIL PROTEC

RE: [FW1] Inbound, Outbound, Eitherbound

2001-04-12 Thread McCammon, Keith
Inbound and Outbound inspection are not functions of network association (internal or external). They have to do with the inspection moving through the TCP/IP stack. For example, if you're only checking inbound, and someone gains control of your firewall, FW-1 won't inspect anything leaving the