http://apjjf.org/2017/02/Elmslie.html
The Great Divide: West Papuan Demographics Revisited; Settlers
Dominate Coastal Regions but the Highlands Still Overwhelmingly Papuan
Jim Elmslie January 15, 2017
Volume 15 | Issue 2 | Number 7
Synopsis
This paper will reconsider previous work on the demographic
transition under way in West Papua (the Indonesian provinces of Papua and Papua
Barat) in the light of documents received from the Indonesian Statistics Office
(Badan Pusat Statistic BPS) that give an ethnic breakdown across the 29
regencies that comprise Papua province and the eleven regencies in Papua Barat.
They show that, while the proportion of Papuan people as a percentage of the
entire population continues to decline, this process varies widely between
different regencies. While some have a strong majority of non-Papuan people
other regencies are still overwhelmingly Papuan. This dichotomy is closely
linked with topography – the mountainous interior outside of urban areas having
a Papuan majority and the accessible lowlands a non-Papuan majority. The
consequences of this dichotomy – a large chunk of West Papua about the size of
Great Britain is peopled almost exclusively by Melanesian people, even as some
of the coastal regions become non-Papuan majority– is profound. West Papuans of
the interior have not only survived Indonesian occupation but have kept their
lands and cultures largely intact, which continues to underpin calls for an
independent West Papua and conflict with the Indonesian government and its
security forces. While coastal regions continue to receive large numbers of
non-Papuan migrants resulting in the increasing minoritisation of the Papuan
people and their concomitant militarization, marginalization and dispossession.
This process is also occurring in the highlands from expansion of the oil/gas
sector and mining sector; the proliferation of new regencies (with new
bureaucracies) and the continuing development of new roads, all of which
alienate traditional land and draw in migrants. Meanwhile the conflict over the
political status of West Papua will continue, and indeed grow, as external
actors, such as the Pacific countries of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, shine
a spotlight on the conflict and advocate for the right to self-determination
for the West Papuan people.
The Importance of West Papua to Indonesia
The territory of West Papua (the Indonesian provinces of Papua and
Papua Barat) makes up about 24% of Indonesia’s total landmass but contains only
1.7% of the nation’s population. It is also Indonesia’s richest region in terms
of natural resources with the largest extant tracts of rainforest in south-east
Asia; vast oil and gas reserves, and possibly the world’s largest deposits of
copper and gold. Indeed the Papua’s giant Freeport Mine is the largest economic
entity in Indonesia and the country’s largest taxpayer.
The economic exploitation of these resources, especially in the
establishment of massive oil palm plantations (millions of hectares are
underway or planned), and the economic opportunities that arise from a fast
growing local economy has drawn in hundreds of thousands of migrants from other
regions of Indonesia motivated by self-interest and previously by government
sponsored transmigration programs. The migrants differ starkly from the
indigenous (mainly Christian) Melanesian inhabitants of West Papua, being light
skinned Asians predominantly of the Muslim faith.
West Papua is also symbolically central to the
self-conceptualization of the Indonesian state as an archipelago nation whose
motto is Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) and it represents the final
victory of the Indonesian nationalists over the Dutch after 350 years of brutal
colonial rule. This means that the future of West Papua, and the movement by
Papuan nationalists to break away from Indonesia, is a first order concern for
the Indonesian government and military. The demographic transition now underway
wherein new migrants have become the majority in many regencies is one of the
underlying drivers of conflict in West Papua and is fueling the widespread
desire for independence amongst the Papuan people. This is resulting in a
direct challenge to the authority and legitimacy of the Indonesian state and
its sovereignty over West Papua.
Map One showing the territory of West Papua (the Indonesian
provinces of Papua and Papua Barat), previously known as Irian Jaya. Note the
large chain of mountain ranges that run through the island of New Guinea all
the way to the Bird’s Head region and the flat coastal plains to the north and
south of this highlands region.
West Papuan Demographic Transition
In a series of papers since 2006 I have examined the demographic
transition that has taken place in West Papua following Indonesian takeover in
1962-63, and especially since the census of 1971, which found the total
population of 923,000 as being 96% Papuan and only 4%, or 36,000 people, as
non-Papuan1. The basis of this argument is that the non-Papuan sector of the
population is growing faster than the Papuan sector due to large scale inward
migration of non-Papuans from other parts of Indonesia and the vastly
substandard living conditions of ethic Papuans, including high infant and
maternal mortality rates, that cause a lower overall fertility rate. Due to
patchy statistical information the rate of growth of the two population sectors
had to be estimated from different censuses data and then extrapolated as a
projection of a possible future demographic break down.
While the trends are clear and unambiguous the actual population
growth rates vary depending on assumptions about future inward migration and
respective fertility rates. It also must be presumed that in a region as vast
and as rugged as West Papua, census data will always be incomplete, as well as
containing certain inaccuracies. Therefore while the data allows one to
establish trends with great confidence, the precise number of future population
segments should be taken as indicative (with the caveat that projections are
based on past growth rates remaining consistent, which may not always be the
case). Nonetheless the population of West Papua continues to grow and the
percentage of the population which is non-Papuan also continues to rise. This
is a driver of conflict: newcomers take resources such as land, forests and
minerals from traditional land owners; the Indonesian security apparatus
continues to grow to maintain control over the territory and resource
extraction in particular; Papuan people are further marginalized and lose even
their basic freedoms of speech and association, and so Papuan discontent at the
Indonesian occupation also grows and with it the desire for independence.
Therefore understanding the demographic transition that is underway is central
to comprehending the nature of the conflict in West Papua.
Where this paper extends the argument made in previous works is in
the examination of the Papuan population on a regency by regency basis. Whereas
in previous analyses the figures were largely conflated to look at the
territory of West Papua (both Papua and Papua Barat provinces) as a whole, we
are now able to rather forensically examine each particular region in
isolation. This allows a deeper more finely grained insight into the process.
My previous analysis determined that the long term annual growth
rate for the Papuan population was 1.84% and that of the non-Papuan population
10.82%2 for the period from 1971 up to 2000. From my calculations this meant
that indigenous Papuans comprised about 48%3 of the entire population of West
Papua (Papua and Papua Barat provinces) in 2010. The figures received from the
BPS are from the 2010 census and identify the inhabitants of Papua province as
either Suku Papua (Papuan tribe) or Suku Bukan Papua4 (non-Papuan tribe).
According to these figures out of a total population of 2,883,381 in Papua
Province, some 2,121,436 were Papuan (73.57%) and 658,708 Non-Papuan (22.84%),
the remainder being unknown. The BPS figures for Papua Barat show that the
total population is 753,399 of which 51.49% is Papuan5.
Map Two showing the territory of West Papua including the
Indonesian provinces of Papua and Papua Barat (West Papua) and the
administrative regions called kabupatan (regencies).
Thus these BPS figures differ somewhat from my previous figures
where I estimated that in 2010 for a combined population of Papua Province and
Papua Barat Province of 3,612,854 some 1,730,336 (47.89%) were Papuan and
1,882,517 (52.10%) were non-Papuan. The new BPS figures now indicate that the
Papuan proportion of the total population of Papua and Papua Barat provinces is
66.26%, or 2,409,670 Papuans out of a total population of 3,612,8546. This
means (according to the BPS figures) that the historical growth rate of the
Papuans for the period 1971-2000 (1.84%) and the non-Papuans (10.82%) have
changed. However the total number of Papuans in the 2000 Indonesian census,
where there was a breakdown of tribal populations, was 1,505,405 while the
number of Papuans in the 2010 Indonesian census (Papua and Papua Barat
provinces) was 2,409,670. This seems hard to believe as it implies a Papuan
population growth rate of nearly 5%. The historical Papuan growth rate was
1.84% (1971 to 2000). The current estimated growth rate for the whole of
Indonesia is 1.40%7. The 2013 estimate for the growth rate of PNG is 2.1%. How
can a growth rate of 5% for the Papuan population be explained? The answer to
this question explains why there is a divergence of my previous predictions and
the figures released by BPS.
One explanation is that previous and current Indonesian governments
have deliberately pursued a policy that researcher and analyst, Emil Ola Kleden
describes as the ‘unclarity of ethnic composition in Papua [that] reflected
Indonesia’s lasting political stand on this issue. Both Old and New Order
regimes held the view that knowing the ‘truth’ about ethnic composition could
result in social and political instability8’. One example of this policy of
‘unclarity’ is that the BPS documents from the 2010 census relating to
ethnicity quoted in this paper were only briefly displayed on the provincial
BPS website before being taken down9.
Besides any deliberate Indonesian government policy there are
several other possible explanations for the confusion over the Papuan
population growth rate and the subsequent total Papuan population and they lie
in the uncertainty of the data collected by BPS over various census periods. I
have derived my figures from the 1971; 2000 and 2010 censuses and extrapolated
growth rates from the changes in population numbers between censuses. It is
very possible that:
a.. The 1971 census was inaccurate due to the recent takeover of
Irian Barat (as the territory of West Papua was then officially designated) by
the Indonesian military; the relatively loose state control over a vast and
wild country and the limited resources of the Indonesian state apparatus to
conduct such a census.
b.. The 2000 census was inaccurate due to the widespread turmoil
that was unfolding across much of Eastern Indonesia in the wake of the fall of
President Suharto and the subsequent independence of East Timor. In West Papua
militia and other groups were active and the Indonesian state apparatus was
again poorly equipped to undertake such a huge process as a census across the
vast and restless stretches of West Papua.
c.. The 2010 census may well be accurate, although given that
West Papua remains a very large and relatively undeveloped region with low
population densities spread throughout very rugged terrain where a low level
insurgency still continues it is highly likely some groups were not included.
It is also possible that groups of Papuans were included who had not been
included in previous census (which could go some way to explaining the rapid
increase in the number of Papuans).
d.. Anecdotally there has been an incentive for the local regent
(bupati) and other local leaders and politicians to inflate the number of
people in villages and tribes to leverage more resources from the provincial
government – funds allocated for health and education services for instance.
This may or may not have had an effect on census data.
Besides actual difficulties in data collection there are also
assumptions embodied in the data that may impact the outcome – either
intentionally or unintentionally. For instance Table One shows the average
annual population growth rates for Indonesian provinces going back to 1971 by
decade. For Papua (and previously Irian Jaya Province) the growth rates have
been 2.31% (1971-1980); 3.46% (1980-1990); 3.22% (1990-2000); 5.39% (200-2010)
but just 1.99% for 2010-2014. This last figure is an estimation as censuses are
conducted every ten years. This is counter intuitive as the population growth
rate has been growing for four decades in a solid trend, inward migration of
non-Papuans into Papua has been strong in recent years (not least due to
massive development in the oil palm sector that has brought in many workers),
and there has been rapid growth in (non-Papuan dominated) urban areas.
Together the above points mean that the data provided by BPS must
be used with a degree of caution. It is highly possible that Papuans who missed
out on earlier censuses due to their isolation were included in subsequent
censuses as the strengthening Indonesian state apparatus and modern
communications and transportation improved the efficiency of BPS field
operatives. It is also quite possible that the numbers of Papuan people living
in remote regions have been inflated to secure more government funding (and
electoral advantage).
Does this mean that it is impossible to draw conclusions on the
demographic transition that is underway in West Papua? No. Even if precise
numbers might be elusive trends can clearly be established from the BPS data
which hold even when the exact numbers of respective population groups are
unclear. By examining the data from the 2010 census it is apparent that:
a.. The percentage of Papuans as a proportion of the total
population of the Papua and Papua Barat is falling over time, primarily due to
inward migration. This process is ongoing.
b.. In some regions the percentage of Papuans as a proportion of
the population has fallen catastrophically. This is particularly true in most
urban centres such as Jayapura and Sorong, and in the flat coastal areas such
as Merauke and Keerom. This process is ongoing (see below).
c.. That in large areas of the highlands and remote regions of
both Papua and Papua Barat provinces Papuan people still make up in excess of
90% of the total population.
Figures from the BPS publication, Profil Penduduk Menurut Suku
Hasil SP 2010 di Papua, (Population Profile Result According to Tribe in Papua
2010), show that the most of the Non-Papuan population reside in only a few of
Papua’s 28 kabupatens (regencies). According to the Suku document 556,422
Non-Papuans (84.47%) out of the total 658,708 are found in just seven of
Papua’s 28 regencies, leaving just 102,286 non-Papuans spread out in the
remaining 21 regencies.
Laju Pertumbuhan Penduduk menurut Provinsi
Provinsi Laju Pertumbuhan Penduduk per Tahun
1971-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-2014 2
Aceh 2,93 2,72 1,46 2.36 1 2,06
Sumatera Utara 2,60 2,06 1,32 1,10 1,39
Sumatera Barat 2,21 1,62 0,63 1,34 1,34
Riau 3,11 4,30 4,35 3,58 2,64
Jambi 4,07 3,40 1,84 2,56 1,85
Sumatera Selatan 3,32 3,15 2,39 1,85 1,50
Bengkulu 4,39 4,38 2,97 1,67 1,74
Lampung 5,77 2,67 1,17 1,24 1,26
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung - - 0,97 3,14 2,23
Kepulauan Riau - - - 4,95 3,16
DKI Jakarta 3,93 2,42 0,17 1,41 1,11
Jawa Barat 2,66 2,57 2,03 1,90 1,58
Jawa Tengah 1,64 1,18 0,94 0,37 0,82
DI Yogyakarta 1,10 0,57 0,72 1,04 1,20
Jawa Timur 1,49 1,08 0,70 0,76 0,69
Banten - - 3,21 2,78 2,30
Bali 1,69 1,18 1,31 2,15 1,24
Nusa Tenggara Barat 2,36 2,15 1,82 1,17 1,40
Nusa Tenggara Timur 1,95 1,79 1,64 2,07 1,71
Kalimantan Barat 2,31 2,65 2,29 0,91 1,68
Kalimantan Tengah 3,43 3,88 2,99 1,79 2,38
Kalimantan Selatan 2,16 2,32 1,45 1,99 1,87
Kalimantan Timur 5,73 4,42 2,81 3,81 2.64 3
Sulawesi Utara 2,31 1,60 1,33 1,28 1,17
Sulawesi Tengah 3,86 2,87 2,57 1,95 1,71
Sulawesi Selatan 1,74 1,42 1,49 1,17 1,13
Sulawesi Tenggara 3,09 3,66 3,15 2,08 2,20
Gorontalo - - 1,59 2,26 1,65
Sulawesi Barat - - - 2,68 1,95
Maluku 2,88 2,79 0,08 2,80 1,82
Maluku Utara - - 0,48 2,47 2,21
Papua Barat - - - 3,71 2,65
Papua 2,67 3,46 3,22 5,39 1,99
INDONESIA 2,31 1,98 1,49 1,49 1,40
Catatan:
Tidak Termasuk Timor Timur
1 Rata-rata Laju Pertumbuhan Penduduk per tahun 2000–2010
untuk Aceh dihitung dengan menggunakan data Sensus Penduduk Aceh Nias (SPAN)
2005 dan SP2010
2 Hasil Proyeksi Penduduk Indonesia 2010-2035 (Pertengahan
tahun/Juni)
3 Rata-rata Laju Pertumbuhan Penduduk per tahun 2010–2014
untuk Kalimantan Timur merupakan gabungan antara Kalimantan Timur dan
Kalimantan Utara
Sumber :
- Sensus Penduduk 1971, 1980 , 1990 , 2000 , 2010 dan Sensus
Penduduk Antar Sensus (SUPAS) 1995
- Data Dikutip dari Publikasi Statistik Indonesia
Table One showing average annual population growth rates by decade.
Source: BPS.
It is clear that the trend of an increasing proportion of
non-Papuans in the overall population of Papua and Papua Barat province is
continuing. What the Suku document shows is that the non-Papuans are
concentrated in a few regencies, most of which are located in the border region
close to neighbouring PNG; in Mimika near the Freeport Mine; on Biak Island and
in the urban centre of Nabire. Table Two shows the actual breakdown for each
regency in Papua Province by ethnic group. This table shows that there are five
regencies with a majority of non-Papuans: Merauke (62.73%); Nabire (52.46%);
Mimika (57.49%); Keerom (58.68%), and Jayapura City (65.09%). This means that
there are still 23 regencies where Papuans are in the majority although there
are another six with substantial non-Papuan populations: Jayapura (rural)
(38.52%); Yapen Waropen (21.91%); Biak Numfor (26.18%); Boven Digoel (33.04%);
Sarmi (29.75%), and Waropen (20.41%). The remaining 17 regencies are all
overwhelmingly Papuan in their ethnic composition, although with a non-Papuan
presence concentrated heavily in the towns. For instance Lanny Jaya is 99.89%
Papuan; Tolikara 99.04%; Yahukimo 98.57%; Paniai 97.58%, and Jayawijaya 90.79%
Papuan. This dramatic population disparity is graphic shown in Table Three.
Table Three, Jumlah Penduduk Suku Papua dan Bukan Papua Menurut
Topografi Wilayah di Papua, Tahun 2010 (Total Population of Tribe Papua and not
Tribe Papua According to Topography in Papua Year 2010), is quite staggering in
revealing the incredible inconsistency in the ethnic makeup of the various
regencies in Papua Province. Table Three divides the regencies of Papua
Province into three geographical zones: Dataran Mudah (easy plains); Dataran
Sulit (difficult plains) and Pegunungan (mountain range). It is immediately
apparent that the non-Papuan population is predominant in the hospitable ‘easy
plains’, significant in the ‘difficult plains’, but very sparse in the
‘mountain ranges’. The non-Papuan population has moved to and settled regions
most conducive to types of agriculture of industrial development in line with
the economic models seen elsewhere in Indonesia. They have not moved in large
numbers to the mountainous regions – with some exceptions such as the fertile
agricultural lands of the Baliem Valley where much land has been ‘bought’ from
traditional Dani subsistence farmers.
In Papua Barat province the population divide similarly runs
between urban and remote areas. In Sorong regency Papuans make up only 36.07%
of the population and non-Papuans 73.93% with Javanese being the single biggest
ethnic group at 41.46%. Meanwhile the mountainous regencies of Trambraun and
Maybrat both have Papuan populations in excess of 95% of the total
populations10.
Table Two showing the ethnic breakdown of regencies into
Papuan and Bukan Papuan (non-Papuan) charts in 2010. Source: Indonesian
Statistics Office, BPS.
Table Three showing the regencies of Papua Province broken
into Papuan and Bukan Papuan (non-Papuan) population cohorts and by geographic
region into Dataran Mudah (easy plains); Dataran Sulit (difficult plains) and
Pegunungan (mountain range). Source: Indonesian Statistics Office, BPS. Note
that the non-Papuan population cohort is indicated by the darker shaded portion
of the bar graphs and is predominantly in the Dataran Mudah (easy plains)
region of Papuan province. Relatively few non-Papuan people live in the
Pegunungan (mountain range) regions of the highlands.
This situation has echoes of the occupation of Australia by
European settlers. The fertile ‘easy’ country of the coastal regions,
particularly along the Eastern seaboard, was quickly taken over by farmer
settlers, but the harsh interior and northern reaches of Australia were left
alone for nearly a century from initial European invasion in 1788. It was
really only with the expansion of the cattle industry in the late nineteenth
century that large areas of the centre and north were occupied by the
colonialists, driven by commercial imperatives. Similar settlement patterns
unfolded in New Zealand, Canada and the United States where the economics of
settler colonization (where the colonisers never left) resulted in widespread
land alienation from traditional owners and the death of indigenous peoples on
a massive scale. Will this same process unfold in Papua Province driven by
mining projects, new regencies and roads as well as new military bases, rather
than cattle?
Whereas in previous analysis’s I conflated the population segments
and treated the population of West Papua (Papua Province and West Papua
Province) as a single entity and extrapolated future population projections
based on previous growth rates, the Suku, and other, documents allow for
focused analysis. The basic finding that the non-Papuan sector of the
population is growing faster than the Papuan is sound, but with great regional
variance. The projection that the non-Papuan sector of the population would
come to dominate the Papuan sector and comprise a majority is correct in
certain regencies, but clearly not yet happening in other regencies, especially
in the highlands. The non-Papuan sector of the population now clearly dominates
the richest areas and the urban centres of power, with all the benefits that
brings such as education and health services.
One region where the demographic transition has been well
researched is Keerom, where non-Papuans made up around 60% of the population in
2010 (this figure would be significantly higher in 2017). From being 100%
Papuan in 1963 the authors’ predict on current trends that the Papuan
percentage of the population will fall to 15-20% within the next decade or
so11. The Papuans are systematically discriminated against by having manifestly
inferior health and education services, greatly reduced access to sealed roads,
piped water and electricity and have lost large areas of land to migrant ‘land
grabbing’ for both small scale agriculture and large scale oil palm projects12.
Besides the racial divide the two populations are also divided by religion –
Papuans being predominantly Christian and migrants predominantly Muslim. Fear
and mistrust characterize relations between the two communities. As migrants
continue to encroach on Papuan land tension continues to simmer. Such
conditions are a breeding ground for inter-ethnic violence, up to and including
genocide, which I have discussed at some length in previous publications13.
Another region where non-Papuan domination has already become
entrenched is in Merauke Kabupaten, in the southern region of Papua province,
where the Papuans comprised less than 40 percent of the population in 2010
(this figure would be lower in 2017). This is a region where huge oil palm
development is proceeding as part of the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy
Estate (MIFEE). Millions of hectares of plantations are underway or in the
planning stages – all on land taken from traditional owners, often under
coercion and with little or no compensation. Papuans are even deprived of
employment as labourers on the plantations as workers are being brought in from
Java, many of whom apparently do not speak the lingua franca and official
national language, Bahasa Indonesia (and are therefore unable to communicate
with local Papuans who can speak it)14. The Javanese are seen as more reliable
and dedicated workers than the Papuans – which may be true as the Papuans are
used to the more relaxed lifestyle of subsistence farming15. Apparently these
Javanese settlers have themselves been forced off their land in Java due to
large scale industrial developments, for example, the expansion of Java’s
network of freeways; there is therefore an economic imperative to resettle them
elsewhere and Papua is still seen as largely ‘empty’.
Ethnic tension in Merauke is high and minor incidents, such as
traffic accidents, easily escalate into violent stand offs where the
(predominantly non-Papuan) police side with the migrants. There are reports
that police are also arming migrants, who are fearful of the Papuans’
‘primitiveness’16 and believe them to be uncivilized and violent. Further
exacerbated by religious differences this situation is a powder keg contained
only by a repressive military and police presence. It is a situation where
everyday life is one of oppression and misery for most of the Papuan population
who suffer the indignity of being an occupied population: having their
traditional lands stolen; discrimination in employment; very poor levels of
health and education services and no basic freedoms of expression and
association. Violence meted out to Papuans suspected of supporting ‘separatism’
is swift and ranges from beatings, incarceration and torture to extrajudicial
killings. The police and military act with impunity and the legal system is
effectively an arm of the security apparatus.
Concluding Comments
Previously I have predicted that, if the trends of the past few
decades remained constant, the Papuan sector of the total population of West
Papua would continue to fall until it was a ‘small and rapidly dwindling
minority’17. This paper extends that argument and finds while such a conclusion
is correct for some regencies, it is not for others. Indeed the situation
predicted as a possible future for West Papua as a whole – the minoritisation
of the Papuan people – is already a reality in rural areas such as Keerom and
Merauke, and urban centres such as Jayapura and Sorong.
The fact that only relatively small numbers of migrants have moved
into the highlands regions of Papua and Papua Barat means the highland Papuan
groups, such as the Dani and the Mee, are not in imminent danger of becoming a
‘small and rapidly dwindling minority’, even as their lowland brothers and
sisters suffer that fate. Migrants are increasingly drawn to the economic
advantages, and relative safety, of the lowland regions where they can work on
oil palm plantations or ‘own’ their own small agricultural blocks, as well as
works as traders, public servants and participants in the rapid economic
expansion that is underway. These opportunities are more limited in the
highlands but growing as new regencies are created and new roads and
settlements built, and as mining and oil/gas projects proliferate.
While some regions are Papuan dominated and others migrant
dominated, regions such as Sarmi, Biak Numfor and Jayapura (rural) still have a
Papuan majority but are receiving large numbers of migrants. If these trends
continue they will end up in the same pernicious situation as the migrant
dominated areas discussed above where the Papuans become marginalised and their
future existence is put in peril.
The consequences of these new findings are profound:
a.. The Papuan people living in regencies such as Sorong,
Merauke, Jayapura City, Keerom and Mimika are already a minority and are set to
become further marginalized as non-Papuan migrants continue to arrive to work
in the agricultural sector and pursue other economic opportunities. Non-Papuan
migrants clash with the Papuan population due to loss of traditional lands;
discrimination in employment, health and education services; religious
tensions, and by the increasing suppression and human rights abuses inflicted
by Indonesian security forces, especially in response to perceived ‘separatist’
activity. This is set to continue and grow as more non-Papuan migrants arrive,
fueling ethnic tensions and laying the ground for violent, even genocidal,
conflict.
b.. The Papuan people living in regencies in the mountainous
interior of the country are still the overwhelming majority. The relatively
small number of non-Papuan migrants in these areas are involved in trade, civil
service, the construction industry and the security forces. While new roads,
airports and industrial developments are underway, large numbers of migrants
will only arrive when economic opportunities are present, such as oil palm or
other plantations (where possible); mines; gas and oil fields are expanded or
other projects are established. It seems likely that this will occur, at least
in some areas, as the economic imperative driving development reaches ever
further into remote areas. Conflict over such resource development and the
ongoing security response with ‘sweeping’ operations and military reprisals
seems likely to continue under current Indonesian government policies. The
situation can be described as ongoing insurgency which is now characterized by
non-violent resistance on the part of the Papuans demanding not just their
basic human rights but also that of self-determination, bolstered by rapidly
growing international support, particularly from the small Pacific island
nations such as Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands.
c.. Given the above the conflict in Papua Province (and West
Papua Province) will only grow short of a fundamental shift in Indonesian
policy including: the recognition of traditional land ownership rights; ceasing
militarization and military impunity; respect for the fundamental human rights
of free speech and association; progressive education, health and employment
opportunities, and the emergence of political organisations that adequately
reflect the interests of the Papuan people. At this stage such policy shifts by
the Indonesian government appear unlikely.
d.. International support for the basic rights of the Papuan
people is growing rapidly with a goal of taking the issue to the United
Nations, having (West) Papua put back on the Schedule of Non-Self Governing
Territories and, ultimately, having the flawed 1969 Act of Free Choice, whereby
Indonesia gained sovereignty over the region, revisited. These figures mean
that the ‘problem’ of West Papua will not be resolved any time soon by the
effective minoritisation of the Papuan people, at least not in the highlands.
On the contrary large portions of the Papuan people retain their lands and
cultures intact and are quite capable of both having an open and honest vote on
their integration into Indonesia, and, given the chance, functioning as an
independent nation.
This paper shows how that the process of settlement by recent
non-Papuan migrants in the territory of West Papua is far from uniform. On the
contrary most of the migrants have settled in the coastal plains and urban
centres while the vast highlands regions remain populated predominantly by
Papuan people. However the highlands regions will be increasingly attractive to
migrants as the Indonesia government pursues aggressive economic development
policies including creating new regencies (and their concomitant
bureaucracies); building roads and developing mineral; oil/gas and forestry
resources. While the Indonesian government claims that accelerated development
will help resolve Papuan grievances against Indonesian rule the opposite is
likely as the Papuans get left behind in the development process in favour of
non-Papuan migrants; they become further marginalized within an Asian Muslim
society, and their traditional lands are forcibly taken over by government or
commercial interests. Therefore it looks likely that the changing demographic
make of West Papua will continue to fuel conflict into the future.
The author would like to thank Septer Manufandu for his insightful
comments and assistance with this essay.
Related articles
a.. Cammelia Webb-Gannon, Here: Salvaging Democracy for West
Papuans in the Face of Australia-Indonesia Obstruction
b.. Camellia Webb-Gannon and Jim Elmslie, Here: MSG Headache,
West Papuan Heartache? Indonesia's Melanesian Foray
c.. David Adam Stott, Here: Would An Independent West Papua Be A
Failing State?
d.. David Adam Stott, Here: Indonesian Colonisation, Resource
Plunder and West Papuan Grievances
Notes
1
For instance, West Papua: Genocide, Demographic Change, the Issue
of ‘Intent’ and the Australia-Indonesia Security Treaty, Australia Institute of
International Affairs, Adelaide, 23/10/06; Not Just a Disaster, Papuan Claims
of Genocide Deserve to be taken Seriously, Inside Indonesia Issue 97,
July-Sept. 2009; West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian
Census: “Slow Motion Genocide” or Not?, Papua Papers No. 1, CPACS, University
of Sydney, September, 2010. More recently with Camellia Webb-Gannon, A Slow
Motion Genocide: Indonesian Rule in West Papua, Griffith Journal of Law and
Human Dignity, Vol. 1(2), 2013, pp. 142-165.
2
See West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian
Census: “Slow Motion genocide” or not? Op. cit.
3
Ibid.
4
Suku meaning ‘tribe’ and Bukan meaning ‘not’ in Bahasa Indonesia
5
Statistics on Ethnic Diversity in the Land of Papua, Indonesia,
Aris Ananta; Dwi Retno Wilujeng Wahyu Utami; Nur Budi Handayani, Asia & Pacific
Policy Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 3, September 2016, p. 3.
6
There is some variance in the figures from the Badan Pusat Staistik
of total populations etc. although these are statistically insignificant.
7
www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/print/id/1268
8
This quote is from a paper presented by Emil Ola Kleden, ‘Papua,
Indonesia and Climate Change’ for the conference, At The Intersection: Climate
Change in the Pacific and Resource Exploitation in West Papua, organized by the
West Papua Project at the University of Western Sydney on November 3-4, 2016.
Kleden refers to Ananta, A., Evi Nurvidya Arifin, M. Sairi Hasbullah, Nur Budi
Handayani, Agus Pramono, Demography of Indonesia’s Ethnicity, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2015, p.10.
9
10
Statistics on Ethnic Diversity, op. cit.
11
Cypri J. P. Dale and John Djonga, The Papuan Paradox: The Patterns
of Social Injustice, the Violations of Right to Development, and the Failure of
Affirmative Policies in Kabupaten Keerom, Papua, Yayasan Teratai Hati Papua,
Arso, Keerom, Papua, and Sunspirit for Justice and Peace, Flores, NTT,
Indonesia, 2011, slide 45.
12
Ibid.
13
See Jim Elmslie and Cammi Webb-Gannon, A Slow-Motion Genocide:
Indonesian Rule in West Papua, Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity, Vol.
1[2] 2013, pp. 142-165.
14
Confidential source with firsthand knowledge of conditions in
Merauke.
15
Personal comment from a Papuan source who related that many Papuan
people are unused to the controlled and repetitive regime of industrial
agriculture, and intensely bored from such occupations as security ‘guards’.
16
Ibid.
17
For instance see, Jim Elmslie, West Papuan Demographic Transition
and the 2010 Indonesian Census: “Slow Motion Genocide” or not?, Papua Papers
No. 1, West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of
Sydney, 2010, p.4.
