d Wi-Fi hot spot. The attacker can see a DHCP
request or INFORM, and race in a fake response with an URL of their own
choosing. The mark's computer automatically connects there, and download some
zero-day attack. Bingo!
-- Christian Huitema
__
On Saturday, July 11, 2015 1:13 PM, Warren Kumari [mailto:war...@kumari.net]
wrote
> On Saturday, July 11, 2015, Christian Huitema wrote:
>
>> There is definitely an attack vector there. Suppose an attacker can monitor
>> the traffic, say on an
>> unencrypted Wi-Fi ho
the DHCP server. This is not always desirable. Some DHCP
> > servers provide facilities like publishing names and addresses in the
> > DNS, or ensuring that returning clients get reassigned the same
> > address.
>
> Many DHCP servers will only give addresses to pre
On Friday, February 5, 2016 6:11 PM, Brian Carpenter wrote
> Bonjour Christian,
Hello Brian
Thanks for the suggestions. I will update the draft accordingly, but I will
also wait a few day to check whether there is more feedback coming from other
reviewers.
-- Christian Huitema
>
&
e policy derives from that. So maybe it should be stated
upfront!
- -- Christian Huitema
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Thanks for the feedback, Meral. I will start preparing an updated draft shortly.
-- Christian Huitema
> On Sep 3, 2019, at 8:47 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>
> Thanks for the review, Meral!
>
> Authors, I'm going to go ahead and send this over to the IESG, but it will
>
eems to be two big offenders, logs and configuration.
So maybe we should develop a simple way to anonymize logs, and a secure way to
get configuration data…
-- Christian Huitema
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