Many thanks Elwyn for your detailed review. I also found the discussion
afterwards enlightening.
I’m expecting the authors to draw some conclusions re: possible modifications
based on the questions and answers.
Jari
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Right, it is always up to the authors (subject to wg consensus)... but it
certainly helps me understand - so many thanks for that.
Cheers,Elwyn
Sent from Samsung tablet.
Original message From: "Dearlove, Christopher (UK)"
Date: 20/12/2016
Elwyn
I was just commenting as an author of most of the RFCs referred to - but not
this one. So that’s down to the authors of this one to accept, adjust or
whatever.
But in my personal capacity, I think a comment on packet ICVs would not go
amiss - but it needs to get its layering right.
Hi.
Thanks, Christopher.
So, I think the situation can be clarified - and would have provided a clearer
answer to my question by 1. adding a couple of sentences to s6.2 to point up
the alternative packet and message protections; and 2. explaining in s6.2.1
that that the 'hole' in the
Elwyn Davies
> s3.2: I do not know enough about the details of NHDP and OLSRv2 to know if
> this is a silly question: Would it be possible for a compromised node to
> perform hop-limit or hop-count modification attacks even with RFC 6183
> security in place just by modifying these fields and
Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
Review result: Ready with Nits
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
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