Gitweb:
http://git.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=291041e935e6d0513f2b7e4a300aa9f02ec1d925
Commit: 291041e935e6d0513f2b7e4a300aa9f02ec1d925
Parent: 7a5c5d5735e785a700a377a5fce913b8ad45a58f
Author: Al Viro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
AuthorDate: Sun Oct 7 00:24:36 2007 -0700
Committer: Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CommitDate: Sun Oct 7 16:28:43 2007 -0700
fix bogus reporting of signals by audit
Async signals should not be reported as sent by current in audit log. As
it is, we call audit_signal_info() too early in check_kill_permission().
Note that check_kill_permission() has that test already - it needs to know
if it should apply current-based permission checks. So the solution is to
move the call of audit_signal_info() between those.
Bogosity in question is easily reproduced - add a rule watching for e.g.
kill(2) from specific process (so that audit_signal_info() would not
short-circuit to nothing), say load_policy, watch the bogus OBJ_PID entry
in audit logs claiming that write(2) on selinuxfs file issued by
load_policy(8) had somehow managed to send a signal to syslogd...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
kernel/signal.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 9fb91a3..7929523 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -531,18 +531,18 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo
*info,
if (!valid_signal(sig))
return error;
- error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
- if (error)
- return error;
-
- error = -EPERM;
- if ((info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) &&
SI_FROMUSER(info)))
- && ((sig != SIGCONT) ||
- (process_session(current) != process_session(t)))
- && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
- && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
- && !capable(CAP_KILL))
+ if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) &&
SI_FROMUSER(info))) {
+ error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the
signal */
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (((sig != SIGCONT) ||
+ (process_session(current) != process_session(t)))
+ && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
+ && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
+ && !capable(CAP_KILL))
return error;
+ }
return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
}
-
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