On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 11:19:21AM +0200, Realos wrote:
> >>but it does not resolve the "this key is untrusted - use it
> >>anyway?" question unless people select the key using the empty UID.
> Did not get your point.
> My idea was: Having a signed free-form uid puts more trust in
> my key that re
On Thu, 20 Oct 2005 15:45:21 +0200, Ismael Valladolid Torres said:
> Any pointer to a complete spec on what data's expected to be on the card
> and on a external medium? I have access to personalise a smartcard with
> any dedicated or elementary file needed and I'd like to give it a try.
http://g
On Thu, 20 Oct 2005 14:53:57 +, cdr said:
> Use of smatrcards presents a sociological phenomenon, deserving
> further research: unexpectedly large number of computer security
> practitioners who don't trust closed source crypto on open hardware
> but apparently do trust closed source crypto o
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Well, my first "attempt to repair" would be to "open" the Key with the
> Edit function in GPGshell and re-set the prefs (even if you keep them
> the same) and then use the "save" Command. Whenever one "tinkers" with
> their Key a new self-signature is generated showing
Use of smatrcards presents a sociological phenomenon, deserving
further research: unexpectedly large number of computer security
practitioners who don't trust closed source crypto on open hardware
but apparently do trust closed source crypto on closed hardware.
cdr
__
Werner Koch wrote:
> We don't save attributes of the key on the card; there is just the key
> and its fngerprint. The attributes (user IDs and signatures) are
> expected on an external medium.
Any pointer to a complete spec on what data's expected to be on the card
and on a external medium? I ha
Here's a patch to dirmngr's .info file so that one can cleanly remove it
from %_infodir/dir.
-- Rex
--- dirmngr-0.9.0/doc/dirmngr.info.fixinfo 2004-12-17 04:36:29.0
-0600
+++ dirmngr-0.9.0/doc/dirmngr.info 2005-01-07 08:25:26.0 -0600
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
INFO-DIR-SECTION
On Thu, 20 Oct 2005 10:24:04 +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer said:
> 1) Are there any security drawbacks when using smartcards compared with
> the "normal" store key on disc procedure?
Depends on you needs. In general a smart card is better than a
on-disk key. Some people claim that the 1024 b
On Thu, 20 Oct 2005 12:15:24 +0200, Realos said:
> I did not spot any comprehensive documentation on the web about what
> kind of key-update different keyservers allow.
They always merge keys.
> If I like to remove my signature from a certain key and/or uid, what is
> the best approach to that
Hi.
I'd have some questions about using smartcards with together with GnuPG
and would be grateful if you could help me.
1) Are there any security drawbacks when using smartcards compared with
the "normal" store key on disc procedure?
2) Any knowledge if the Omnikey (www.omnikey.com) readers
On Wed, 19 Oct 2005 16:46:23 +0200, Realos said:
> I also thought of using the free-form UID for collecting signatures and
> the using it to sign my new UID.
Please consider that many folks run an email challenge response for
each user ID they are going to sign. Thus, you won't get a signature
I did not spot any comprehensive documentation on the web about what
kind of key-update different keyservers allow.
If I like to remove my signature from a certain key and/or uid, what is
the best approach to that? Does it make sense to revoke the signature or
just delete it? I find both of these
>>but it does not resolve the "this key is untrusted - use it
>>anyway?" question unless people select the key using the empty UID.
Did not get your point.
My idea was: Having a signed free-form uid puts more trust in
my key that revoked uid.
>
>If i use that UID to sign my other IDs doesn't it
>Some people do this, and it can be useful in certain places (signing
>keys), but it does not resolve the "this key is untrusted - use it
>anyway?" question unless people select the key using the empty UID.
I also thought of using the free-form UID for collecting signatures and
the using it to si
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