Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Werner Koch
On Mon, 17 Oct 2011 20:25, jer...@jeromebaum.com said: > Skimmed over this. You say that you need ISP support to get the system > adopted (for the DNS-based distribution). Wouldn't that hinder adoption? Please look at how most people use mail: They get a mail address from their ISP, a preinstalle

Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 10/17/2011 6:07 PM, Jerome Baum wrote: >>> So enabling _Enigmail_'s "Send 'OpenPGP' header" option is difficult now? > > The emphasis was clearly on "Enigmail", not on whether it's difficult or > not. And the answer to your question is obviously, "Yes." > If you hadn't misquoted me you might

Re: private key protection

2011-10-17 Thread Doug Barton
On 10/17/2011 14:44, Jerome Baum wrote: >> Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you >> have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an >> attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average >> attacker isn't going to be able to break

Re: private key protection

2011-10-17 Thread Derick Centeno
On 10/17/11 5:18 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote: > Hi everybody, > > what is the best way to protect > your private key from getting stolen? Page 29 (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN513) of the Gnu Privacy Handbook (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html)recommends a strong passphrase t

Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Aaron Toponce
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 08:25:04PM +0200, Jerome Baum wrote: > How about an opportunistic approach? This email should include the > following header: > > OpenPGP: id=C58C753A; > url=https://jeromebaum.com/pgp > > The MUA could recognize a header like this one and remember that there's > a cer

Re: private key protection

2011-10-17 Thread Jerome Baum
> Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you > have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an > attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average > attacker isn't going to be able to break your key on modern hardware > and anyone who

Re: How to use terminal to change mac-cache-ttl

2011-10-17 Thread Benjamin Donnachie
On 12 October 2011 16:44, Vortran66 wrote: > I realize now that changing the cache values involves a little more than > changing a few values and that I am probably in > way over my head. Open a terminal and type "man gpg-agent". Make a note of any ttl values you want to set, eg: --def

Re: private key protection

2011-10-17 Thread Anthony Papillion
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:18 PM, wrote: > > what is the best way to protect > your private key from getting stolen? Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an attacker almost no leverage. With a stron

Re: private key protection

2011-10-17 Thread Anthony Papillion
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Jerome Baum wrote: >> Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you >> have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an >> attacker almost no leverage.  With a strong passphrase, the average >> attacker isn't going to be a

Re: private key protection

2011-10-17 Thread Anthony Papillion
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Jerome Baum wrote: >> Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you >> have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an >> attacker almost no leverage.  With a strong passphrase, the average >> attacker isn't going to be a

Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Jerome Baum
On 2011-10-17 23:59, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 10/17/11 5:21 PM, Jerome Baum wrote: >> So enabling _Enigmail_'s "Send 'OpenPGP' header" option is difficult now? > > [long rant about Enigmail] The emphasis was clearly on "Enigmail", not on whether it's difficult or not. If you hadn't misquoted

Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 10/17/11 5:21 PM, Jerome Baum wrote: > So enabling _Enigmail_'s "Send 'OpenPGP' header" option is difficult now? Unquestionably, indubitably, beyond doubt, *yes*. You are assuming a level of computer literacy that is beyond 95% of the computing public. Remember, under 10% of the computing publ

Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Jerome Baum
> http://windowslivehelp.com/solution.aspx?solutionid=a485233f-206d-491e-941b-118e45a7cf1b Wow, since 2009 (I haven't checked back in a while -- stay clear of strange hosts like hotmail). I think the point still stands though. I don't think email providers are the right place to look for end-to-e

Re: private key protection

2011-10-17 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 10/17/11 5:18 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote: > what is the best way to protect your private key from getting > stolen? Smartcard and a good PIN. That's pretty much the gold standard. It's not the best way (there is no 'best way'), but it's generally an excellent place to start from. > 1. Using

Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Jerry
On Mon, 17 Oct 2011 20:25:04 +0200 Jerome Baum articulated: > Skimmed over this. You say that you need ISP support to get the system > adopted (for the DNS-based distribution). Wouldn't that hinder > adoption? hotmail and the like still don't support POP3 or IMAP in a > standard account, and they

private key protection

2011-10-17 Thread takethebus
Hi everybody, what is the best way to protect your private key from getting stolen? I think: 1. Using gnupg on a windows PC with internet connection is not good, because there are too many trojans out there. 2. Using gnupg on a linux PC with internet connection (like privatix, see http://ww

Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Jerome Baum
On 2011-10-17 23:00, Ben McGinnes wrote: > On 18/10/11 7:32 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote: >> >> I like the idea, but how are you setting the header? I see you're >> using Thunderbird, and I don't believe that setting that header is >> part of Enigmail. Further, it appears your mail isn't signed. Just >>

Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Ben McGinnes
On 18/10/11 7:32 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote: > > I like the idea, but how are you setting the header? I see you're > using Thunderbird, and I don't believe that setting that header is > part of Enigmail. Further, it appears your mail isn't signed. Just > curious. No, but it is part of Thunderbird:

Re: STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Jerome Baum
> http://g10code.com/docs/steed-usable-e2ee.pdf Skimmed over this. You say that you need ISP support to get the system adopted (for the DNS-based distribution). Wouldn't that hinder adoption? hotmail and the like still don't support POP3 or IMAP in a standard account, and they are still popular

STEED - Usable end-to-end encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Werner Koch
Hi! Over the last year Marcus and me discussed ideas on how to make encryption easier for non-crypto geeks. We explained our plans to several people and finally decided to start a project to develop such a system. Obviously it is based on GnuPG but this is only one component of the whole system.

Re: use key, not passphrase, in symmetric encryption

2011-10-17 Thread David Tomaschik
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 7:51 AM, sweepslate wrote: > The end goal is to encrypt a volume of around 100GB of personal files that > I'll be carrying arround with me in a portable drive. I like GnuPG as much as the next guy around here, but is there a reason you want to use GPG instead of a tool des

Re: use key, not passphrase, in symmetric encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Hauke Laging
Am Montag, 17. Oktober 2011, 13:51:03 schrieb sweepslate: > The end goal is to encrypt a volume of around 100GB of personal files > that I'll be carrying arround with me in a portable drive. > The key point is doing the encryption of 14000 files in a > non-interactive way. echo fubar | gpg --symm

Re: use key, not passphrase, in symmetric encryption

2011-10-17 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 10/17/2011 7:51 AM, sweepslate wrote: > I wanted to use something larger than a passphrase so I wondered if I > can use a key. But on a second thought, I could use a SHA512SUM as a > passphrase, which is 128 bytes in length. That makes it 1024 bits; > correct? It's like a small key. I could use

Re: use key, not passphrase, in symmetric encryption

2011-10-17 Thread sweepslate
The end goal is to encrypt a volume of around 100GB of personal files that I'll be carrying arround with me in a portable drive. It's around 14000 files, so I can't possibly encrypt them one-by-one interactively! Doing a tarball is going to be time-consuming, space consuming [1], and cumbersom

Re: How to use terminal to change mac-cache-ttl

2011-10-17 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 10/16/2011 9:31 PM, Vortran66 wrote: > Thank you very much. Looks like alter agent will not work with Snow > Leopard. It will, actually: all I have to do is recompile it for Snow Leopard. There's nothing in there that's Lion-specific. I'll see about making a new build within the next couple o

Re: How to use terminal to change mac-cache-ttl

2011-10-17 Thread Vortran66
Mr. Hansen: Thank you very much. Looks like alter agent will not work with Snow Leopard. As soon as I upgrade to Lion I will give it a try. Thanks for helping out a novice! Bill Robert J. Hansen-3 wrote: > > On 10/12/11 11:44 AM, Vortran66 wrote: >> Thanks for all your effort. I realize

Re: GPGME and Windows Server 2003/2008

2011-10-17 Thread Werner Koch
On Sun, 16 Oct 2011 02:51, mwink...@compass-analytics.com said: > * GPG 1.1.4 Do you mean GnuPG 1.4.11 or GPGME 1.1.4? The latter is quite old and the NEWS file shows that 1.1.5 and 1.1.6 both had fixes for Windows. The current version is 1.3.0; a binary for Windows of that versions (or

no, you can't

2011-10-17 Thread M.R.
On 17/10/11 01:37, Doug Barton wrote: On 10/16/2011 14:37, sweepslate wrote: It's sort of hard to understand what you're trying to accomplish, can you give us more details? To me, it is perfectly obvious what the OP is trying to accomplish: perform the encryption by supplying the cryptographic