On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 02:18:13PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 6/22/2012 1:44 PM, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> > As you mentioned earlier, the v3 people have an entrenched user-
> > base, and are hardly novices, and 'for them', listing the keysize
> > with the fingerprint, really is trivia
Hello. In this instance I am running 64-bit Win7, and I have GPA installed
with Gpg 2.0.17, which came from here: http://www.gpg4win.org/. In my
configuration file are these two lines:
keyserver hkps://zimmermann.mayfirst.org
keyserver-options verbose ca-cert-file=%appdata%\gnupg\mfpl.crt
An
On 06/22/2012 02:52 PM, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> Am somewhat surprised by the unprovoked V3 rants, when I asked for
> nothing from anyone, and only thanked WK for allowing it to happen.
Your characterization of "adding the key length is a trivial
[something]" is what irritated me. As I menti
On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 14:18:25 -0400 Robert J. Hansen
wrote:
>If people want to keep using PGP 2.6, let them, but I'm not going
>to >help them do it.
>Were it up to me, PGP 2.6 support in GnuPG would be reduced to
>read-only. So be thankful Werner isn't paying attention to my
>preferences. :
Hi All
I was demonstrating GPA for the first time to a class of students
yesterday and a very strange thing happened. (Note that I am new to GPA,
having used OpenPGP for the last 10 years, so I am not familiar with its
"normal" behaviour). When I signed a message in the clipboard and was
aske
On 6/22/2012 1:44 PM, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> As you mentioned earlier, the v3 people have an entrenched user-
> base, and are hardly novices, and 'for them', listing the keysize
> with the fingerprint, really is trivial.
If people want to keep using PGP 2.6, let them, but I'm not going to
h
Hi Robert
yes you are right. It does indeed reveal your passphrase.
I also tried to repeat my problem again with GPA, and this time most of
my passphrase appeared in a thunderbird window that had not popped up
when I started to use GPA after immediately reading your email.
Something (I did?)
On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 12:56:46 -0400 Robert J. Hansen
wrote:
>On 6/22/2012 12:39 PM, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
>> " trivially countered by
>> simply listing the keysize together with the fingerprint."
>
>This is, unfortunately, not a trivial fix.
>
>Already people don't pay attention to proper v
On 6/22/2012 11:54 AM, David Chadwick wrote:
> I was demonstrating GPA for the first time to a class of students
> yesterday and a very strange thing happened.
I was able to recreate this on GPG4WIN Win7/64, incidentally. The
problem does not appear to be in GPA, but in pinentry. It can be
recre
On 6/22/2012 12:39 PM, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> " trivially countered by
> simply listing the keysize together with the fingerprint."
This is, unfortunately, not a trivial fix.
Already people don't pay attention to proper validation because the idea
of checking the fingerprint is alien to the
On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:23:27 -0400 David Shaw
wrote:
>There is more than one attack against V3. There is the "bit
>sliding" attack, where you can forge the whole fingerprint, but as
>a side effect it changes the keysize, and there is the DEADBEEF
>attack where you can forge the key ID, but
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 22/06/12 16:54, David Chadwick wrote:
> Hi All
>
> I was demonstrating GPA for the first time to a class of students yesterday
> and a very
> strange thing happened. (Note that I am new to GPA, having used OpenPGP for
> the last
> 10 years, so I
Hi All
I was demonstrating GPA for the first time to a class of students
yesterday and a very strange thing happened. (Note that I am new to GPA,
having used OpenPGP for the last 10 years, so I am not familiar with its
"normal" behaviour). When I signed a message in the clipboard and was
aske
On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 10:21:35AM -0400, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> vulnerability in that their fingerprint mechanism is trivially
> gamable,
> so long keyid collisions are easy.
[snip]
Please fix your mail client. It is breaking threads.
Thanks,
--
. o . o . o . . o o . . . o .
.
On Jun 22, 2012, at 10:21 AM, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> Daniel Kahn Gillmor dkg at fifthhorseman.net wrote on
> Thu Jun 21 22:38:31 CEST 2012 :
>
>> v3 keys have a serious
> vulnerability in that their fingerprint mechanism is trivially
> gamable,
> so long keyid collisions are easy.
>
> The
Daniel Kahn Gillmor dkg at fifthhorseman.net wrote on
Thu Jun 21 22:38:31 CEST 2012 :
>v3 keys have a serious
vulnerability in that their fingerprint mechanism is trivially
gamable,
so long keyid collisions are easy.
The 'serious vulnerability' you refer to, is trivially countered by
simply lis
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