On 25.07.2013, Christopher J. Walters wrote:
> On 7/24/2013 6:06 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> >(My original reply went just to Philipp. My apologies.)
>
> No apology necessary.
>
> I also must apologize, as my original reply got sent to Robert J. Hansen,
> when it was intended for the list.
On 7/24/2013 6:06 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
(My original reply went just to Philipp. My apologies.)
No apology necessary.
I also must apologize, as my original reply got sent to Robert J. Hansen, when
it was intended for the list.
On 7/24/2013 1:53 AM, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
Unfor
(My original reply went just to Philipp. My apologies.)
On 7/24/2013 1:53 AM, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
> Maybe having a look at the following scenario will help:
Unfortunately, this is not casting very much light on things. The use
of phrases like CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET have v
On 24.07.2013, Mark H. Wood wrote:
> Absolute security isn't possible. Any machine you are not shackled to
> is sometimes out of your control.
It depends. In my workingplace, nobody can access my own
machine physically. I don't claim that there will be 100% security,
though.
___
On 24.07.2013, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
> How else would others know that the key they use to encrypt is mine
They would know if they would check your identity.
> and assume that only I can decrypt it?
Most people would silently assume that, if they had checked your
identity and concluded w
On Wed, Jul 24, 2013 at 10:13:52AM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> My reluctance to rely on a certifications from a user with several keys
> is due to GnuPG's trust model; I rarely (if ever) assign full ownertrust
> to other people's keys. I usually mark other people's keys with
> marginal own
On 07/24/2013 05:52 AM, Einar Ryeng wrote:
> I'd just stick to three different keys if I were you. Nobody will care that
> they have to sign three keys rather than one or two.
While i agree with Einar that signing three keys isn't a big difference
from signing one key with three user IDs, I will n
Am 24.07.2013 15:18, schrieb Mark H. Wood:
> On Wed, Jul 24, 2013 at 11:33:18AM +0200, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
>> I just want multiple security levels: Decrypt mail addressed to the
>> university address, but not mail addressed to my private address on the
>> university computer. Decrypt both t
On Wed, Jul 24, 2013 at 11:33:18AM +0200, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
> I just want multiple security levels: Decrypt mail addressed to the
> university address, but not mail addressed to my private address on the
> university computer. Decrypt both types of mail on my private computer.
> After all
On Wed, Jul 24, 2013 at 08:35:25AM +0200, Heinz Diehl wrote:
> On 24.07.2013, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
>
> > I do not trust the computer at university with the secret key used to
> > decrypt my private mail.
> []
>
> > Still, I want to be able to read any encrypted mail sent to my
> > un
On Wed, Jul 24, 2013 at 12:04:40AM +0200, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
> Am 23.07.2013 23:22, schrieb Max Parmer:
>
> >
> > Sounds like you might want an offline master key with a couple UIDs and
> > several subkeys.
> >
>
> But can I have multiple encryption subkeys, with encryption subkeys
> a
On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 07:50:48PM +0200, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
>
> Of course it is annoying to have to ask everyone to sign three keys -
> after all they are all my keys, and the people I ask to sign my key all
> get to see the same passport. Is there a better alternative?
I've never thoug
On 7/24/2013 2:35 AM, Heinz Diehl wrote:
You can't have security on a machine which is out of your control. If
others have physical access to your machine at university, what you
want isn't possible. They could simply install a keylogger or other
monitoring.
Exactly. My suggestion would grant
Am 24.07.2013 08:35, schrieb Heinz Diehl:
> On 24.07.2013, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
>
>> I do not trust the computer at university with the secret key used to
>> decrypt my private mail.
> []
>
>> Still, I want to be able to read any encrypted mail sent to my
>> unversity addresses on th
Hello Philipp,
On 7/24/2013 1:53 AM, Philipp Klaus Krause wrote:
Hmm, since everyone seems to think "He doesn't consider the unviersity
computer secure enough for something, so he shouldn't consider it secure
enough for anything", it seems I'm failing and communicating what I want
to do. Maybe h
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