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On 10/18/19 2:12 PM, Steffen Nurpmeso wrote:
> (redacted)... there are drugs and other specialists which
> can make you talk and reveal that presence. At some later time
> i would expect a court order to access log etc. data in and of the
> brain
Tony Lane via Gnupg-users wrote in :
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That seems to be a good choice.
|On 10/17/19 3:38 PM, Steffen Nurpmeso wrote:
|> You know, i would say people should be advised to use the most
|> compatible, most secure keys available for their "very
On Thu, 2019-10-17 at 17:40 +0200, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
> In all cases, we certainly won't re-write GnuPG or similar. The
> question
> on the table is: do we continue to use GnuPG (be it directly or via
> gpgme), or do we use a different OpenPGP implementation (and if yes
> which one). There
Brennecke, Simon wrote:
> I have a question regarding the interaction of SSH with gpg-agent
> (and possibly also gnuk).
[...]
> So I generated a new ECC key in gnuk, imported the public keys in gpg.
> Added the keygrip everything to "~/.gnupg/sshcontrol"
Just FYI, for smartcard, adding a keygrip
Vincent Breitmoser wrote:
> > It would be nice if you can add to the keyserver list also the
> > mailvelope.com keyserver,
>
> I concur keys.mailvelope.com is a fine keyserver today. However, you might
> want to consider:
>
> > because it requires users to authenticate their keys against the
> It would be nice if you can add to the keyserver list also the
> mailvelope.com keyserver,
I concur keys.mailvelope.com is a fine keyserver today. However, you might want
to consider:
> because it requires users to authenticate their keys against the keyserver
> with an received encrypted
On Fri, 2019-10-18 at 09:19 +0200, Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>
> > 1. How should we handle the SKS keyserver attacks?
>
> I would list in the FAQ the kind of attacks possible,
> to educate users, before they choose one for uploading
> their key.
>
> > One
> 1. How should we handle the SKS keyserver attacks?
Worth mentioning that at the openpgp summit recently, Kristian announced some
plans that the SKS pool would:
1) Move implementation from SKS to Hockeypuck
2) Disable search by user id entirely
3) Filter out third party signatures, at least
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> 1. How should we handle the SKS keyserver attacks?
I would list in the FAQ the kind of attacks possible,
to educate users, before they choose one for uploading
their key.
> One school of thought says "SKS is tremendously diminished as a
> resource, because using it
On Thu, 2019-10-17 at 15:18 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> 1. How should we handle the SKS keyserver attacks?
>
> One school of thought says "SKS is tremendously diminished as a
> resource, because using it can wedge older GnuPG installations and we
> can't make people upgrade. We should
Hello
I use linux, ubuntu budgie.For my mail i use thunderbird 60.3.0 and also
mailfence, would like to know how to use gnupg in case of 2FA gpg
authentification? Let me explain, i need to read a message crypted with my
public key,i didn' receved this message by email it is online and i just
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