retracing the validity of a key

2013-08-22 Thread Christoph Groth
Hello, For some key in my keyring that GnuPG considers valid due to the web of trust I would like to understand why it does so. I can list all the signatures with --list-sigs, but is there any way (short to writing a script myself) to mark those signatures that are actually considered trusted? T

gpgsm: trust a specific sender but not CA

2014-09-22 Thread Christoph Groth
Hi, Is it possible with gpgsm to trust a specific sender while not trusting the CA? I tried putting the key’s fingerprint into trustlist.txt, but this doesn’t seem to work for individual keys. Christoph ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnu

What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-07 Thread Christoph Groth
Hello, Through an article [1] in LWN, I stumbled across a thread [2] on this list that dealt with the usefulness of smartcards for storing OpenPGP keys. I understand that OpenPGP smartcards do not protect from a compromise of the computer system that they are used with. As Peter Lebbing puts it

Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-08 Thread Christoph Groth
Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 2020-01-06 18:26, Christoph Groth wrote: > > > > But then he also mentions his 128-bit passphrase and that he would > > be OK to publish his (passphrase-protected) private key in > > a newspaper. Why then not store it on the disks of multi

Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-08 Thread Christoph Groth
Wiktor Kwapisiewicz wrote: > There is one feature of smartcards that's hard to reproduce otherwise: > once you pull the smartcard out of the port the attacker can't use it. > > (...) Thanks, that’s a good point! So if one’s concern is signing or authentication, this is indeed useful. However,