Alyssa Ross writes:
>> > For example, why isn't ask-cert-level a default?
>>
>> For an alternative view on ask-cert-level see also:
>>
>> https://debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/98
>
> Oh, interesting. Thank you for showing this to me. I had it in my head
> that a "weak" signature would
Mirimir via Gnupg-users writes:
>>- Embeds a hardcoded list of already-disrupted keys for which packets
>> should be filtered-out when serving them
>
> That's what I meant. Plus some mechanism for testing keys, so poisoned
> ones are blocked, as soon as possible.
>
> It'd also be useful f
> 1. We would have to ensure that all keyservers block the same
> uploads. One permissive keyserver is a backdoor into the entire
> system. We can’t block bad keys at reconciliation time for the same
> reasons that have been hashed to death already.
One way to do that, though it would mean officia
On 06/06/2018 06:56 PM, NdK wrote:
> Il 06/06/2018 17:49, Tom Li via Gnuk-users ha scritto:
>
>> BTW, BasicCard and JavaCard seemed even more obscure and I cannot find
>> any public service of cracking.
> Because those are (at least should be) based on secure chips.
>
>> But it does not solve any
On 05/23/2018 01:40 AM, Dennis Clarke wrote:>> The longer you leave
people with maintenance, the longer they will want
>> maintenance past the deadline.
>>
>
> [1] Then a service org should exist that charges fees.
This service org already exists, is named in the message you replied to,
and is ca
On 05/22/2018 11:48 PM, Dennis Clarke wrote:
> On 05/22/2018 05:38 PM, Dan Kegel wrote:
>> Lessee...
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard
>> already give an end-of-life date for 2.0, but none for 1.4.
>> And since Ubuntu 16.04 includes 1.4, there are likely
>> to still be a few vocal
On 05/14/2018 09:45 AM, Werner Koch wrote:> The topic of that paper is
that HTML is used as a back channel to create
> an oracle for modified encrypted mails. It is long known that HTML
> mails and in particular external links like
> are evil if the MUA actually honors them (which many meanwhile
On 01/16/2018 10:56 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 01/16/2018 07:40 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>
>> The keyserver network (or some future variant of it) can of course play
>> a role in parallel to any or all of these. for example, keyservers are
>> particularly well-situated to offer k
On 01/16/2018 06:33 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 01/16/2018 06:19 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
>> Also, there are flaws with this approach (like after a private key
>> compromise, it would allow to prevent dissemination of the revocation
>> certificate) [1], but fi
On 01/16/2018 05:42 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> The mechanism to prove you are the owner of a public key is pretty much
>> in place :-). A mechanism where you can have a signed statement saying
>> "on 2018-01-16, I allow my key to show up on keyservers"
>
> It is theoretically and practically p
On 01/16/2018 09:20 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:>> should not be viewed
as "discussing a [...] nightmare scenario",
>
> I am darkly amused at someone who has not done the research into what
> the nightmare scenario *is* telling me that it's not a nightmare scenario.
>
> The nightmare scenario is m
On 01/15/2018 08:13 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:>> Since you can never remove
>> anything from the public key server, You are
>> wondering if you can add something to it -- for
>> example, add another 100 of UIDs with other
>> people's real name and emails so people can not
>> find out which one is
On 10/10/2017 08:23 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Tue 2017-10-10 19:46:28 +0200, Leo Gaspard wrote:
>> That said, I wonder whether the sentence with “all GNU/Linux distros
>> feature a suitable GnuPG tool” would make sense at all, given GnuPG is,
>> as pointed out by
On 10/10/2017 06:45 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:> (where is the FAQ
maintained, btw? how is one expected to submit
> patches?)
I based my quotes on https://dev.gnupg.org/source/gnupg-doc.git ,
directory web/faq, running `git grep Linux`.
> I suspect that many minimal Linux-based operating syst
On 10/10/2017 03:13 PM, Mike Gerwitz wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 09, 2017 at 22:06:17 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> A request has been made that each instance of "Linux" in the FAQ be
>> replaced with "GNU/Linux".
>
> GnuPG is part of the GNU operating system. Anywhere "Linux" is used to
> describe
On 10/10/2017 05:55 PM, Mario Castelán Castro wrote:
> On 10/10/17 01:46, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> With respect to specific distros, we ought use the name the distro
>> prefers. The Fedora Project releases Fedora, not Fedora GNU/Linux. The
>> Debian guys release Debian GNU/Linux, not Debian Lin
(you forgot to Cc: the list, I'm Cc-ing back as it doesn't seem
voluntary to me)
On 09/10/2017 07:50 PM, lesto fante wrote:
>> Besides, there is no
> need to give the same masterkey to your bank and your smart fridge, as
> they will (likely?) not participate in the Web of Trust anyway
>
> not the
On 09/10/2017 06:36 PM, lesto fante wrote:
> I am a bit confused by your "C key" terminology, i assume you are
> referring to what i call "master key", or level 2 key, that now I want
> to call SIGN KEY.
Oh yes sorry, I forgot to explain my terminology.
> Lets all agree on the terminology please.
On 09/10/2017 04:36 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:>> My user case is
simple; maintain my identity even if my master key is
>> compromised. Tho achieve that, I think about a multilevel subkey
>> system.
>
> I'm not sure how the proposed multi-level system is an improvement over
> an offline primary
On 08/18/2017 06:33 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:>> In my own and other
people's keyrings and in key servers.
>
> The impact of you doing this on your own seems vanishingly small. And
> the ratio of disk space used by a public keyring versus everything else
> that is commonly on a computer isn't differ
On 02/23/2017 09:00 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> [...]
>
> To which I said, "Create two keys with the same fingerprint. Sign a contract
> with one, then renege on the deal. When you get called into court, say "I
> never signed that, Your Honor!" and present the second key. This collision
> p
On 09/29/2015 06:04 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> But you never know when a George Dantzig will appear. And that means I
> think your long-term confidence in RSA is misplaced.
Does that mean long-term confidence in elliptic curves would be better
placed?
Does ECC rely on a stronger mathematical
On Sun, Jul 06, 2014 at 12:21:13PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 7/6/2014 3:36 AM, The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm wrote:
> > Using GPG encryption is still good, although it's vulnerable to
> > quantum cryptodecryption.
>
> In point of fact, we don't know this.
>
> Theoretically, science-f
On Sun, Jun 08, 2014 at 01:13:27PM -0400, t...@piratemail.se wrote:
> And personally, I do not trust google. Enough said in that regard. ;-)
Sorry to hijack this topic, but... Why would you trust the OpenPGP.js
developers?
At least, you can hold google as accountable for their actions. You cannot
On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:51:40AM +0200, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> You can't object to scientific theories on the basis that you did not
> study them properly. It might have a bit of a Socratic feel to it, but
> it quite falls short of the real thing.
Just for the record: I do not feel like I ever o
First: I agree with everything skipped in the quotes.
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 07:31:26PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> > BTW: AFAICT, a nuclear warhead (depending on the warhead, ofc.) does
> > not release so much energy, it just r
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 01:15:40PM -0700, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> >First, the Margolus-Levitin limit: "6.10^33 ops.J^{-1}.s^{-1} maximum"
> >So, dividing the 2^128 by 6.10^33 gives me a bit less than 57000 J.s
> >(assuming testing an AES key is a single operation). So, that's less than
> >1min fo
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:21:36PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > Since the well known agency from Baltimore uses its influence to have
> > crypto standards coast close to the limit of the brute-forceable, 128
> > bit AES will be insecure not too far in the future.
>
> No.
>
> https://www.gnu
On Wed, Apr 09, 2014 at 11:37:52PM +0100, One Jsim wrote:
> PGP/GPG does not work easily with web-mail.
>
> Most email, today, is read and write using the browser
>
> POP ou IMAP mail is a rarity
>
> That is the problem
>
> Some text/link in this problem?
>
> José Simões
Well... I started to
On Fri, Apr 04, 2014 at 01:32:47PM -0400, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> I trust them to encrypt to my public key, and was planning to work out
> a system where I could decrypt on my own without it going through
> them.
> (they could have my public key, and verify my RSA signature).
>
> [All this is
On Thu, Apr 03, 2014 at 09:56:18AM -0400, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, April 02, 2014 at 5:41 PM, "Leo Gaspard"
> wrote:
>
> >If you are not to use the key in gnupg, why make gnupg generate it
> >in the first
> >place? Why not use the pro
On Wed, Apr 02, 2014 at 01:55:21PM -0400, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> Is it possible to generate an RSA key in GnuPG, and then use it (not in
> GnuPG, but in other systems using RSA keys), to encrypt and decrypt RSA
> messages?
>
> If so, what portion of the GnuPG generated RSA key functions as
On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 07:25:46PM +0100, Martin Behrendt wrote:
> One use case would be, if you use portable thunderbird only those
> encrypted messages get compromised which can be decrypted by the local
> key and which were composed in a certain time-frame. On my side, I
> still can read message
On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 09:09:45PM +, MFPA wrote:
> > The advantage you have here though is the web of trust.
> > 1 level 1 signature would probably be not enough, but
> > 5, 10, 100..?
>
> If the signatures are made automatically be email software without
> verifying identity, where is the we
On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 11:08:16PM +, Steve Jones wrote:
> [...]
>
> Finally there's the possibility of explicit verification, if someone
> sends me a challenge and I publish that challenge's signature on my
> blog then that verifies that I am in control of that private key and
> can publish t
On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 07:47:15AM +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> [...]
>
> > the usefulness of revocation certificate, just the advice always popping
> > out to
> > generate a revocation certificate in any case, without thinking of whether
> > it
> > would be useful.
>
> Okay, that is a different
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 04:38:19PM -0800, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> >Well... I don't know how you type
>
> With a nine-volt battery, a paperclip, and a USB cable that has only one end
> -- the other is bare wires. You wouldn't believe how difficult it is to do
> the initial handshake, but once yo
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 03:08:40PM -0800, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> >Yet, I agree I would not send my encrypted private key. But having your
> >divorced
> >spouse bruteforce 90 bit of passphrase just to annoy you... seems quite an
> >unreasonable threat to me.
>
> It is. That's why that's not the
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 01:27:58PM -0800, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> [...]
>
> And yes, a strong passphrase is still the strongest bar against these
> backups being misused -- but unless you've got an eye-poppingly strong
> passphrase, your best bet is to rely on denying attackers access to the dat
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 10:26:33PM +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu, 23 Jan 2014 21:25, ekl...@gmail.com said:
>
> > PS: Please, do not tell me one might have forgotten his passphrase. In this
> > case
> > there is no harm in shredding the secret key and waiting for the expiration
>
> Experien
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 09:59:30PM +0100, Pete Stephenson wrote:
> [...]
>
> They would need to be trustworthy
> enough to not abuse the revocation certificate by revoking your
> certificate, but otherwise would not need to be given absolute trust
> that comes with having a copy of the private key
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 05:53:57PM +, nb.linux wrote:
> Hi Uwe,
>
> Johannes Zarl:
> > So in short:
> > - a delay won't help you
> > - protect your private key so this won't happen
> > - always use a strong passphrase
> and in addition: if you fear (or know) that your secret key was copied
On Sat, Jan 04, 2014 at 10:28:26PM +0100, Johannes Zarl wrote:
> On Saturday 04 January 2014 16:09:51 Leo Gaspard wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 07:31:29PM -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> > > In your example, the fact that a message was encrypted makes the
> >
On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 07:31:29PM -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 01/03/2014 06:56 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 12:50:47PM -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> >> On 01/03/2014 08:12 AM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> >>> So changing the e
On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 12:50:47PM -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 01/03/2014 08:12 AM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> > So changing the encryption could break an opsec.
>
> If someone's opsec is based on the question of whether a message was
> encrypted or not, then they
On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 06:21:05AM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 1/3/2014 4:57 AM, Hauke Laging wrote:
> > Would you explain how that shall be avoided?
>
> I already did, in quite clear language.
>
> You are trying to solve a social problem ("people don't have the
> background to think form
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 12:12:12PM +0100, Mindiell wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I'm using GPG regularly and did want to "save" my private key.
>
> [...]
>
> I found (http://point-at-infinity.org//) too, but it wasn't
> really usable beacause it has too many limitations IMHO.
>
> So I did it mys
On Tue, Dec 03, 2013 at 07:26:09PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 12/3/2013 6:59 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
> > It may be possible to prevent someone from seeing the revocation
> > certificate. Certificate distribution is a lot less secure than the
> > keys themselves. But you cannot trick someon
On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 02:50:20PM -0800, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> >>That depends on your threat model. If you fear juridical problems (say,
> >>for example, some encrypted mails have been intercepted by the police
> >>but they can't decrypt them), destroying the key will prevent you from
> >>havi
On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 09:06:18PM +0100, Johan Wevers wrote:
> On 19-11-2013 7:07, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > Even then, scrubbing data is usually a sign you've misunderstood the
> > problem you're trying to solve. If you're concerned about sensitive
> > data lurking on your hard drive the solut
(Failed again to answer to list. I really ought to replace this shortcut...)
On Fri, Nov 08, 2013 at 12:11:38AM +0100, Johannes Zarl wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I'm currently thinking about using a raspberry pi as a non-networked stand-
> alone system for signing keys. Since I haven't heard anything to the c
On Thu, Nov 07, 2013 at 08:10:11PM +0100, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> I'm sorry, I think I gave too much importance to your earlier statement
> ("Signing is to be an attestation to the validity of the key.") [...]
Sorry again, just noticed it actually wasn't you statement
On Thu, Nov 07, 2013 at 01:40:22PM -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 11/07/2013 11:09 AM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> >Except they do not have to know X, nor that he makes perfectly reasonable
> >decisions in signing keys.
> >
> >And I believe it's not noise. Let
On Thu, Nov 07, 2013 at 07:21:28PM +0100, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 2013-11-07 17:09, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> >If I understood correctly, the depth parameter you are talking about
> >is useless, except in case there are trust signature. And you agreed with
> >me for
> >
On Thu, Nov 07, 2013 at 11:48:07AM +0100, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 06/11/13 23:28, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> > But mostly because signing is an attestion of your belief someone is who
> > (s)he is. Thus, if you believe someone is who the UID states (s)he is as
> > much as if you
(Sorry, failed again to reply to the list, so you probably have this message
twice again.)
On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 05:32:38PM -0800, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
> >On Tuesday 5 November 2013 at 11:03:19 PM, in
> >, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
> >
> >> But if you sign it with an exportable
> >> signature, you ar
On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 12:40:11AM -0800, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
> I don't know how I can explain it any better than I have. I think you are
> confusing assertion with verification. Unless you can differentiate between
> the two in this case, I don't think you will see what I am talking about.
>
On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 01:44:51PM -0800, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
> MFPA wrote:
> >Why do we need to establish they can also sign? Isn't it enough to
> >demonstrate they control the email address and can decrypt, by signing
> >one UID at a time and sending that signed copy of the key in an
> >encrypt
(Sorry, I once again sent the message only to you and not to the list -- I
really need to get used to mailing lists, sorry !)
On Sat, Nov 02, 2013 at 07:08:15PM -0700, Paul R. Ramer wrote:
> On 11/02/2013 02:25 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> > Isn't the presence of a UID sufficient f
> The reason why the cryptanalytic community looked into whether DES forms a
> group is because the 56-bit keyspace was too short and we critically needed
> a way to compose DES into a stronger algorithm. That's not the case with
> AES.
Disclaimer : I am not a mathematician, only a student in mat
On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 06:29:01PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> A factor of 125 is so small as to be irrelevant.
Well... If factoring takes a month, with the factor of 125, it takes ten years.
Seems not that irrelevant to me.
Of course, this is made using completely made up numbers, as I do n
On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 03:15:24PM -0400, Avi wrote:
> As must I. Robert has one of the clearest modes of exposition from
> which I have ever been fortunate to benefit.
I have to agree on this point.
The issue is that I disagree with him on his stance : in my opinion, having a
schedule stating wh
On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:40:35AM +0300, Martin T wrote:
> Hi,
>
> one can sign the message with "--clearsign" option which adds ASCII
> armored(Radix-64 encoding) "PGP signature" at the end of the text.
> This "PGP signature" contains the UID of the signer, timestamp and key
> ID. However, two q
On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 11:49:39AM +0200, Nils Faerber wrote:
> IANAL but from my understanding:
> 1. by invocation of the commandline commands: Yes
> 2. invocation of GnuPG exe: Yes
> 3. Linking, dynamically or statically, against a GnuPG DLL, presumed
> that it is licensed under GPL: No
IANAL ei
Well... IMHO you did all what you had to/could do, if you want to keep
confidentiality : claiming your public key in association with your name on
several websites. Now, just hope no covert agency will try to impersonate you
until a lot of people verify and sign your public key.
On Tue, Mar 26, 20
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