On 2015-02-20 06:32, Ranjini H.K wrote:
> Yes i used Scute. No success with it. I better ask OpenSC mailing list with
> the help asking for the support for handle data objects even if the card
> could store them..
As mentioned in my more detailed follow-up email on how TrueCrypt
accesses the "keyf
On 2015-02-19 20:00, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 18:22, o...@mirix.org said:
>
>> Your Java Card does probably not support PKCS #11. An applet on the card
>> might implement it. To make it work, you need a PKCS #11 middleware and
>
> PKCS#11 is an API between two applications. It is
On 2015-02-19 19:50, Thomas Harning Jr. wrote:
> On Thu Feb 19 2015 at 12:23:34 PM Matthias-Christian Ott
> wrote:
>
>> On 2015-02-19 09:23, Ranjini H.K wrote:
>>> Yes my java card supports PKCS#11. Am not so sure about OpenPGP applet.
>>> What should i do ot
On 2015-02-19 09:23, Ranjini H.K wrote:
> Yes my java card supports PKCS#11. Am not so sure about OpenPGP applet.
> What should i do othercase To make my OpenPGP applet support PKCS#11.
Your Java Card does probably not support PKCS #11. An applet on the card
might implement it. To make it work, yo
On 2015-02-06 09:12, Andreas Schwier wrote:
> On 02/06/2015 01:21 AM, Matthias-Christian Ott wrote:
>> What is the threat model in which a smartcard is an effective defense
>> and what are attacks that smartcards protect against? How are smartcards
>> supposed to protect a
On 2015-02-05 10:38, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 04/02/15 23:12, Matthias-Christian Ott wrote:
>> You could protect against this scenario by signing the firmware.
>
> Yes, you /could/. However, we were talking about Rainer smartcard readers,
> which
> /don't/.
Do you
On 2015-02-04 23:07, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 04/02/15 21:44, Matthias-Christian Ott wrote:
>> There are enough examples of vendors that introduced government backdoors in
>> their proprietary products to come to the conclusion that it is probably not
>> a good idea to use pr
On 2015-02-03 20:43, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Sun, 25 Jan 2015 17:31, o...@mirix.org said:
>
>> I don't think that such discussion belongs on this mailing list but I
>
> I think such a discussion is important and belongs here. I see no
If I remember correctly, that statement refers to speculatio
On 01/24/15 16:57, Andreas Schwier wrote:
> On 01/24/2015 12:05 AM, Matthias-Christian Ott wrote:
>> The same is true for the OpenPGP smart card or for almost any other
>> smart card available on the market. They could all contain a secret key
>> escrow mechanism and some pro
On 2015-01-23 03:56, Faramir wrote:
> compromized. Or if you issue a signature and then you get a message
> about "do it again", ok, you can fall once, but not 500 times.
Twice is enough: once to generate a revocation certificate and once to
sign a new key created by the attacker.
- Matthias-Chri
On 2015-01-23 21:31, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, 23 Jan 2015 12:19, felix.k...@inka.de said:
>
>> * There will be a new batch of cards, with the same functionality but
>> updated print: On the back of the current cards, it says “RSA with
>> up to 3072 bit” when in fact the cards support
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 01:46:02AM +0200, Marcus Brinkmann wrote:
> On 10/20/2011 10:25 PM, Matthias-Christian Ott wrote:
> > But who are the providers? Except for people who work in computer
> > science, physics or similar fields I don't know people who run their own
> >
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 04:16:01AM +0200, Marcus Brinkmann wrote:
> On 10/19/2011 09:30 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> > However, I think you're not ambitious enough when you opt for using DNS for
> > key
> > distribution. Yes, the infrastructure and RR types[1] are already there.
> > But it
> > brin
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