phrase as it would be to brute force the
GnuPG encrypted message session key itself.
Much as I like different crypto options, I don't think it would really improve
GnuPG to have a keyfile option.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
key?)
TIA,
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
e programs generating RSA keys.
> I would like to use my GnuPG RSA key, easily available on
keyservers, for other RSA functions.
>
>
> vedaal
>And... You say you do not trust closed source programs for key
generation, but
does that mean you trust them for key usage?
=
y it out in an RSA program offline.
(Obviously, for a real secret key, would not use the online PGPdump)
Any help or criticism about how to extract a functional RSA key would be
appreciated.
TIA,
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.
ents in hex (or hex escaped string with -g).
>
>Also, when I did apt-cache search pgpdump, I noticed there is a
>Python library:
>[1]. That might be even better for your purpose.
>
>HTH,
>
>Peter.
>
>[1] https://pypi.python.org/pypi/pgpdump/
=====
Ye
want to
>ask.
>"pure" RSA is extremely limited, and a secret RSA key is usually
>only
>used for either signing or decrypting symmetric session keys,
>whether
>that's in TLS or OpenPGP or CMS or any other place where RSA is
>used.
>
> --dkg
=
OK
ess on the keyserver at all?
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
uld just try a passphrase-guessing
algorithm on the key with the passphrase.
Knowing the un-encrypted copy of the key would not help any.
(I don't know how to explain the workings of the block-ciphers in gnupg, but
think that they are resistant to known-plaintext attacks.)
vedaal
__
tps://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
If anyone has a backup copy for Ubuntu please let me know.
TIA
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
ion key for any message encrypted
to my key, which, presumably, is all you are interested in,
but would prefer not to give you my key itself."
(GnuPG, as well as allowing generation of signing subkeys, and encrypting
subkeys,
also allows generating
ed robotic #D Gnu might be a consideration.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
mpatibilities
it could be discouraging enough to just stop using it before one has had a
chance to appreciate what it can do, and come to love it.
Many thanks to WK and the GnuPG development team for taking the trouble to
provide backward compatibility even as GnuPG grows better and
ogether or
otherwise connected first.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
CAT and pipe to gpg encrypt,
i.e.
split the signature from the plaintext
CAT the plaintext and the .sig file into one file
then pipe it into gpg --encrypt
if anyone has actually done this, please post,
TIA,
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-u
in 2.4 which was
changed to 2.6
It may be that it's a variant unique to pgp.
I'll try to see what happens in Disastry's version, if it will accept gnupg's
compression
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
ologies, Hauke, in advance if I mis-understood you and this discussion).
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
verything except Camellia,
cannot verify a V4 key signature).
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
the world will
have him back again ...
with Profound Respect,
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
one go about doing this?
>
>I would imagine that, if possible, the command would be similar to
>"gpg
>--armor --digest-algo SHA256 RIPEMD160 --clearsign" but this fails.
>
>If it is possible, how does GPG handle multiple signatures?
=
It can be done i
people to still encrypt to that key, until he makes other
arrangements, and that GnuPG is prudently set up so that it 'shouldn't be 'too
easy' to do, so that one will think twice it one 'really' needs to do it.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
g error:
gpg: Invalid option "--faked-system-time"
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
ed mesage with the
'--faked-system-time' option .
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
On 9/17/2014 at 4:25 AM, "Werner Koch" wrote:
> Users with very advanced requests are expected to use a
>very advanced version (2.1-beta) .-)
=
Seems to need a 'very advanced' downloading too ;-)
Could not find 2.1-beta on the GnuPG download page.
Where is i
On Thu Sep 18 17:13:58 CEST 2014 "Werner Koch" wrote:
> But right, there are other files which should not be published.
Is it possible to have .gnupg on a smart card ?
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@g
bgpg-error-1.16'
Makefile:333: recipe for target `all' failed
make: *** [all] Error 2
So,
can it be done on Cygwin, using other steps/commands first?
(btw, have not had any problems compiling, making, and installing gnu
likely 128 was a typo for the more common older RSA key of 1028 ...
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
and have a link to an easy GnuPG
gui tutorial, once people think that encryption can be useful and
'fun'.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
ata, the appended PDF
'Suffix'.
While this is *do-able* and a good reason to move on to a future
SHA256 hash, it would not be transferable (at this time, based on the
PDF collision data), to find a fingerprint collision for any v4 key.
vedaal
___
be doable day, even with the google cloud computer sharing efforts,
and the breakthrough of finding pdf's with the same hash.
Again, I fully support moving to a secure hash, but I do think that
users have more than enough time until the open-pgp group issues the
ing key can be 'leaked' to the public for deniability,
if necessary.
There are probably other similar variations of this approach.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.
gpg: agent_genkey failed: Not supported
Key generation failed: Not supported
londo@londo-earth-trinket:~$
=[end quoted terminal]=
What am I forgetting/doing wron
) 2.2.1-beta1
libgcrypt 1.8.1
[...]
=
Sorry,
here it is:
londo@londo-earth-trinket:~$ gpg2 --verbose --verbose --version
gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.11
libgcrypt 1.6.5
Should I get the new Libcrypt?
TIA
Vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@g
failed
make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
make[1]: Leaving directory '/home/londo/gnupg-2.2.1/ntbtls-0.1.2'
Makefile:387: recipe for target 'all' failed
make: *** [all] Error 2
londo@londo-earth-trinket:~/gnupg-2.2.1/ntbtls-0.1.2$
=[e
On 10/21/2017 at 1:14 PM, "Felix E. Klee" wrote:See the attached
file. When I try to decrypt it using `gpg -d`, I get:
gpg: [don't know]: 1st length byte missing
=
gnupg mailing list automatically scrubs attachments.
please list the encrypted text as part of the inline message.
Thanks,
ooting from the Tails USB avoids a
screencapturer, and using on on-screen keyboard avoids a hardware keyboard
logger.
But even so, there are problems with using it on an 'unknown' computer :
https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/warning/index.en.html#index2h1
vedaal
__
nder and receiver post to and
check certain websites
This could be facilitated by Tails/Tor, although there are still some
vulnerabilities:
https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/warning/index.en.html#index2h1
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnu
--verbose --verbose
The full command would then be:
gpg --expert --verbose --verbose --gen-key
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
load this key to any participating keyserver
or something along those lines, assuming that keyservers will abide by this and
require this 'comment' before accepting a key
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
and use exclusively that, and can
easily handle the hardwired MDC fail, and will even be thankful for the GnuPG
'protection'.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
them use an 'old' version of 1.4.x, and
as long as these versions are still being archived (which is reasonable for the
forseeable future), they should have no problems.
So,
to put in a vote for RJH,
“Break backwards compatibility already: it’s time. Ignore the haters. I trust
you.”
v
a frend's laptop to do some
work on files on my usb ;-) )
Anyone here have any experience with it?
TIA,
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
ate Key, (other than factoring the modulus),
but suffice it to say, that in the over 20 years that RSA has been around and
many different attacks have been tried,
*this* type of attack has not seemed feasible enough for anyone to try.
So,
Short summary,
No useful information can be gleaned
aintexts and known resulting ciphertexts, and still not
construct the RSA Private key.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
file rather than a .asc file.
If you want a .asc file, you need to include the option of '--armor'
or '-a' in your encryption command:
gpg2 -u FFEEDDCC -r AABBCCDD -a -e supersecret.txt
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
compatible anyway)
Armored signing, or a detached signature of a text file, *will* detect any
spaces added on to a line.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
n easily verify it.
Assuming you just want to do this for the mailing list, where most people don't
sign their messages anyway,
then just send the plaintext without worrying about the signature.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@g
d files,
... and breathe new life into pgp encryption ...
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
essage of step [1] ).
The string-to-key part of generating the session key for the symmetrically
encrypted message, will be using a random 64 character GnuPG generated session
key as it's password.
You can't find a better password
Is it feasible to mount an attack on a keypair by starting with trying
successive primes greater than this lower bound,
and possibly successfully find *some* GnuPG secret keys?
TIA,
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
ht
2047^2] = 5678 which is a fairly small number of primes
to check, for this type of attack to find the GnuPG keypair.
Also,
does GnuPG automatically reject twin primes ( p, p+2) , and Sophie-Germain
primes (p, 2p+1) ?
TIA,
vedaal
___
Gnup
want q = p+2
>because it's a trivial test to factor that composite), but is
>there a
>reason to reject using a p that meets these categories with some
>other,
>unrelated q?
-
Sorry,
I meant does GnuPG automatically reject the PAIR since they are trivial to
factor.
Thanks,
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
then the user will need to specify the option either in gnupg.conf or on the
command line.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
to give the passphrase.
(* Unless* you misjudged someone to whom you sent the passphrase, and he turns
maliciously on you, and uploads the decrypted form )
If such a key-type were implemented, would it need a change in 4880, other than
a notice to allow it?
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
ww.spywarewarrior.com/uiuc/disastry/263multi.htm
(btw,
If anyone knows how to install this on 64 bit Ubuntu 14.04 please let me know.
It wouldn't compile on Ubuntu 12.x, but was able to install the linux
executable PGP on a 32 bit system, but can't
s to cross-certify all the 'good'
signatures they were happy to get.
Just a suggestion.
The implementers can best decide how much extra work this would require, and if
there is a simpler better way to accomplish the desired result.
vedaal
_
ple encrypt, then
the receiver who trusts the sender's *trust* of the other keys, can go
ahead and multliple encrypt the reply.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
vedaal at nym.hush.com vedaal at nym.hush.com
wrote on Fri Nov 6 16:46:21 CET 2015 :
Since you are not able to encrypt either the real or the fake
Rumplestiltsken key, you have no way of knowing if the session key is
genuine or not in that packet.
=
Sorry, typo,
meant to say
If you want a simple random list, look at diceware:
http://world.std.com/~reinhold/diceware.html
Both the page and the diceware lists are available in many languages,
including German
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http
n -r
0x1234567890ABCDEF filename
The encryptions should now be with AES256 for both the symmetric part and the
part encrypted to your key.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
r, is encrypting the message,
it is again reasonable that the sender be able to choose the algorithm with
which the sender feels most comfortable.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
ger in continuing to use this passphrase for
additional symmetrical messages.)
It will allow decryption of sent messages, while providing anonymity.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
g site
is there anywhere else to find zlib?
are there any other dependencies that are also needed before compiling?
is it supposed to be 'not do-able' under windows?
(the compililer *did* give the encouraging message of:
'checking whether build environment is sane... y
thing to do with the string-to-key formation.
When the passphrase is off, the 'key' generated from it, is wrong, and when
that wrong 'key' is used to attempt decryption,
gpg rightfully gives an error message that the 'key' is bad.
maybe worthy of a note in the FAQ
se be aware
that pdf treats a line return as empty whitespace, so when trying to import the
key,
GnuPG does not recognize the empty whitespace, and reads the version line as
continuous with the keyblock, and it won't import.
vedaal
___
G
nupg on android, but prudently safe.
fwiw, the gnupg apps work well on android, but I just don't trust the phone.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
n get the preferred email to register in google, and you have
passport personal verification,
just because there is another ID attached?
It seems unnecessarily restrictive.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.o
nt with the same message encrypted to the same recipient as in
step (a)
This is just to point out, that if someone wants to think paranoidly
about 'who else knows' what is encrypted in your encrypted e-mail that
was encrypted only to you, i
On 1/3/2019 at 10:14 PM, "MFPA" wrote:> [3] only for the overly
paranoid who revel in tedious
> work-arounds 8^) :
> (a) Encrypt to both yourself and the recipient
> (b) Remove your own id packet from the ciphertext,
> (c) Re-calculate the crc of the ciphertext
> (d) Send the 'hacked'
On 2/1/2019 at 2:48 PM, "Stefan Claas" wrote:Maybe someone, in the
future, can pick-up the idea of PGPfone and develop it further
so that it can be used on Linux too or modern macOS. The old Windows
version still runs
fine, under Windows 7, for example.
=
Can be done on Ubuntu, or any Linux
the Plaintext, where it belongs, and
not vulnerable to MIMT attacks
(c) backward compatibility in maintained, and no new standards have to
be designed
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
cal rants,
much as they may be deserved.
There are other forums ideally suited to that.
Thanks.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
On 2/26/2019 at 10:29 AM, "Stefan Claas" wrote:
Von: vedaal via Gnupg-users
Gesendet: Montag, 25. Februar 2019 22:09
An: justina colmena; gnupg-users@gnupg.org
Betreff: Re: Ok this is a stupid questions
Why do you think GnuPG is useless if you check the source-code,
ould trust WK and the GnuPG team even if they didn't *sign* a Warrant Canary
(i / we all, sort-of trust the verification of the new GnuPG releases, with his
sig),
And if we *don't trust*, then signing a Warrant Canary with the same signing
key as the GnuPG release,
wouldn
www.pocket-lint.com/laptops/reviews/toshiba/70711-toshiba-no100-11r-notebook-review
it's small, easily portable, comes with a toshiba linux variant installed, but
you can easily install ubuntu or any other OS you prefer
it came our in 2008
and should be relatively inexpensive after 11 y
uPG key of 4096, it's only necessary to compute for primes up to 2^2048.
But,
Since GnuPG uses 2 primes only in the 2^2048 size, for a 4096 bit key,
then the amount of primes is actually:
[ (2^2048) / ln(2^2048) ] - [ (2^2047) / ln (2^2047) ] = 1.37 x 10^613
So, not to worry ab
if simply binding the subkey to a different master key,
won't allow for anyone else other than the 'real' owner, to decrypt messages
encrypted to that subkey?
TIA
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
upload them to the keyserver,
but at least then, no individual key by a real user, could be attacked.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
et-key keyname
The private key block should then appear in your terminal window.
No passphrase is necessary unless you want to 'edit' the key.
This works in both GnuPG 1.x and 2.x
assuming that your keyrings are in your home directory.
Don'
uot;Export Secret Keys"
and works on Ubuntu
(and probably on other Linux flavors too, but have not tested them)
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
er you write as plaintext" | gpg -a -e -r -o -filename.gpg | more
(obviously not intended for big files, or non-text files, but occasionally a
useful workaround if you aren't comfortable with your system's 'wipe' process.)
vedaal
___
On 11/15/2019 at 7:26 PM, "Steffen Nurpmeso" wrote:The
public key _is_ in there, no?
=
No.
Only the public Key ID is in there, not the entire public key, and and even
this keyID can be hidden too,
if the sender uses the option of --hidden-encrypt-t
E6
=
Maybe try generating new keys until you have a keypair of palindromic
primes,
or at least a palindromic fingerprint
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PalindromicPrime.html
8^))
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.
nd third
and thirty-eighth and fortieth position of the fingerprint).
It might not be that simple, but it doesn't seem impossible, to create
a Palindromic fingerprint,
(and just reset your computer clock to 02/20/2020 at 02:20 am) 8^))
vedaal
___
Gn
learsigned messages with it''s
header and footer, are somewhat 'resented' in any non-crypto group, and often
don't verify anyway because of minor alterations by the media posting)
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-us
qIpHbgAVzRVa/UsUFiqiCkPkS3sHIF1lz5tLbnoC0E1p6e2uA2mlXtvNNt
HaXPFll+Xk7U1/OuNjnFFyjUs30yDpxLT4O+46I/hioH7zGisTFjJO1iEuSO0RqO
QZ3jsyjjBEhIOC9Aiko9FMhXa6MvCqIembcFQUm2v0XoZSl6PBvtBJDmVmGvLt1P
GvSmaHRbRCZaiYk/KmV3d7axJQHXmt2CyFIJvw28yFh85PrGnZN6F/0TZmwZSEKh
fGTZanDrJYrys3425Fd4=/Rbe-END PGP SIGNATU
a dictionary, 77760^8 = 1.336×10³⁹,
still greater than a a 2^128 Brute Force Space.
So, not only is is NOT *horrible* advice, it should be enough for anyone's
threat model.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
rse! Battery Staple
https://xkcd.com/936/
8^)
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
directory, but not the keyring,
gpg will still decrypt when using the option of --no-default-keyring
(feature request: can GPG2 be made to work from only the command-line without
a pine entry window, and without gpg-agent?)
TIA
vedaal
___
Gnupg-us
e
passphrase to decrypt
(n.b. I have not actually tried the above, so am unsure if it is effective)
otherwise , just use GnuPG 1.4.x , and unless you ever need an elliptic key, it
should do everything you want.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing l
on any android phone with microSD slots.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
data: [4095 bits]
gpg: public key is D35FB186
You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "vedaal nistar (all other addresses were spam flooded) "
4096-bit RSA key, ID D35FB186, created 2008-01-22
gpg: cancelled by user
:symkey enc packet: version 4, cipher
#x27;Revelato')
but not really in my threat model 8^
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
.
Even If you don't need more than 64gb, I would still recommend a Sandisk newer
64gb card, because of the much faster transfer rates.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
symmetric encryption:
mxtzphu.klemauj@qwejidnalldiopxz.wdb9D7ECA9BEDF40F804EB26A3C25FF072DDFD35F5D
Only you and the person you send this key to, will be able to decrypt your
symmetrically encrypted messages.
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@g
y encrypted text?
There still needs to be a way to 'enter' it as the 'passphrase'. If the OP
doesn't mind saving it in a file-decsriptor way, that would work,
but it would work the same as the secret key had a passphrase, or even if it
nd the pgp header of the encrypted file)
[3] Save the whole thing as filename.sig.asc
[4] gpg filename.sig,asc will automatically verify the sig if the
original signed file 'filename' is present, and also decrypt the added
com
vedaal at nym.hush.com vedaal at nym.hush.comwrote on Thu Jan 14
19:37:37 CET 2021:
>but functionally, yes, it can be done.- my mistake. Can't really
be done this way :-((= >[1] Armor the signature file ( gpg --armor
filename.sig ) -should be enarmor instead of armor :-( t
On 3/9/2021 at 4:46 AM, "Margaret via Gnupg-users Call" wrote:
We would like to migrate our Symantec PGP to GNU PGP. We tested the
system last week with new PGP users and a user that migrated to GNU
from Symantec. We have fixed all bugs except one:
Our legacy Symantec u
Or, for the really paranoid ;-)you can have random data on a read-only
mini cdrom,and use it as an OTP, and throw it into a garbage
incinerator afterwards.
If you are up against adversaries where this is necessary,this methods
may ultimately not help ...
=
On 5/4/2021 at 1:19 PM, "Ingo Klöcker
nto a garbage
incinerator afterwards.
But really, if anyone is up against adversaries where this is
necessary,this methods may ultimately not help.
These adversaries are not known for their honor and fair play ...
vedaal
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
G
301 - 400 of 413 matches
Mail list logo
