Hi,
attached is the (hopefully proper) key.
Regards
Stefan
On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 10:44 PM Stakanov via Gnupg-users
wrote:
>
> I hope this is the correct list for this question:
>
>
>
> I tried to follow the instructions of
>
> https://www.mageia.org/it/downloads/get/?q=Mageia-7.1-x86_64.iso
>
I hope this is the correct list for this question:
I tried to follow the instructions of
https://www.mageia.org/it/downloads/get/?q=Mageia-7.1-x86_64.iso[1]
were it says you can import the key to verify the iso.
But kleopatra stays without reaction (no matter how many pools I join) and
entropia
On Wed, 2 Jan 2019 11:18:25 +0100, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz wrote:
Hi Wiktor,
> Revoke your current key locally and generate a new one, now export both binary
> keys (that includes revocation) to a file. Place it in
> .well-known/openpgpkey/hu
> overwriting the old file.
>
> Now, when GnuPG does --l
On 01.01.2019 13:19, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Hi Wiktor and all,
>
> since my current WKD key is a temporary key i would like to know
> for best practice the following:
>
> In a couple of days i will receive my Kanguru Defender 3000 USB stick
> and then i will create a new key pair and put it on the
Hello Stefan.
Am Dienstag, den 01.01.2019, 13:19 +0100 schrieb Stefan Claas:
> On Sat, 29 Dec 2018 20:18:54 +0100, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-
> users wrote:
> > On 29.12.2018 15:48, Stefan Claas wrote:
> > > Hi all,
> > Just create more files in .well-known/openpgpkey/hu directory.
> since m
On Tue, 1 Jan 2019 13:19:34 +0100, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Hi Wiktor and all,
I wish everybody a Happy New Year 2019!
Best regards
Stefan
pgpOAPgmyGZdO.pgp
Description: Digitale Signatur von OpenPGP
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
ht
On Sat, 29 Dec 2018 20:18:54 +0100, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users wrote:
> On 29.12.2018 15:48, Stefan Claas wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > is it also possible to add manually more pub keys to WKD
> > or do i have to install WKS for that purpose?
> >
> > I ask, because in case i like to add mor
On Sat, 29 Dec 2018 20:18:54 +0100, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users wrote:
> On 29.12.2018 15:48, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Just create more files in .well-known/openpgpkey/hu directory.
Ah, o.k. thanks!
> I didn't follow how you set it up initially but you can grab the file name
> (hash) using
On 29.12.2018 20:50, Stefan Claas wrote:
>> I did a small proof-of-concept checker for small deployments, that you may
>> find
>> useful: https://metacode.biz/openpgp/web-key-directory
> That is very interesting! I checked Werner's, yours and my key.
>
> With yours everything is fine, with Werner
On 29.12.2018 15:48, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> is it also possible to add manually more pub keys to WKD
> or do i have to install WKS for that purpose?
>
> I ask, because in case i like to add more users to my
> mail server.
Just create more files in .well-known/openpgpkey/hu directory.
Am 27.12.18 um 23:43 schrieb Stefan Claas:
However, it would be nice to know why GnuPG told me
that the certs are not trusted. I googled for that but could
not find anything.
Regards
Stefan
Hi all,
is it also possible to add manually more pub keys to WKD
or do i have to install WKS for that
On Thu, 27 Dec 2018 20:48:09 +0100, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz wrote:
> It works "on my end" too (GnuPG 2.2.12 on Linux).
That is good to know!
> Did you try fetching some "well-known" WKD people? E.g.:
>
> $ gpg --auto-key-locate clear,wkd,nodefault --locate-key w...@gnupg.org
No, i did not.
On 26.12.2018 10:39, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> hope you all had a nice Christmas!
>
> I have set up WKD on my VPS, in order to learn more about it and get now
> the following error:
>
> gpg --encrypt -r s...@300baud.de OpenSSL.txt
> gpg: error retrieving 's...@300baud.de' via WKD: Not tr
On Thu, 27 Dec 2018 18:19:11 +0100, Stefan Claas wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Dec 2018 16:01:52 +0100, Stefan Claas wrote:
>
> > As a test i also created a blank .gnupg folder and tried to encrypt but it
> > still
> > say not trusted. I run out of ideas now and i will contact Patrick
> > Brunschwig
> > a
On Thu, 27 Dec 2018 16:01:52 +0100, Stefan Claas wrote:
> As a test i also created a blank .gnupg folder and tried to encrypt but it
> still
> say not trusted. I run out of ideas now and i will contact Patrick Brunschwig
> and wait what he says, because he is the maintainer of the SourceForge
> b
On Thu, 27 Dec 2018 10:35:22 +0100, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> On Wed 26/Dec/2018 22:59:19 +0100 Stefan Claas wrote:
> >
> >> You seem to have already solved that:
> >
> > May i ask you what version of GnuPG you are using and what OS?
>
> Sure:
> ale@pcale:~/tmp$ uname -a
> Linux pcale 4.9
On Wed 26/Dec/2018 22:59:19 +0100 Stefan Claas wrote:
>
>> You seem to have already solved that:
>
> May i ask you what version of GnuPG you are using and what OS?
Sure:
ale@pcale:~/tmp$ uname -a
Linux pcale 4.9.0-8-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.9.130-2 (2018-10-27) x86_64 GNU/Linux
ale@pcale:~/tmp$
al
On Wed, 26 Dec 2018 14:35:28 +0100, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> You seem to have already solved that:
May i ask you what version of GnuPG you are using and what OS?
I ask, because i tried also the following with gpg4win earlier today
and it sayd in German no data found. Then i set up an SRV recor
On Wed, 26 Dec 2018 14:35:28 +0100, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> And, using the attached script:
>
> ale@pcale:~/tmp$ testwkd.sh s...@300baud.de
> gpg: keybox '/tmp/user/1000/tmp.EDqjfCCXPH/pubring.kbx' created
> gpg: /tmp/user/1000/tmp.EDqjfCCXPH/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
> gpg: using pgp trust
On Wed 26/Dec/2018 10:39:39 +0100 Stefan Claas wrote:
>
> I have set up WKD on my VPS, in order to learn more about it and get now
> the following error:
>
> gpg --encrypt -r s...@300baud.de OpenSSL.txt
> gpg: error retrieving 's...@300baud.de' via WKD: Not trusted
You seem to have already solve
Hi all,
hope you all had a nice Christmas!
I have set up WKD on my VPS, in order to learn more about it and get now
the following error:
gpg --encrypt -r s...@300baud.de OpenSSL.txt
gpg: error retrieving 's...@300baud.de' via WKD: Not trusted
gpg: s...@300baud.de: skipped: Not trusted
gpg: OpenS
On 8/25/2011 10:28 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Except that, quite clearly, most users have no idea it is their problem
> and the problem remains unsolved.
Now that you mention it, I'd like to reject the premise outright: that
this is a problem. How do we know it's a problem? I don't doubt t
On 08/25/2011 10:04 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Now, maybe you have thousands of keys on your keyring and it takes a
> ridiculous amount of time, but I suspect you're a bit of an outlier.
Yes, it's true, and yes, i'm an outlier. At the moment.
> The problem for any system of automated certifi
On 8/25/11 9:36 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Yes, i do this myself, but with a large keyring, a full --refresh-keys
> takes ages and thrashes my machine.
Define 'large keyring', please: I mean no offense, but that's a pretty
vague word.
proverbs:~ rjh$ gpg --list-keys|grep "^pub"|wc -l
2
On 08/25/2011 09:00 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 8/25/11 8:27 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>> This sort of situation is one which a better toolset could automate.
>
> It would seem the proper place for this is to leverage existing system
> automation tools, not inventing something new.
>
>
On 8/25/11 8:27 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> This sort of situation is one which a better toolset could automate.
It would seem the proper place for this is to leverage existing system
automation tools, not inventing something new.
proverbs:~ rjh$ crontab -l
30 2 * * * gpg --refresh-keys
On 08/24/2011 09:40 PM, David Manouchehri wrote:
> I personally try to update my keyring every few weeks.
This sort of situation is one which a better toolset could automate.
If you have suggestions about how/when gpg could automatically refresh
keys, you might consider adding them to this
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Just to add to what Grant said, if you decide to set a expiration date,
make sure it isn't too often. Anywhere from six months to two years is
a good range if you ask me, but it's totally up to you; I've set my
subkeys to six months.
I personally
On 8/24/11 11:47 AM, Mike Acker wrote:
>
> given that I have loaded my public key to a key-server ( e.g.
> keys.gnupg.net )
>
> when i upload information to be merged into my keyblock (e.g. a new user
> ID, revocate certificate, or new expiration date )
>
> what will cause other GPG users to r
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
given that I have loaded my public key to a key-server ( e.g.
keys.gnupg.net )
when i upload information to be merged into my keyblock (e.g. a new user
ID, revocate certificate, or new expiration date )
what will cause other GPG users to refres
given that I have loaded my public key to a key-server ( e.g.
keys.gnupg.net )
when i upload information to be merged into my keyblock (e.g. a new user
ID, revocate certificate, or new expiration date )
what will cause other GPG users to refresh their copy of my key in their
keyring?
should I
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Doug Barton wrote:
>> The AF's conclusion seems obvious, however it ignores a critical
>> factor of the Navy's use case.
>
> The story is apocryphal, so it doesn't make much sense to talk
> about the motives of the people involved -- it's fiction.
Has every example you'
Doug Barton wrote:
> The AF's conclusion seems obvious, however it ignores a critical
> factor of the Navy's use case.
The story is apocryphal, so it doesn't make much sense to talk about the
motives of the people involved -- it's fiction. But even were it true,
I'd be hard-pressed to agree that
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Faramir wrote:
>> Well, I don't think you are crazy, but I am part of the group that
>> likes to be able to chose between several options, provided all the
>> options are secure.
>
> That "provided" is the sticking point. Small is beautiful, IMO. YMMV.
I agree that s
On Jan 24, 2009, at 1:29 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
David Shaw wrote:
But then, once we have algorithm agility, that means we must have a
means for dealing with that agility (preference lists being the
defined OpenPGP mechanism for that). And then, having such means,
why do we care all that m
David Shaw wrote:
> But then, once we have algorithm agility, that means we must have a
> means for dealing with that agility (preference lists being the
> defined OpenPGP mechanism for that). And then, having such means,
> why do we care all that much whether an algorithm is present or not?
To
On Jan 24, 2009, at 12:44 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
David Shaw wrote:
OpenPGP benefits from the flexibility of being able to use multiple
algorithms.
The ability to use multiple algorithms is independent of how many
algorithms are in the spec and in each implementation. Algorithm
agility i
David Shaw wrote:
> OpenPGP benefits from the flexibility of being able to use multiple
> algorithms.
The ability to use multiple algorithms is independent of how many
algorithms are in the spec and in each implementation. Algorithm
agility is a great idea and I think protocols ought be designed
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Robert J. Hansen escribió:
> Faramir wrote:
>> Well, you have always said any algo in GPG is safe enough to use...
> First, I've said the algorithms are safe enough to use. I've never said
> GnuPG's implementation of them is correct and error-fre
On Jan 23, 2009, at 6:49 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
David Shaw wrote:
This has nothing to do with your preference list. GPG will happily
decrypt messages to any cipher, whether it is in your preference list
or not, as per the spec:
Yes, which sort of demonstrates the point that the preferen
Faramir wrote:
> Well, you have always said any algo in GPG is safe enough to use...
First, I've said the algorithms are safe enough to use. I've never said
GnuPG's implementation of them is correct and error-free. There's a
_big_ difference between saying "3DES is a trusted algorithm" and say
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Robert J. Hansen escribió:
> Faramir wrote:
>> Well, I don't think you are crazy, but I am part of the group that
>> likes to be able to chose between several options, provided all the
>> options are secure.
>
> That "provided" is the sticking poi
Faramir wrote:
> Well, I don't think you are crazy, but I am part of the group that
> likes to be able to chose between several options, provided all the
> options are secure.
That "provided" is the sticking point. Small is beautiful, IMO. YMMV.
There is an apocryphal story about the United S
David Shaw wrote:
> This has nothing to do with your preference list. GPG will happily
> decrypt messages to any cipher, whether it is in your preference list
> or not, as per the spec:
Yes, which sort of demonstrates the point that the preference mechanism
is just needless complexity. It's a r
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Robert J. Hansen escribió:
...
> algorithm, cryppies have a lot of confidence in it -- I'm just part of
> the (vocal) minority which screams that OpenPGP has way too many
> algorithms and we need to start cutting algorithms out. I would like
...
>
On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 05:14:15PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> David Shaw wrote:
> > You have the ability to do pretty much that, but:
>
> I actually don't, but for policy reasons. My local policy is "have
> total control over what I send, but don't assert control over what I
> receive." I
David Shaw wrote:
> You have the ability to do pretty much that, but:
I actually don't, but for policy reasons. My local policy is "have
total control over what I send, but don't assert control over what I
receive." I guess you could call it my small-l libertarian philosophy
as applied to OpenPG
On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 03:55:20PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Faramir wrote:
> > Don't worry, while I like to change some settings, I also like to
> > "play safe". Even if I could use Camellia, I would not use it to send
> > messages (maybe it would be interesting to be able to receive messag
Faramir wrote:
> Don't worry, while I like to change some settings, I also like to
> "play safe". Even if I could use Camellia, I would not use it to send
> messages (maybe it would be interesting to be able to receive messages
> encrypted with it).
There's no real reason to avoid Camellia, by the
On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 05:13:32PM -0300, Faramir wrote:
> Sorry to ask what was already answered some time ago, but: why GnuPG
> doesn't implement Camellia? IIRC (but probably I misunderstood it), it
> is enabled for Japanese version, since they need it. But in that case,
> why it is not enabled f
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Robert J. Hansen escribió:
> Camellia is not yet part of the OpenPGP standard. The standardization
> process for it is still underway. Once it's standardized, GnuPG will
> support Camellia the same as any other algorithm -- but please don't use it
Faramir wrote:
> Sorry to ask what was already answered some time ago, but: why GnuPG
> doesn't implement Camellia?
Camellia is not yet part of the OpenPGP standard. The standardization
process for it is still underway. Once it's standardized, GnuPG will
support Camellia the same as any other al
his message as a request to enable it in the windows
binary file, it's just a question...
Best Regards
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeiTsAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA/kYH/j/s81qWEhi2Xr7iBGG
Werner Koch wrote:
> Thus in the latter case there is no way to check whether the key belongs
> to a certain user ID. Of course if you sign a file with a content like:
>
> pub 2048D/1E42B367 2007-12-31 [expires: 2018-12-31]
> Key fingerprint = 8061 5870 F5BA D690 3336 86D0 F2AD 85AC
On Fri, 19 Dec 2008 11:26, jam...@jml.net said:
> Is a signed e-mail containing a fingerprint equivalent to signing a key?
No, it is different:
* If you sign a key, you actually sign the concatenation of a key and
a user ID.
* If you sign a file with a fingerprint you merely sign the key.
T
A colleague of mine asked me to send him a signed e-mail of fingerprints
of some keys that I'd personally verified earlier in the day. I'd also
signed the keys, and published the signatures to a public key server.
I argued that my signature on the publicly available keys was as good as
the signed
Hello Santiago !
Santiago José López Borrazás <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
> How the two lines are removed that appears above all of the signed of
> messages?
> There is some human way to tell him al GnuPG to that show not those two
> lines of B
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
> There is some human way to tell him al GnuPG to that show not those
> two
> lines of BEGIN PGP MESSAGE?
Those two lines are required by OpenPGP and must be present in any
clearsigned message.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi:
I ask a question:
How the two lines are removed that appears above all of the signed of messages?
There is some human way to tell him al GnuPG to that show not those two
lines of BEGIN PGP MESSAGE?
TIA.
- --
Slds de Santiago José López
On Fri, 20 Oct 2006 06:02, Chris Walters said:
> says "Encrypted with 1 passphrase". This implies that it is possible to
> use more than one passphrase when encrypting. Does anyone know if this
> is true? Or if it is a future plan? If it is possible, could someone
> give me an idea of how to d
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi All,
I have been lurking in this group for a while now, and have been using
gnupg for a while, as well.
My question is this: When I symmetrically encrypt something with
"gpg -c" it will allow me to enter only one passphrase. However, when I
decr
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