On Sep 5, 2009, at 5:25 AM, Laurent Jumet wrote:
I found information about CAMELLIA.
According to this info, I suppose I can assume that CAMELLIA is
part of
OpenPGP *and* S11, S12 & S13 are from now on, owned by CAMELLIA.
Yes, and GnuPG 1.4.10 and 2.0.12 (if libgcrypt is re
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Hello !
I found information about CAMELLIA.
According to this info, I suppose I can assume that CAMELLIA is part of
OpenPGP *and* S11, S12 & S13 are from now on, owned by CAMELLIA.
=== Begin Windows Clipboard ===
Network Working G
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Hello !
Is CAMELLIA actually part of OpenPGP?
Are S11, S12 & S13 assigned definitively?
Is BZIP2 definitively excluded, or is it an option when compiling? In the
latter case, why don't compiling with it?
- --
Laur
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Doug Barton wrote:
>> The AF's conclusion seems obvious, however it ignores a critical
>> factor of the Navy's use case.
>
> The story is apocryphal, so it doesn't make much sense to talk
> about the motives of the people involved -- it's fiction.
Has every example you'
Doug Barton wrote:
> The AF's conclusion seems obvious, however it ignores a critical
> factor of the Navy's use case.
The story is apocryphal, so it doesn't make much sense to talk about the
motives of the people involved -- it's fiction. But even were it true,
I'd be hard-pressed to agree that
again, not an
expert) justifies the additional complexity. The lesson here being,
make sure you understand ALL the parameters before you make your
conclusions.
BTW, to get back to Camellia, I had to do some research on this in
another context and while I'm not prepared to judge the "
If I recall, Twofish was added
to the spec before AES was finalized. Twofish has a block size of 128
bits, which was needed, and at the time, no other ciphers in the
standard had that block size.
I don't think it's at all unreasonable to say
"Camellia has users supporting i
t;)? Sure we do. Or at least, I do.
This doesn't explain Twofish, Blowfish, RIPEMD160, etc., etc. These are
well-designed algorithms that very few people use, and they're still
littering the standard. I don't think it's at all unreasonable to say
"Camellia has users supp
that much whether an algorithm is present or not?
Camellia is a good example here. It does not really bring something
new to OpenPGP in terms of security. Sure, Camellia is believed to be
strong, and some studies have shown it to be strong. But we don't
really *need* that - we have oth
David Shaw wrote:
> OpenPGP benefits from the flexibility of being able to use multiple
> algorithms.
The ability to use multiple algorithms is independent of how many
algorithms are in the spec and in each implementation. Algorithm
agility is a great idea and I think protocols ought be designed
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Robert J. Hansen escribió:
> Faramir wrote:
>> Well, you have always said any algo in GPG is safe enough to use...
> First, I've said the algorithms are safe enough to use. I've never said
> GnuPG's implementation of them is correct and error-fre
e hard limits of the
protocol. The semantics are extremely clear, including the places
where the spec dictates that the implementor can follow his desires.
If I allow (say) 3DES, AES, and Camellia, you can't send me anything
that isn't 3DES, AES, or Camellia. If you really really really
Faramir wrote:
> Well, you have always said any algo in GPG is safe enough to use...
First, I've said the algorithms are safe enough to use. I've never said
GnuPG's implementation of them is correct and error-free. There's a
_big_ difference between saying "3DES is a trusted algorithm" and say
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Robert J. Hansen escribió:
> Faramir wrote:
>> Well, I don't think you are crazy, but I am part of the group that
>> likes to be able to chose between several options, provided all the
>> options are secure.
>
> That "provided" is the sticking poi
Faramir wrote:
> Well, I don't think you are crazy, but I am part of the group that
> likes to be able to chose between several options, provided all the
> options are secure.
That "provided" is the sticking point. Small is beautiful, IMO. YMMV.
There is an apocryphal story about the United S
David Shaw wrote:
> This has nothing to do with your preference list. GPG will happily
> decrypt messages to any cipher, whether it is in your preference list
> or not, as per the spec:
Yes, which sort of demonstrates the point that the preference mechanism
is just needless complexity. It's a r
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Robert J. Hansen escribió:
...
> algorithm, cryppies have a lot of confidence in it -- I'm just part of
> the (vocal) minority which screams that OpenPGP has way too many
> algorithms and we need to start cutting algorithms out. I would like
...
>
On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 05:14:15PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> David Shaw wrote:
> > You have the ability to do pretty much that, but:
>
> I actually don't, but for policy reasons. My local policy is "have
> total control over what I send, but don't assert control over what I
> receive." I
David Shaw wrote:
> You have the ability to do pretty much that, but:
I actually don't, but for policy reasons. My local policy is "have
total control over what I send, but don't assert control over what I
receive." I guess you could call it my small-l libertarian philosophy
as applied to OpenPG
On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 03:55:20PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Faramir wrote:
> > Don't worry, while I like to change some settings, I also like to
> > "play safe". Even if I could use Camellia, I would not use it to send
> > messages (maybe it would
Faramir wrote:
> Don't worry, while I like to change some settings, I also like to
> "play safe". Even if I could use Camellia, I would not use it to send
> messages (maybe it would be interesting to be able to receive messages
> encrypted with it).
There's no r
On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 05:13:32PM -0300, Faramir wrote:
> Sorry to ask what was already answered some time ago, but: why GnuPG
> doesn't implement Camellia? IIRC (but probably I misunderstood it), it
> is enabled for Japanese version, since they need it. But in that case,
> why
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Robert J. Hansen escribió:
> Camellia is not yet part of the OpenPGP standard. The standardization
> process for it is still underway. Once it's standardized, GnuPG will
> support Camellia the same as any other algorithm -- but pl
Faramir wrote:
> Sorry to ask what was already answered some time ago, but: why GnuPG
> doesn't implement Camellia?
Camellia is not yet part of the OpenPGP standard. The standardization
process for it is still underway. Once it's standardized, GnuPG will
support Camellia the s
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Sorry to ask what was already answered some time ago, but: why GnuPG
doesn't implement Camellia? IIRC (but probably I misunderstood it), it
is enabled for Japanese version, since they need it. But in that case,
why it is not enabled for "
all of them,
> > or try only the one specified ?
> >
> > ( disclaimer:
> > *not* a feature request for the gnupg team :-)
> >
> > only a workaround thought
> > for the hackers who choose to enable Camellia now )
>
> FWIW, vedaal, Camellia 12
On Thu, 12 Jun 2008 23:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
> pgp approved version) is that when the session key is retrieved
> from the public key encrypted packet, it needs to know what cipher
> it is to be plugged into to decrypt
Use --{show,override}-session-key:
$ gpg --show-session-key /dev/nul
o-preference string placed within gpg.conf.
no,
that allows the user to choose which cipher to use for encryption
to begin with
my suggestion is *after* Camellia is enabled in a hacked version
and unable to be decrypted in the hacked version when the message
was encrypted using Camellia in a later
>
> ( disclaimer:
> *not* a feature request for the gnupg team :-)
>
> only a workaround thought
> for the hackers who choose to enable Camellia now )
FWIW, vedaal, Camellia 128, 192 & 256 have been incorporated into the
GnuPG Source already. They have been assigned the
>Message: 9
>Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 07:42:19 -0400
>From: "John W. Moore III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Re: CAMELLIA
>as Camellia has not been assigned an OpenPGP cipher
>number,
>I've picked 11 (the next unassigned number). If Camellia gets
>a
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Laurent Jumet wrote:
> Hello !
>
> Is CAMELLIA implemented in 1.4.9 or should we install a plug-in like
> IDEA.DLL ?
"Implemented" = Yes; in that it is present but Camellia is *not* Enabled
by default. In order to En
On Thu, 12 Jun 2008 11:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
> Is CAMELLIA implemented in 1.4.9 or should we install a plug-in like
> IDEA.DLL ?
Camellia is not yet defined by OpenPGP and thus you can't use it.
There is a testing only option to enable it. However using it now w
Hello !
Is CAMELLIA implemented in 1.4.9 or should we install a plug-in like
IDEA.DLL ?
--
Laurent Jumet
KeyID: 0xCFAF704C
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