Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force

2014-05-25 Thread Leo Gaspard
On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:51:40AM +0200, Peter Lebbing wrote: You can't object to scientific theories on the basis that you did not study them properly. It might have a bit of a Socratic feel to it, but it quite falls short of the real thing. Just for the record: I do not feel like I ever

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force

2014-05-17 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 17/05/14 01:12, Leo Gaspard wrote: Well... If the operation the bit just underwent was a bitflip (and, knowing the bruteforcing circuit, it's possible to know that), the bit was a '0'. I admit this is beyond my knowledge, but maybe the following is rather intuitive and not too incorrect.

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-17 Thread Peter Lebbing
(This mail originally got dropped by the list managing software because I had accidentally misused a new webmail plugin. I'm resending it with all original identifiers so it hopefully threads correctly. I'm also completely ignoring section 3.6.6 of RFC 2822, but who cares? ;) --- I suddenly

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force

2014-05-17 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 2014-05-17 15:28, Robert J. Hansen wrote: Another way of looking at it: RAM is normally implemented as a flipflop. I think the register bank in a processor is still implemented as flipflops, and all computation ends up there (on a register machine)[1], so your statement is correct in that

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force

2014-05-17 Thread Robert J. Hansen
However, the word normally is not quite apt. What you normally call the RAM of your computer is DRAM, and DRAM is implemented by a charge on a capacitor. This achieves much higher densities on a chip than SRAM, but is also slower. Point, but I think it's equivalent: whether it's a flipflop

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force

2014-05-17 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 2014-05-17 19:52, Robert J. Hansen wrote: Point, but I think it's equivalent: whether it's a flipflop getting a signal or a microcapacitor that's charging/discharging, in both cases previous state is getting obliterated and the entropic cost accrues. :) Absolutely, no argument there. In

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force

2014-05-16 Thread MFPA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Thursday 15 May 2014 at 5:55:08 PM, in mid:ac4ef92f2c0a44f147cb3fedeb2ea...@butters.digitalbrains.com, Peter Lebbing wrote: Decryption using a wrench rather than a key; http://xkcd.com/538/ (don't forget the on-hover text!) I guess I

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-16 Thread Leo Gaspard
First: I agree with everything skipped in the quotes. On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 07:31:26PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote: BTW: AFAICT, a nuclear warhead (depending on the warhead, ofc.) does not release so much energy, it just releases it in a deadly

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-16 Thread Robert J. Hansen
This is the last I will be saying on the subject. I am not interested in teaching a course on thermodynamics. Well... A nuclear reactor produces 1GW, and thus produces 1PJ in 10^6 s, that is approx. 11 days 14 hrs. Sure, you may be very interested in Health Safety compliance of nuclear

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-15 Thread Mark H. Wood
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 07:31:26PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote: [snip] * You state it is a lower bound on the energy consumed/generated by bruteforcing. Having a closer look at the Wikipedia page, I just found this sentence: If no information is

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-15 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 5/15/2014 8:30 AM, gnupg-users@gnupg.org wrote: The save of 64 bits to 1 bit loses you 6 bits exponential complexity, the increase of the expected number of tries increases it again by 1 bit, so you have saved 2^5 = 32 = 10^1.5 on the numbers Rob gives. When I'm quickly reading through the

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force

2014-05-15 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 2014-05-15 14:30, gnupg-users@gnupg.org wrote: Leo called it 10^5, Rob called it 10^3. If you save 63 bitflips on a total of a million, that doesn't change the final numbers in the least. Pull out some hairs and you still have a beard: 10^3 - 63 = 10^3. Incidentally, we went from 100

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-15 Thread Robert J. Hansen
I notice that the Wikipedia article refers here to thermodynamically reversible which is perhaps not the same thing as computationally reversible. So I looked up thermodynamically reversible and found At the level we're talking about, the distinction between thermodynamics and computational

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force

2014-05-15 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Incidentally, we went from 100 nuclear warheads to 3 to 100,000[3]. So, I can put you down as solidly in the eco-catastrophe camp, then? :) ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force

2014-05-15 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 2014-05-15 18:25, Robert J. Hansen wrote: So, I can put you down as solidly in the eco-catastrophe camp, then? :) Oh, definitely. Unless our understanding of computing at the physical limits drastically changes, I think blunt-force cryptanalysis is way better than brute-force.

GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-14 Thread Leo Gaspard
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:21:36PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: Since the well known agency from Baltimore uses its influence to have crypto standards coast close to the limit of the brute-forceable, 128 bit AES will be insecure not too far in the future. No.

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-14 Thread Robert J. Hansen
10^10 * 10^6 = 10^16. So far your estimate is off by a factor of a thousand trillion. *Ten* thousand trillion. Sorry, that one's entirely my error. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-14 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote: Well... Apart from the assumption I stated just below (ie. single bit flip for AES), I cannot begin to think about an error I might have done with this one, apart from misunderstanding Wikipedia's statement that The processing rate cannot be higher than