Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-17 Thread Peter Lebbing
(This mail originally got dropped by the list managing software because I had accidentally misused a new webmail plugin. I'm resending it with all original identifiers so it hopefully threads correctly. I'm also completely ignoring section 3.6.6 of RFC 2822, but who cares? ;) --- I suddenly

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-16 Thread Robert J. Hansen
This is the last I will be saying on the subject. I am not interested in teaching a course on thermodynamics. > Well... A nuclear reactor produces 1GW, and thus produces 1PJ in > 10^6 s, that is approx. 11 days 14 hrs. Sure, you may be very > interested in Health & Safety compliance of nuclear re

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-16 Thread Leo Gaspard
First: I agree with everything skipped in the quotes. On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 07:31:26PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote: > > BTW: AFAICT, a nuclear warhead (depending on the warhead, ofc.) does > > not release so much energy, it just releases it in a dead

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-15 Thread Robert J. Hansen
I notice that the Wikipedia article refers here to "thermodynamically reversible" which is perhaps not the same thing as computationally reversible. So I looked up "thermodynamically reversible" and found At the level we're talking about, the distinction between thermodynamics and computation

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-15 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 5/15/2014 8:30 AM, gnupg-users@gnupg.org wrote: > The save of 64 bits to 1 bit loses you 6 bits exponential complexity, > the increase of the expected number of tries increases it again by 1 > bit, so you have saved 2^5 = 32 = 10^1.5 on the numbers Rob gives. When > I'm quickly reading through t

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-15 Thread Mark H. Wood
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 07:31:26PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote: [snip] > > * You state it is a lower bound on the energy consumed/generated by > > bruteforcing. Having a closer look at the Wikipedia page, I just > > found this sentence: "If no informat

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-14 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote: > Well... Apart from the assumption I stated just below (ie. single > bit flip for AES), I cannot begin to think about an error I might > have done with this one, apart from misunderstanding Wikipedia's > statement that "The processing rate cannot be higher

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-14 Thread Leo Gaspard
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 01:15:40PM -0700, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > >First, the Margolus-Levitin limit: "6.10^33 ops.J^{-1}.s^{-1} maximum" > >So, dividing the 2^128 by 6.10^33 gives me a bit less than 57000 J.s > >(assuming testing an AES key is a single operation). So, that's less than > >1min fo

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-14 Thread Robert J. Hansen
10^10 * 10^6 = 10^16. So far your estimate is off by a factor of a thousand trillion. *Ten* thousand trillion. Sorry, that one's entirely my error. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-us

Re: GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-14 Thread Robert J. Hansen
First, the Margolus-Levitin limit: "6.10^33 ops.J^{-1}.s^{-1} maximum" So, dividing the 2^128 by 6.10^33 gives me a bit less than 57000 J.s (assuming testing an AES key is a single operation). So, that's less than 1min for 1kJ. Pretty affordable, I believe. No. But since I'm going to be giv

GPG's vulnerability to brute force [WAS: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography]

2014-05-14 Thread Leo Gaspard
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:21:36PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > Since the well known agency from Baltimore uses its influence to have > > crypto standards coast close to the limit of the brute-forceable, 128 > > bit AES will be insecure not too far in the future. > > No. > > https://www.gnu