Re: Moving away from SHA-1

2014-02-12 Thread Per Tunedal
Hi Kristian, Thanks for the link. I've studied some interesting threads. Anyhow, I'm surprised that apparently there isn't any decision on how to move to the next OpenPGP standard, or what it would look like. Or has something been decided? I just want to be updated as I haven't followed the discu

Re: Moving away from SHA-1

2014-02-12 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 09:10:32AM +0100, Per Tunedal wrote a message of 17 lines which said: > When SHA-1 falls, GnuPG will otherwise be completely broken as > internal key signatures, as well signatures of public keys from > others and the fingerprint rely on SHA-1 hashes. Isn't three diffe

Re: Moving away from SHA-1

2014-02-12 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi Per, On 02/12/2014 09:31 AM, Per Tunedal wrote: > Hi Peter, Yes, I've searched the archives. Conclusion: There's not > any immediate danger to GnuPG. > > But, all the same: I cannot find any information on what's the > plans for the future. Soon

Re: Moving away from SHA-1

2014-02-12 Thread Per Tunedal
Hi Peter, Yes, I've searched the archives. Conclusion: There's not any immediate danger to GnuPG. But, all the same: I cannot find any information on what's the plans for the future. Sooner or later a transition to some other hash has to take place, hasn't it? Yours, Per Tunedal On Tue, Feb 11, 2

Re: Moving away from SHA-1

2014-02-11 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 11/02/14 09:10, Per Tunedal wrote: > Is there any work in progress to move to a more secure > hash algorithm? Have you searched the mailing list archives? There are several times this has been discussed already, including many different opinions, responses to those opinions and arguments for an

Moving away from SHA-1

2014-02-11 Thread Per Tunedal
Hi, GnuPG, as OpenPGP compliant, relies heavily on the near broken hash algorithm SHA-1. Is there any work in progress to move to a more secure hash algorithm? When SHA-1 falls, GnuPG will otherwise be completely broken as internal key signatures, as well signatures of public keys from others and