Or someone builds a working quantum computer with many bits and
demonstrate a working decryption of RSA-2048 in a few seconds. :-)
Well, you'd need 4096 qubits in the ensemble, representing a state space
of something like 10^1233 (not a typo).
At that point I'm going to just give up and offer
Hi, is there any plan to include post-quantum cryptography ciphers such as
McEliece and NTRU in GnuPG?
I know that NTRU is patented until 2020, but I found some C
implementations. It says that modifying the code it is possibile to have it
patent-free in 2017.
http://goo.gl/cQGavW
This is there
Hi, is there any plan to include post-quantum cryptography ciphers such
as McEliece and NTRU in GnuPG?
I am not a GnuPG developer: they will have the official word.
Unofficially, no. GnuPG tracks the RFCs published by the IETF Working
Group. If you want to see this, make a case for it to the
On 02-04-2014 1:43, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
I know, I know -- I didn't mean 'how do *I* implement it,' I meant 'are
*you* going to implement it.' And the answer there is probably not,
not unless someone like you gets the ball rolling in the above fashion.
Or someone builds a working quantum
On 4-1-2014 13:31, micha137 wrote:
A spoofing organization is no fertile ground for true innovation. The
real scientists, not the NSA are going to make progress in quantum
computing. And it is not going to be as cheap as some tens of megabucks.
Progress to get it practical will be painfully
They cheat, they bribe, they lie, they blackmail, they take polygraph tests on
each other but they don't invent.
A spoofing organization is no fertile ground for true innovation. The real
scientists, not the NSA are going to make progress in quantum computing. And it
is not going to be as cheap
Hello, micha137.
You wrote 4 января 2014 г., 16:31:44:
m They cheat, they bribe, they lie, they blackmail, they take polygraph
m tests on each other but they don't invent.
As far as I know, NSA is biggest employer of mathematicians in the world. I
don't know about physics and quantum computing
advances in cryptology are nothing that would require key
lifetimes. Once you do not feel comfortable enough with your current
keylength anymore, you can simply revoke the key manually.
Actually, predicting possible advances in fields like quantum computing
is very hard, so it would be far easier
On 200704201113, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
Yeah, again. I completely agree on the practical aspect of it, but
would nevertheless like to see proofs of complexity that weren't
dependent on the current models of computations.
I don't mean to sound flip, but as soon as you invent a
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``never'' is in this case based on one case of provable secure scheme
(that was notably difficult in implementation)?
I wouldn't be so quick to place blame on the difficulty of
implementing the one-time pad. Implementing the OTP is really
. However, the proofs that consolidate the security
of programs like gnupg, assume some model of computation... And in the
face of quantum computing, that assumption may (=has the potential to)
radically change.
So what I would love to see is some proof that -- even when faced with
this new model
, not to mention to see venture capitalists dump money
after it.
BTW, none of this has anything to do with Quantum Computing, which
may indeed yield breakthroughs someday in areas such as factoring but
which is totally unrelated...
Perry
Salam-Shalom,
Werner
Anders Breindahl wrote:
Well. Yeah. But the thing that was and is fascinating about cryptography
is that it -- assuming some model of computing -- is ``provable too
hard'' to bypass. I'm worried that the future holds in store revolutions
in computability that will shake those assumptions on
[ Please interrupt if this is getting too off-topic. ]
On 200704200441, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
Anders Breindahl wrote:
Well. Yeah. But the thing that was and is fascinating about cryptography
is that it -- assuming some model of computing -- is ``provable too
hard'' to bypass. I'm worried
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Yeah, again. I completely agree on the practical aspect of it, but
would
nevertheless like to see proofs of complexity that weren't
dependent on
the current models of computations.
I don't mean to sound flip, but as soon as you invent a
On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 01:57:46PM +0200, Anders Breindahl wrote:
Saying that ``there is no such thing'' seems harsh and as if you ignore
reality. The European Union put its hopes up for implementing a
``quantum cryptography'' network of communications. That sort of makes
the term real in
Message: 4
Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2007 19:56:48 -0500
From: Robert J. Hansen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Quantum computing
Brute-forcing a 128-bit cipher using a traditional
computer is a ridiculous proposition, but using Grover's, it
becomes
as hard as brute-forcing a 64-bit cipher... hard
on implementation details.
What s2k algorithm is being used? What algorithm is
used to encrypt the secret key? What... etc., etc.
3. I've already explained why quantum computing is not
something we need to worry about. Be far, _far_ more
concerned with the physical security of your machine
that increases in key sizes makes
traditional symmetric cryptography keep up with advances in quantum
computing, such as Grover's algorithm for searching the keyspace.
Then... It would seem that quantum computers poses no threat to
traditional cryptography -- helped by increases in key sizes
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Which I also remarked in the original post. However, when (if?)
commercial interests grab a hold of quantum computing, huge leaps in
cost of production perhaps could be achieved, making memory-rich
quantum
computers abundant -- at least, from
On 4/18/07, Anders Breindahl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
However, I assume you know what you talk about, when you say that we
aren't likely to factor 256-bit-numbers ever. So please restate that --
even in the face of quantum computers -- we won't ever factor 256 bit
numbers.
By the way, I
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Note that breaking Diffie-Hellman and other discrete logarithm based
algorithms is thought to be nearly equivalent to factoring, but has
not been proven to be so.
Going off the top of my head, the DLP is known to be greater than or
equal to
On Wed, Apr 18, 2007 at 09:10:17AM +0200, Anders Breindahl wrote:
On 200704172359, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
1. We are unlikely to ever be able to brute-force a 256-bit
keyspace. Ever. Not until computers are made of something other
than matter, occupy something other than space, run
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