Re: Unecrypted download of public keys

2017-02-04 Thread sivmu
Am 04.02.2017 um 23:27 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor: > On Sat 2017-02-04 15:14:50 -0500, sivmu wrote: >> I suppose this config did not change after upgrading from 2.1.17. >> Just tested it on 2.1.18 using arch and it still uses http on my setup. > > it's not a config change -- it's a defaults

Re: Unecrypted download of public keys

2017-02-04 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On Sat 2017-02-04 15:14:50 -0500, sivmu wrote: > I suppose this config did not change after upgrading from 2.1.17. > Just tested it on 2.1.18 using arch and it still uses http on my setup. it's not a config change -- it's a defaults change. in the old arrangement, if you didn't specify a

Re: Unecrypted download of public keys

2017-02-04 Thread sivmu
Am 04.02.2017 um 08:18 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor: > On Sat 2017-02-04 01:33:56 -0500, sivmu wrote: >> When using --revc-key or the gpa frontend, I noticed that the >> target public keys are still downloded using unencrypted http. While the >> trnasmitted information is generally public, it

Re: Unecrypted download of public keys

2017-02-03 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On Sat 2017-02-04 01:33:56 -0500, sivmu wrote: > When using --revc-key or the gpa frontend, I noticed that the > target public keys are still downloded using unencrypted http. While the > trnasmitted information is generally public, it doesmake things pretty > easy for an adversary to collect

Unecrypted download of public keys

2017-02-03 Thread sivmu
When using --revc-key or the gpa frontend, I noticed that the target public keys are still downloded using unencrypted http. While the trnasmitted information is generally public, it doesmake things pretty easy for an adversary to collect metadata such as your contacts. This is expecially