On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 09:15:14AM -0400 Also sprach Mark H. Wood:
On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 02:10:07PM +0200, Jerome Baum wrote:
I'm going to lean very far out the window and assume he meant the actual
private key, not the private key-ring/-file/...
I'm not sure I understand the
On Mon, 25 Jun 2012 17:08, lists.gn...@mephisto.fastmail.net said:
cracking the symmetric encryption used to protect the private key is
comparable to the problem of cracking an encrypted message's session
key.
No, it is not. The entropy in a session key matches the size of the
session key.
On 06/25/2012 11:08 AM, Kevin Kammer wrote:
Eventually being... the age of the Earth?
(I do not disagree with Kevin: this is an emphatic agreement.)
There is a minimum energy associated with flipping a bit -- something so
small that a single proton has the energy to flip about a trillion bits.
On 06/25/2012 11:44 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
cracking the symmetric encryption used to protect the private key is
comparable to the problem of cracking an encrypted message's session
key.
No, it is not. The entropy in a session key matches the size of the
session key. The key used to
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
El 18-10-2011 10:07, Peter Lebbing escribió:
...
A capable enough hacker might infect the USB pendrive while it is
in your internet-connected PC and that way still gain access to the
non-connected system.
Ok, but if the online computer uses
On 19/10/11 22:43, Faramir wrote:
Ok, but if the online computer uses Windows, and the offline one
uses Linux, then it would be a multiplataform trojan horse... that is
not likely to be a common case.
Define your threat model... are we talking random trojan infection or a focused
attacker
On 10/19/2011 4:43 PM, Faramir wrote:
Ok, but if the online computer uses Windows, and the offline one
uses Linux, then it would be a multiplataform trojan horse... that is
not likely to be a common case.
At this point we're throwing conjecture onto conjecture. If the offline
one happened
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
El 19-10-2011 17:54, Peter Lebbing escribió:
On 19/10/11 22:43, Faramir wrote:
Ok, but if the online computer uses Windows, and the offline one
uses Linux, then it would be a multiplataform trojan horse...
that is not likely to be a common
On 10/19/2011 4:54 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
Because in the latter case, I hardly think commonality matters.
As an example:
Three years ago I was thrown into a week-long sink-or-swim course on
malware analysis, taught by an instructor who was a principal scientist
at a company that's a big name
I'm going to lean very far out the window and assume he meant the actual
private key, not the private key-ring/-file/...
I'm not sure I understand the distinction you're making there.
One is protected with a passphrase (i.e. it's encrypted), the other is
in the clear.
If I manage to steal
On 10/18/2011 8:10 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
If I manage to steal your private keyring, then yes the very strong
passphrase should grind my attempts to steal your key to a halt. If I
manage to steal your private _key_ OTOH, I don't need to get past your
passphrase as that doesn't come into play.
On 18/10/11 14:36, Jerome Baum wrote:
* I'm going to take the word to mean what it says: key, not what I can
flexibly interpret it as: encrypted key.
One of those metal things in my pocket? What good are they for encryption? Even
if you manage to read it in, it still has way too little
Monday, October 17, 2011, 11:30:48 PM, Robert wrote:
Smartcard and a good PIN. That's pretty much the gold standard. It's
not the best way (there is no 'best way'), but it's generally an
excellent place to start from.
I read a smartcard is simply a chip card. Why is it save, what's a
PIN?
On 10/18/2011 8:36 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
Have you looked at my original statement?
Yes.
I recall making the distinction between a key* and a key-ring/-file,
not between a key-ring and a key-file.
A distinction that has been lost on apparently everyone here. Please
use accepted terminology.
On 18/10/11 14:53, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
I read a smartcard is simply a chip card. Why is it save, what's a
PIN? Say I'm using it on a PC with a trojan in the background
that logs my keystrokes (my password) and can send data (my key)
via internet to an attacker. How is access
On 2011-10-18 14:48, Peter Lebbing wrote:
On 18/10/11 14:36, Jerome Baum wrote:
* I'm going to take the word to mean what it says: key, not what I can
flexibly interpret it as: encrypted key.
One of those metal things in my pocket? What good are they for encryption?
Even
if you manage to
On 10/18/2011 9:08 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
Makes sense if there's no context. But there's context here --
cryptography. In that context, key means something specific.
This ain't EUROCRYPT or FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY. If you're reading
professional journals that are talking about crypto in purely
On 2011-10-18 15:05, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
On 10/18/2011 8:36 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
I recall making the distinction between a key* and a key-ring/-file,
not between a key-ring and a key-file.
A distinction that has been lost on apparently everyone here. Please
use accepted terminology.
On 18/10/11 15:05, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
On 10/18/2011 8:36 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
Have you looked at my original statement?
Yes.
Oddly, I don't recall Jerome ever making a statement remotely like If I steal
your decrypted key, I only remember him stating that he thought, as did I,
If someone sniffs your PIN, and has trojaned or rooted your computer, he could
use your smartcard while it is still plugged in to your computer, just like
you
are using your smartcard.
If you're worried about this you should be able to find a smartcard
reader with PIN entry that GnuPG
On 18/10/11 15:05, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
IIRC nowadays is store a separate file per key?
No, it's still a single file (pubring.gpg, for instance, is the public
keyring). I just can't promise that it's still a raw stream of RFC4880
octets.
ls ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/
Peter.
PS:
On 18/10/11 15:08, Jerome Baum wrote:
It's one thing to be picky when it adds to the discussion proper. That
would be the case when we're distinguishing between the key as it is
stored on disk (encrypted, inside a key-file/-ring/...) and the key as
it is stored in memory (unencrypted). That
On 18/10/11 15:23, Jerome Baum wrote:
It doesn't prevent a trojan from signing something other than what you
intended (if it's your master key on card, even another key or a new
sub-key) but whether this is a problem depends on your threat model.
The signature problem can still be solved by
It doesn't prevent a trojan from signing something other than what you
intended (if it's your master key on card, even another key or a new
sub-key) but whether this is a problem depends on your threat model.
I should mention that the current OpenPGP card spec doesn't let the card
know whether
I'm going to keep this as short as possible, because we've already hit
the point at which we're casting far more heat than light.
Oddly, I don't recall Jerome ever making a statement remotely like
If I steal your decrypted key, I only remember him stating
that he thought, as did I, that
Thanks to everyone for the helpful answers. Maybe I'll buy a smartcard, it
seems more convinient than rebooting for every email.
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Well, not quite. Eventually you would get it. The task of security
systems is to make eventually be longer than:
o the payoff is worth; or
o the time it takes to be discovered; or
o the time it takes for the secured object to lose its value.
Statistically, that is. You could get it
Right, that's a good point I think we all considered trivial when
maybe we shouldn't have. In your threat model you should determine for
how long your data should be safe (per attacker type) before you go
ahead and make decisions about key protection.
To clarify, this is what we should tell
On 10/18/2011 8:53 AM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
I read a smartcard is simply a chip card. Why is it save, what's a
PIN?
PIN: Personal Identification Number.
The idea is the secret key material is stored on the card, not on the
PC. The secret key material is located in write-only memory:
On Tue, 18 Oct 2011 15:05, r...@sixdemonbag.org said:
No, it's still a single file (pubring.gpg, for instance, is the public
keyring). I just can't promise that it's still a raw stream of RFC4880
octets.
It still is for the public keys.
2.1 changes the format of the secring (well, dropped
On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 04:23:42PM +0200, Jerome Baum wrote:
[snip]
While we're discussing the STEED proposal in the other thread, do you
think it's better to educate your users and risk loosing them or do you
think it's better to provide sensible defaults for the average
threat model and
On Tue, 18 Oct 2011 15:19, r...@sixdemonbag.org said:
Arguably we should be using 'certificate' to describe keys, but
We tried that in the Gpg4win manuals. However it turned out that this
term as other problems when used with OpenPGP keys (ah well, keyblocks).
honestly, that's a losing
I was pleased to see room for different classes of users in the STEED
paper. When I encounter software that tries to be helpful, my own
first thought is: how do I turn that off? But I recognized long ago
that I was never a typical user and my own inclinations are no guide
to popularity.
On 10/17/11 5:18 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
Hi everybody,
what is the best way to protect
your private key from getting stolen?
Page 29 (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN513) of the Gnu
Privacy Handbook (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html)recommends a
strong passphrase to
Hi everybody,
what is the best way to protect
your private key from getting stolen?
I think:
1. Using gnupg on a windows PC with internet connection is not good, because
there are too many trojans out there.
2. Using gnupg on a linux PC with internet connection (like privatix, see
On 10/17/11 5:18 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
what is the best way to protect your private key from getting
stolen?
Smartcard and a good PIN. That's pretty much the gold standard. It's
not the best way (there is no 'best way'), but it's generally an
excellent place to start from.
1. Using
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Jerome Baum jer...@jeromebaum.com wrote:
Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average
attacker isn't
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Jerome Baum jer...@jeromebaum.com wrote:
Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average
attacker isn't
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:18 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
what is the best way to protect
your private key from getting stolen?
Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
attacker almost no
Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average
attacker isn't going to be able to break your key on modern hardware
and anyone who
On 10/17/11 5:18 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
Hi everybody,
what is the best way to protect
your private key from getting stolen?
Page 29 (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN513) of the Gnu
Privacy Handbook (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html)recommends a
strong passphrase to
On 10/17/2011 14:44, Jerome Baum wrote:
Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average
attacker isn't going to be able to break your
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