OPINION Cutting the hype: There wasn't really much to Manohar Parrikar's stint as defence minister
With the Prime Minister's Office holding much of the reins, there wasn't much the Goa chief minister could do. After 28 months as the Union Minister of Defence, Manohar Parrikar returned to Goa as its chief minister last week, a post he had reluctantly vacated in 2014 when he was shifted to Delhi after the Bharatiya Janata Party won the national elections. Parrikar's departure from the Cabinet, after the BJP staked claim over the government in Goa that saw a hung Assembly, generated a flurry of fawning articles that almost described him as the greatest defence minister ever. But lost in the din of the largely positive coverage was a dichotomy: if he was such a great defence minister, why was Prime Minister Narendra Modi allowing him to leave for a state that has only two seats in the Lok Sabha and barely makes a blimp on national politics? Wasn't national security much bigger than state politics, especially for a party that has made nationalism its key calling card? There is little doubt that Parrikar brought fresh energy and a lot of integrity to the ministry that has usually been the hub of scandals for decades. But his purported achievements make for a rather boring, if not depressing picture. In short, there were a bunch of committees, some purchases, two key foreign policy agreements and some controversial statements. Looking West If there is any key achievement during his 28-month-stint at the helm, it was the signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, or LEMOA -- an agreement for close military cooperation -- with the US in August. In many ways, this was a major departure from India's foreign policy objective to avoid any military pact with a foreign power. The move was almost as much of a divergence as the decision to invite the Japanese Navy to participate in the Malabar naval exercises, that have been conducted with the US every year since 1992. The fact that the Japanese and US share India's concerns on China’s maritime ambitions was not lost. Not only did this see naval ships from the three nations exercise jointly but also its Naval Special Forces coming together, setting a new bar to the annual effort. But can Parrikar be credited with a foreign policy initiative that, under the current regime, has largely been the preserve of the Prime Minister's Office? Clearly, this was Parrikar going along with a major policy shift towards increased cooperation that has been crafted by Modi. This was also seen in the mysterious move to cancel the order for a 126 Rafale fighter aircraft from France and instead buy 36 at almost the same cost. This inexplicable move was announced when Prime Minister Modi was on a trip to France in 2015 and it is safe to assume that Parrikar was not in the loop when the announcement came. There were a flurry of articles justifying this piecemeal purchase of 36 aircraft when the Indian Air Force clearly needed much more. In some ways, the Prime Minister's Office had subsumed the defence and external affairs ministries, the two departments it shares space with in South Block. This, to a degree, also explains the nature of the relationship Parrikar shared with Modi. The Goa chief minister was one of the first BJP leaders to openly support Modi as the party's prime ministerial candidate for the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, long before others ditched veteran leader LK Advani. Parrikar did it with conviction because he believed that Modi was the future. A senior BJP leader explained their relationship as follows: "There is a mutual respect shared by the two, and Parrikar accepts Modi as the clear leader, and was always happy to play a second or even a fourth fiddle to him, depending on what the circumstances were. This also worked well for the prime minister". Technocrat in office The fact that Parrikar was from the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay had added to his mystique even when he took over the reins as the Chief Minister of Goa for the first time in 2002. He was the quintessential technocrat who would suddenly leave office in his Hyundai Santro to inspect government works in different parts of the state. Parrikar brought the same attitude to the defence ministry, which came to be appreciated and resented at the same time. A number of officials spoke about how Parrikar would often remind them about his IIT heritage, especially when contentious issues were under discussion. But a seasoned politician would have been able to navigate the defence ministry maze better. Instead, Parrikar remained angular on contentious issues. He was nearly absent when the One-Rank-One-Pension agitation was peaking in mid-2015. The Justice L Narasimha Committee report on the anomalies in the implementation of the OROP scheme for ex-servicemen, which demands pension equity for all officers of a certain rank irrespective of the year in which they retired, had been with Parrikar since October, but did not see any resolution. Most of the negotiations between the military veterans and the government were carried out by the Prime Minister's Office, with Principal secretary Nripendra Mishra playing a key role. The defence ministry was largely left out, making people wonder about its efficacy in representing the interests of the ex-servicemen. Parrikar was also largely absent when the government decided to do away with a long established protocol for appointing the army chief -- that of seniority -- and overlooked two senior generals to appoint General Bipin Rawat as the army chief. Rawat had been virtually hand picked by the prime minister and the national security advisor, who were keen to have an infantry man rather than an armoured corps officer at the helm. The move left the traditional military hierarchy shaken and opened a can worms that was detrimental to policy that had served the Indian Army well for decades. "We had hoped that the defence minister would step in and steady the ship," as senior serving Army general told Scroll.in. "But it was left to the PMO and the Raksha Mantri never spoke up. In our Constitutional scheme of things, that looks upon cabinet ministers to act as checks and balances in a field of competing interests, our voice went completely unheard." A senior Navy officer, posted in South Block, echoed his sentiments. "Contentious issues would usually end up in the PMO for a resolution," he said. "As a minister, he [Parrikar] didn't have the mandate to take the key decisions." In some ways, the so-called surgical strikes carried out by Indian Special Forces across the Line of Control with Pakistan in September last year saw the defence minister stepping back while the Prime Minister's Office took the lead. Like his counterpart in the external affairs ministry, Parrikar was largely a by stander as the decisions were taken and the operational planning began. Controversies and few deals If Parrikar was heard, it was mostly at seminars and public talks that led to controversies. He attributed the success of the "surgical strikes" to the teachings of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. He also likened the Indian Army to Lord Hanuman, saying that the army didn't know its strength until they were sent on this mission. Clearly, these were avoidable and the chest beating for political mileage left the traditionally apolitical military worried and fuming. The politicisation of the military, which started before 2014, also continued to flourish under Parrikar. But Parrikar was also working on several incremental measures to address yawning gaps in India's military preparedness. He shepherded a Rs 20,000 crore acquisition that saw indigenous fighter aircraft, artillery and other critical equipment being purchased to improve war fighting capabilities. He set up a number of committees too look into matters ranging from wage and pension anomalies to defence purchases in a bid to make the ministry more efficient. Weapons and equipment purchases around Rs 1,50,000 crore were given Acceptance of Necessity under him, but will take another five years to fructify. But contentious issues, like the urgent need for setting up a Chief of Defence Staff to oversee all the armed forces, or overhauling of the acquisition process slipped away and clearly, Parrikar had neither the political capital or the clout to push these through. Yes, Parrikar was a man who could have been the best defence minister in India -- but in the end, he clearly wasn't. We welcome your comments at lett...@scroll.in. https://scroll.in/article/832418/cut-the-hype-there-wasnt-much-to-manohar-parrikars-stint-as-defence-minister * * * Manohar Parrikar Could Have Been a Great Defence Minister BY SUDHANSU MOHANTY ON 20/03/2017 He tried creating his own world almost wholly made up of people drawn from Goa, but Lutyen's Delhi had its own inexorable ways of breaching his citadel from time to time. The BJP's gain in the recent electoral battle has, in a way, been the nation's loss. Arun Jaitley has been given the additional charge of the defence ministry but it isn't the same as having a regular raksha mantri and, in particular, with a Manohar Parrikar at its helm. I'm not aware of the games that are played on the political chessboard -- in this case, the BJP's -- but looking from the confines of the defence ministry, sadly I can't think of anyone in the ruling party who can remotely match Parrikar's intellectual brilliance and penetrating insight into the vastly complex issues that confront the ministry. Parrikar was new to the national scenario when he, much against his wishes, was made the defence minister in November, 2014. He was new to the Union government, to the murky world of Delhi's politics and to the even murkier world of defence deals. The defence ministry is vast and humongous. The issues at stake are complex and roiled in tangles of rules and procedures. Decision-making is layered and at the same time labyrinthine. Each of the services has its very own shibboleth and reading a few sentences on a file will make clear the so-called minefield of lingo that one is likely to trample upon. But Parrikar acquitted himself well -- and rather quickly. About six months into his term when, as the controller general of defence accounts, I met him for the first time to discuss the pesky and complex issue of OROP, I discerned his clear understanding of the subject. All the three services chiefs were present at the meeting, as were senior bureaucrats of the ministry. Parrikar seemed to have all the facts of the case, intricate as they are, at his fingertips. He gave everyone a patient hearing, probing the issue deeper, thinking along as he hammered out the necessary calculations almost concurrently. Soon after, when I moved over to the defence ministry, I saw more of the same on any issues I discussed with him in his chamber or in the many meetings he chaired. He was a hands-on minister like no other. He was quick, but behind his quick decision-making lay a mind that had reflected long and hard on crucial aspects of the issue. He was a brainiac who would dissect procurement cases, and expatiate at length on the pros and cons in the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) meetings as if he was slowly peeling off layers of an onion. But he granted every official their right of say, no matter how much he disagreed with them. He knew his every move was under media scanner and the ubiquitous defence lobby, but he was firm and open in his conviction. DPP planning But more than anything that I saw during my tenure was when the new defence procurement procedure (DPP) was a work-in-progress. Of the many discussions we had in meetings, including in the DAC, the meeting of eight-ten senior officers of the ministry and services headquarters that Parrikar called for us to hammer out the DPP clauses is etched in my memory. The meeting went on for a good six hours. What to my mind still rings loud is the new concept of evaluation that he brought to play on the 'essential and enhanced' parameters in the services qualitative requirements granting nuances to the progressive, pragmatic way for single vendor situations in the DPP. "Essential Parameters -- A and Essential Parameters -- B (if applicable) are non-negotiable requirements to be met by the vendor, prior to commencement of equipment delivery. Essential Parameters -- B to be used only when required, with DAC’s approval and not to be used when two or more vendors claim to possess the same at the RFI stage and not to be included in ab-initio single vendor cases. Essential Parameters -- B may also be incorporated in the SoC, for provision of partial quantities of the items being procured, to meet different/higher specifications for specific operational requirements." This is no place to elaborate on other issues he wished to institutionalise in India's protracted and scam-laden defence procurement procedure, like the concept of reverse LD to fast track cases in the ministry, but I can't help alluding to his ability to see and weigh both sides of the coin and provide a transparent level-playing field to all. He certainly played a crucial role in pushing the government machinery to move faster than it has in decision-making. Flip-flops and delays Not that we didn't have our share of disagreements on various issues and his dilly-dallying (the Indian Ministerial filibustering; I called it Parrikaring!) on many others. As a politician he flip-flopped at times; but given our societal value system and cohort pressures, and the times and ethos we live in, plus that he was a relative newbie in the arcane world of the government of India, graduating as he was from the corporation (coined from a friend) of Goa, I'm prepared to grant him the benefit of flip-flops. Cases that have haemorrhaged public funds for years and continue to do so, which he understood very well, readily come to my mind and with immense sadness. But notwithstanding that, I'll always admire his cerebral sparkle and the hard yards he put in, his focus on Make-in-India that put LCA on centre-stage and the encouragement that he unstintingly provided to Aeronautical Development Agency and the DRDO. Critics often complained that the Make-in-India project in the defence sector had failed to take-off. Sadly they fail to grasp, given our ecosystem, how tough it can get, how protracted the procurement of arms and weapons/platform are, and how long it takes to show results. The same goes with the recent criticism of the parliamentary standing committee on inadequate defence budgetary outlay. The expectations are immense but so are the imponderables, not to say anything on the need to appreciate the nation’s budgetary outlay in a holistic vein. Anyone who has dealt with issues knows the periodic pitfalls of achieving milestones and the payouts. Commentators are also often wont to rile against the lower budgetary allocation towards the defence sector. To me though the reference to percentage of GDP is so misplaced that I find this betrays a complete lack of appreciation of the algorithm of a nation’s growth model. To cite a simple example: if a human body requires 'x' calories for an optimal life, must greater prosperity mean a greater/higher calorific intake? Common sense says no -- it’ll be asking for trouble. The same too goes for the nation and its insurance mechanism. This is not even taking into account the available pool of resources that funds all areas of national development and sustenance. Frankly, I can see no correlation between the defence budgetary outlay and the GDP unless of course we wish to get carried away by the western world's paradigm of comparative national defence outlays that SIPRI, among others, does. Incidentally, even SIPRI includes pensionary outlay as a part of defence outlay, which the learned commentators disavow and, instead, hammer out their insular architecture. Parrikar learnt and inhered these issues rather well. He treaded cautiously, as a sensible man would, on issues of strategic partnership that carries in its womb plenitude of ramifications, both for the present and the future. This heaped infinite frustrations on the industry and the industry-driven media ever keen to swoop down on the slightest flaw. The only flaw I can discern here is Parrikar's penchant to shoot his mouth off on such issues rather than holding back. But how "correct" was it for Parrikar to leave the ministry and go back to his home turf? It is not for me to go into political calculations, but that he upped and left suddenly after doing the hardest part -- understanding the DNA of the ministry that takes years to fructify and show results; the machinations and vacillations in its everyday functioning; the many flawed past trajectories; the many countervailing dynamics and interplay of personnel/middlemen/defence and civil bureaucracy et al -- is unfortunate. He left when he ought to have stayed put. Columnists have opined that unlike other politicians he wasn't fond of money, but he loved power in an architecture where he was the numero uno. Far from the general public perception of his ineffable ordinariness and beneath his plebeian visage, he was hubristic and won't let go a chance to so adumbrate. Also, coming to Delhi after years of helming the tiny city-state, the overwhelming world of Delhi may have underwhelmed his overweening psychology and worldview. He tried creating his own world almost wholly made up of people drawn from Goa but Lutyen's Delhi had its own inexorable ways of breaching his citadel from time to time. His periodic, resuscitative visits to Goa didn't exactly help his cause to carve out a niche in India's capital. He longed to get back to Goa. I sensed his heart was in Goa but his head was in Delhi -- so well he had understood the defence ecosystem to lead from the front. Notwithstanding these foibles and his many gaffes, which likely would've ironed themselves out, he had it in him to be among India's distinguished raksha mantris. While his party's political calculations and internal dynamics are theirs, India doubtless needed him more than Goa did. Sudhansu Mohanty worked as Controller General of Defence Accounts and then as Financial Adviser, Defence Services before retiring on May 31, 2016. Liked the story? We're a non-profit. Make a donation and help pay for our journalism. https://thewire.in/117425/manohar-parrikar-could-have-been-a-great-defence-minister/