[Group.of.nepali.translators] [Bug 1779923] Re: other users' coredumps can be read via setgid directory and killpriv bypass

** Changed in: linux (Ubuntu Cosmic) Status: In Progress => Won't Fix ** Changed in: linux (Ubuntu) Status: In Progress => Fix Released -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of नेपाली भाषा समायोजकहरुको समूह, which is subscribed to Xenial. Matching

[Group.of.nepali.translators] [Bug 1779923] Re: other users' coredumps can be read via setgid directory and killpriv bypass

This bug was fixed in the package linux - 3.13.0-157.207 --- linux (3.13.0-157.207) trusty; urgency=medium * linux: 3.13.0-157.207 -proposed tracker (LP: #1787982) * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline) - SAUCE: Fix "x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect

[Group.of.nepali.translators] [Bug 1779923] Re: other users' coredumps can be read via setgid directory and killpriv bypass

This bug was fixed in the package linux - 4.4.0-134.160 --- linux (4.4.0-134.160) xenial; urgency=medium * linux: 4.4.0-134.160 -proposed tracker (LP: #1787177) * locking sockets broken due to missing AppArmor socket mediation patches (LP: #1780227) - UBUNTU SAUCE:

[Group.of.nepali.translators] [Bug 1779923] Re: other users' coredumps can be read via setgid directory and killpriv bypass

This bug was fixed in the package linux - 4.15.0-33.36 --- linux (4.15.0-33.36) bionic; urgency=medium * linux: 4.15.0-33.36 -proposed tracker (LP: #1787149) * RTNL assertion failure on ipvlan (LP: #1776927) - ipvlan: drop ipv6 dependency - ipvlan: use per device

[Group.of.nepali.translators] [Bug 1779923] Re: other users' coredumps can be read via setgid directory and killpriv bypass

** No longer affects: whoopsie (Ubuntu) ** No longer affects: whoopsie (Ubuntu Trusty) ** No longer affects: whoopsie (Ubuntu Xenial) ** No longer affects: whoopsie (Ubuntu Bionic) ** No longer affects: whoopsie (Ubuntu Cosmic) -- You received this bug notification because you are a member

[Group.of.nepali.translators] [Bug 1779923] Re: other users' coredumps can be read via setgid directory and killpriv bypass

I don't think the Security or Foundations teams plan to make any changes in Whoopsie so I'm marking these tasks as invalid. ** Changed in: whoopsie (Ubuntu Trusty) Status: New => Invalid ** Changed in: whoopsie (Ubuntu Xenial) Status: New => Invalid ** Changed in: whoopsie (Ubuntu