On 2024-04-12 14:13, Stefan Berger wrote:
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
From: Patrick Colp
If a protector is specified, but it fails to unlock the disk, fall back
to asking for the passphrase. However, an error was set indicating that
the protector(s) failed. Later code
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
From: Patrick Colp
If a protector is specified, but it fails to unlock the disk, fall back
to asking for the passphrase. However, an error was set indicating that
the protector(s) failed. Later code (e.g., LUKS code) fails as
`grub_errno` is
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
An attacker may insert a malicious disk with the same crypto UUID and
trick grub2 to mount the fake root. Even though the key from the key
protector fails to unlock the fake root, it's not wiped out cleanly so
the attacker could dump the memory
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
As a preparation to test TPM 2.0 TSS stack with grub-emu, the new
option, --tpm-device, is introduced to specify the TPM device for
grub-emu so that grub-emu can share the emulated TPM device with
the host.
Since grub-emu can directly access
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
From: Patrick Colp
Currently with the TPM2 protector, only SRK mode is supported and
NV index support is just a stub. Implement the NV index option.
Note: This only extends support on the unseal path. grub2_protect
has not been updated.
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
From: Hernan Gatta
To utilize the key protectors framework, there must be a way to protect
full-disk encryption keys in the first place. The grub-protect tool
includes support for the TPM2 key protector but other protectors that
require setup
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
From: Hernan Gatta
Add a new parameter to cryptomount to support the key protectors framework: -P.
The parameter is used to automatically retrieve a key from specified key
protectors. The parameter may be repeated to specify any number of key
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
From: Hernan Gatta
The TPM2 key protector is a module that enables the automatic retrieval
of a fully-encrypted disk's unlocking key from a TPM 2.0.
A few minor finds/comments below.
The theory of operation is such that the module accepts
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
From: Hernan Gatta
A key protector encapsulates functionality to retrieve an unlocking key
for a fully-encrypted disk from a specific source. A key protector
module registers itself with the key protectors framework when it is
loaded and
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
GIT repo for v11: https://github.com/lcp/grub2/tree/tpm2-unlock-v11
This patch series is based on "Automatic TPM Disk Unlock"(*1) posted by
Hernan Gatta to introduce the key protector framework and TPM2 stack
to GRUB2, and this could be a
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
This commit handles the TPM2_PolicyAuthorize command from the key file
in TPM 2.0 Key File format.
TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is the essential command to support authorized
policy which allows the users to sign TPM policies with their own keys.
Per
On 4/9/24 04:30, Gary Lin via Grub-devel wrote:
For the tpm2 module, the TCG2 command submission function is the only
difference between the a QEMU instance and grub-emu. To test TPM key
unsealing with a QEMU instance, it requires an extra OS image to invoke
grub-protect to seal the LUKS key,
On 4/12/24 04:39, Gary Lin wrote:
From: Hernan Gatta
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Software Stack (TSS) provides logic to
compose, submit, and parse TPM commands and responses.
compose and submit TPM commands and parse reponses.
A limited number of TPM commands may be accessed via the
From: Hernan Gatta
To utilize the key protectors framework, there must be a way to protect
full-disk encryption keys in the first place. The grub-protect tool
includes support for the TPM2 key protector but other protectors that
require setup ahead of time can be supported in the future.
For
When using disk auto-unlocking with TPM 2.0, the typical grub.cfg may
look like this:
tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/sealed.tpm
cryptomount -u -P tpm2
search --fs-uuid --set=root
Since the disk search order is based on the order of module loading, the
attacker
From: Hernan Gatta
The TPM2 key protector is a module that enables the automatic retrieval
of a fully-encrypted disk's unlocking key from a TPM 2.0.
The theory of operation is such that the module accepts various
arguments, most of which are optional and therefore possess reasonable
defaults.
For the tpm2 module, the TCG2 command submission function is the only
difference between the a QEMU instance and grub-emu. To test TPM key
unsealing with a QEMU instance, it requires an extra OS image to invoke
grub-protect to seal the LUKS key, rather than a simple grub-shell rescue
CD image. On
As a preparation to test TPM 2.0 TSS stack with grub-emu, the new
option, --tpm-device, is introduced to specify the TPM device for
grub-emu so that grub-emu can share the emulated TPM device with
the host.
Since grub-emu can directly access the device node on host, it's easy to
implement the
From: Patrick Colp
Currently with the TPM2 protector, only SRK mode is supported and
NV index support is just a stub. Implement the NV index option.
Note: This only extends support on the unseal path. grub2_protect
has not been updated. tpm2-tools can be used to insert a key into
the NV index.
From: Hernan Gatta
Add a new parameter to cryptomount to support the key protectors framework: -P.
The parameter is used to automatically retrieve a key from specified key
protectors. The parameter may be repeated to specify any number of key
protectors. These are tried in order until one
This commit handles the TPM2_PolicyAuthorize command from the key file
in TPM 2.0 Key File format.
TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is the essential command to support authorized
policy which allows the users to sign TPM policies with their own keys.
Per TPM 2.0 Key File(*1), CommandPolicy for
From: Hernan Gatta
A key protector encapsulates functionality to retrieve an unlocking key
for a fully-encrypted disk from a specific source. A key protector
module registers itself with the key protectors framework when it is
loaded and unregisters when unloaded. Additionally, a key protector
From: Patrick Colp
If a protector is specified, but it fails to unlock the disk, fall back
to asking for the passphrase. However, an error was set indicating that
the protector(s) failed. Later code (e.g., LUKS code) fails as
`grub_errno` is now set. Print the existing errors out first, before
From: Daniel Axtens
Create a wrapper file that specifies the module license.
Set up the makefile so it is built.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko
---
grub-core/Makefile.core.def| 15 +++
An attacker may insert a malicious disk with the same crypto UUID and
trick grub2 to mount the fake root. Even though the key from the key
protector fails to unlock the fake root, it's not wiped out cleanly so
the attacker could dump the memory to retrieve the secret key. To defend
such attack,
Document libtasn1 in docs/grub-dev.texi and add the upgrade steps.
Also add the patches to make libtasn1 compatible with grub code.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko
---
docs/grub-dev.texi| 28 ++
...asn1-disable-code-not-needed-in-grub.patch
GIT repo for v11: https://github.com/lcp/grub2/tree/tpm2-unlock-v11
This patch series is based on "Automatic TPM Disk Unlock"(*1) posted by
Hernan Gatta to introduce the key protector framework and TPM2 stack
to GRUB2, and this could be a useful feature for the systems to
implement full disk
In _asn1_tag_der(), the first while loop for the long form may end up
with a 'k' value with 'ASN1_MAX_TAG_SIZE' and cause the buffer overrun
in the second while loop. This commit tweaks the conditional check to
avoid producing a too large 'k'.
This is a quick fix and may differ from the official
From: Daniel Axtens
We don't expect to be able to write ASN.1, only read it,
so we can disable some code.
Do that with #if 0/#endif, rather than deletion. This means
that the difference between upstream and grub is smaller,
which should make updating libtasn1 easier in the future.
With these
From: Daniel Axtens
Do a few things to make libtasn1 compile as part of grub:
- remove _asn1_strcat and replace strcat with the bound-checked
_asn1_str_cat except the one inside _asn1_str_cat. That strcat is
replaced with strcpy.
- adjust header paths in libtasn1.h
- adjust header
From: Daniel Axtens
- Define SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG_INT, it's the same as
SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG.
- Define WORD_BIT, the size in bits of an int. This is a defined
in the Single Unix Specification and in gnulib's limits.h. gnulib
assumes it's 32 bits on all our platforms, including 64 bit
Friendly ping. Any comments about this ?
On 19/01/2024 at 11:28, Pascal Hambourg wrote:
GRUB documentation states:
'GRUB_OS_PROBER_SKIP_LIST'
List of space-separated FS UUIDs of filesystems to be ignored from
os-prober output. For efi chainloaders it's @
But the actual behaviour does
On Tue, Apr 09, 2024 at 04:30:32PM +0800, Gary Lin wrote:
> GIT repo for v10: https://github.com/lcp/grub2/tree/tpm2-unlock-v10
>
> This patch series is based on "Automatic TPM Disk Unlock"(*1) posted by
> Hernan Gatta to introduce the key protector framework and TPM2 stack
> to GRUB2, and this
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