Re: [SECURITY PATCH 00/28] Multiple GRUB2 vulnerabilities - BootHole

2020-07-29 Thread John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
Hi Dimitri! On 7/29/20 11:20 PM, Dimitri John Ledkov wrote: > Disclosures were done to a subset of binary distributions that have a > trust path to shims signed with Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 db key. Arch > Linux does not provide shim-signed with keys controlled by Arch Linux > and it doesn't provide

Re: [SECURITY PATCH 00/28] Multiple GRUB2 vulnerabilities - BootHole

2020-07-29 Thread Dimitri John Ledkov
On Wed, 29 Jul 2020 at 21:20, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz wrote: > > On 7/29/20 10:12 PM, Christian Hesse wrote: > > This does not apply on top of grub 2.04. Will downstream maintainers have to > > do their cherry-picking on its own or will a maintenance branch on top of > > grub-2.04 (or what ever)

Re: [SECURITY PATCH 00/28] Multiple GRUB2 vulnerabilities - BootHole

2020-07-29 Thread John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
On 7/29/20 10:12 PM, Christian Hesse wrote: > This does not apply on top of grub 2.04. Will downstream maintainers have to > do their cherry-picking on its own or will a maintenance branch on top of > grub-2.04 (or what ever) be available? > I would like to push updates to the Arch Linux repositori

Re: [SECURITY PATCH 00/28] Multiple GRUB2 vulnerabilities - BootHole

2020-07-29 Thread Christian Hesse
Daniel Kiper on Wed, 2020/07/29 19:00: > I am posting all the GRUB2 upstream patches which fixes all security bugs > found and reported up until now. Major Linux distros carry or will carry > soon one form or another of these patches. Now all the GRUB2 upstream > patches are in the GRUB2 git repos

[SECURITY PATCH 00/28] Multiple GRUB2 vulnerabilities - BootHole

2020-07-29 Thread Daniel Kiper
Hi all, We have recently been made aware of a problem with GRUB2 by security research firm Eclypsium that allows a bad actor to circumvent UEFI Secure Boot. Normally, when Secure Boot is enabled, only modules [1] that have a valid signature can be loaded. The bug allows this to be circumvented and