An updated version taking into account the various comments
received during Last Call is now available as
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-wilde-text-fragment-07.txt.
Most Last Call comments were editorial in nature, but one commenter
strongly, and in the end convincingly, argued that
Also from the draft:
At least for the strong security requirement of BCP 61 [RFC3365], the
Security Area, with the support of the IESG, has insisted that all
specifications include at least one mandatory-to-implement strong
security mechanism to guarantee universal interoperability.
I do
- more and more ISP infrastructure practices OP25B for IPv4.
OP25B = Outbound Port 25 Blocking. it disallows ISP customers to run
SMTP server, or use SMTP server outside of the ISP network.
maybe it is japanese-local acronym, google shows me japanese
pages
On 2007-07-07 08:30, Keith Moore wrote:
Also from the draft:
At least for the strong security requirement of BCP 61 [RFC3365], the
Security Area, with the support of the IESG, has insisted that all
specifications include at least one mandatory-to-implement strong
security mechanism to guarantee
Keith Moore wrote:
Also from the draft:
At least for the strong security requirement of BCP 61 [RFC3365], the
Security Area, with the support of the IESG, has insisted that all
specifications include at least one mandatory-to-implement strong
security mechanism to guarantee universal
[I should know better, but...]
Masataka Ohta wrote:
What, do you mean, strong security?
Given that CAs of PKI can be compromised as easily as ISPs
of the Internet, PKI is merely weakly secure as weakly as
the plain Internet.
This can be said of any technology that is poorly managed. On
Eliot Lear wrote:
[I should know better, but...]
That's your problem.
Given that CAs of PKI can be compromised as easily as ISPs
of the Internet, PKI is merely weakly secure as weakly as
the plain Internet.
This can be said of any technology that is poorly managed.
So, you merely believe
What, do you mean, strong security?
valid question. but that's a can of worms.
Given that CAs of PKI can be compromised as easily as ISPs
of the Internet, PKI is merely weakly secure as weakly as
the plain Internet.
only if those CAs are stupid enough to connect their certificate signing
On 6-jul-2007, at 20:53, Douglas Otis wrote:
How will SMTP servers vet sources of inbound messages within an
IPv6 environment? Virtually every grain of sand can obtain a new
IPv6 address.
Simple: look at prefixes rather than individual addresses. If
2002::2002 is a spammer, then you may
On Jul 7, 2007, at 11:19 AM, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
On 6-jul-2007, at 20:53, Douglas Otis wrote:
How will SMTP servers vet sources of inbound messages within an
IPv6 environment? Virtually every grain of sand can obtain a
new IPv6 address.
Simple: look at prefixes rather than
On 6-jul-2007, at 20:53, Douglas Otis wrote:
How will SMTP servers vet sources of inbound messages within an
IPv6 environment? Virtually every grain of sand can obtain a new
IPv6 address.
Simple: look at prefixes rather than individual addresses. If
2002::2002 is a spammer,
Thus spake Mark Andrews [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You will still see consective addresses with IPv6. Until
you put a *dedicated* router at the end of the DSL line or
on the cable modem etc. there will still be lots of addresses
handed out where the next address is managed by someone
else.
That's not
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