All;
On June 15, 2007 the IAOC published an RFP for delivering IETF
Secretariat Services. This is to announce that answers have been posted
to the questions received from potential bidders.
The answers are located at: http://iaoc.ietf.org/rfpsrfis.html
The closing date for submission of
Keith == Keith Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Also from the draft: At least for the strong security
requirement of BCP 61 [RFC3365], the Security Area, with the
support of the IESG, has insisted that all specifications
include at least one mandatory-to-implement strong
Masataka == Masataka Ohta [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Masataka Keith Moore wrote:
Also from the draft: At least for the strong security
requirement of BCP 61 [RFC3365], the Security Area, with the
support of the IESG, has insisted that all specifications
include at least
todd glassey wrote:
So, you merely believe that the infrastructure of PKI is well
managed.
How the PKI process is managed is not generally part of the PKI Model
itself and that is what most ISP's and Network Geeks totally miss...
sorta like you did.
So are ISPs and telcos.
Secure
This can be said of any technology that is poorly managed.
So, you merely believe that the infrastructure of PKI is well
managed.
In all but a single instance I have no evidence to the contrary. The
one case of an exploit was extremely well publicized and ameliorated
within days.
On 2007-7-5, at 19:07, ext Tom.Petch wrote:
If we had a range of transports (perhaps like OSI offered), we
could choose the
one most suited. We don't, we only have two, so it may become a
choice of one
with a hack. But then that limited choice may be the reason why
the Internet
Protocol
On June 15, 2007 the IAOC published an RFP for delivering IETF Secretariat
Services. This is to announce that answers have been posted to the
questions received from potential bidders.
The answers are located at: http://iaoc.ietf.org/rfpsrfis.html
The closing date for submission of proposals is
