I guess I'll jump in as well. I was reading some of the related papers
recently for a different reason including the ones on active networks
(thank gods they are history) and whether that concept is in line with
the e2e philosophy.
In any event, exploring one of your examples with the
On Aug 14, 2007, at 10:59 PM, Lakshminath Dondeti wrote:
In any event, exploring one of your examples with the concepts in
the paper in mind (perhaps I am using a verbatim application of the
concepts) that the network may filter some (and that being the
keyword) malware or suspicious
this is not a way to make the network more robust.
Robust for what? Spammers? The simple fact of the matter is that the
alternative is to just shut down port 25 given the growth in both volume
and complexity to filter. That ain't robust either. Dealing with false
positives is the cost
Keith Moore wrote:
this is not a way to make the network more robust.
Robust for what? Spammers? The simple fact of the matter is that the
alternative is to just shut down port 25 given the growth in both volume
and complexity to filter. That ain't robust either. Dealing with false
The communication system isn't being a filter, properly speaking - it
is simply routing some traffic to black holes using standard routing
technology. And it doesn't relieve the application of the burden of
filtering. But it can help reduce the volume of crapola at the
application.
...at
Keith Moore wrote:
The communication system isn't being a filter, properly speaking - it
is simply routing some traffic to black holes using standard routing
technology. And it doesn't relieve the application of the burden of
filtering. But it can help reduce the volume of crapola at the
On Aug 15, 2007, at 12:16 PM, Fred Baker wrote:
in that context, here's one that one could use to dramatically
reduce spam intake.
That suggests a simple approach - in one's firewall, null route the
addresses reported by the reputation service as spam spews. It's a
network layer
people who cite reality generally do so because they lack
justification for their statements.
The thing is, Keith, I don't lack justification. I've seen the numbers
with
my own eyes in our own largish organization with an IT staff that's
super paranoid about about false positives (free
On Aug 15, 2007, at 2:06 PM, Keith Moore wrote:
and I've had more than my share of legitimate mail fail to be
delivered (in either direction) because of such measures. you may
consider that legitimate for your or cisco's purposes. whether to
throw away mail that can potentially be from
On 15-aug-2007, at 22:44, Michael Thomas wrote:
Robust for what? Spammers? The simple fact of the matter is that the
alternative is to just shut down port 25 given the growth in both
volume
and complexity to filter. That ain't robust either. Dealing with
false
positives is the cost of
On Wed, 15 Aug 2007, Keith Moore wrote:
and I've had more than my share of legitimate mail fail to be delivered
(in either direction) because of such measures.
Of course, all reputation services are equally incompetent.
Tony.
--
f.a.n.finch [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://dotat.at/
IRISH SEA:
and I've had more than my share of legitimate mail fail to be delivered
(in either direction) because of such measures.
Of course, all reputation services are equally incompetent.
without accountability, there's no good way to tell.
that, and incompetence is not the only problem.
On Wed, Aug 15, 2007 at 01:44:09PM -0700, Michael Thomas wrote:
Keith Moore wrote:
...at the cost of dropping legitimate traffic. the thing is, the set of
valid senders for you and the set of valid senders for everyone at cisco
is very different, and the latter set is much fuzzier. and
A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.
RFC 4923
Title: Quality of Service (QoS) Signaling
in a Nested Virtual Private Network
Author: F. Baker, P. Bose
Status: Informational
Date:
A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.
RFC 4948
Title: Report from the IAB workshop
on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006
Author: L. Andersson, E. Davies,
L. Zhang
Status:
A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.
RFC 4919
Title: IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal
Area Networks (6LoWPANs): Overview, Assumptions,
Problem Statement, and Goals
Author:
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